

**Sammy Smooha**

# **Still Playing by the Rules**

**Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2019**



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Sammy Smooha

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University of Haifa, 2020

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Sammy Smoocha

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## Chapter 1

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# Changes in Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel and the Index

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel examines the attitudes of Arabs and Jews toward each other and toward the state on sixteen key issues. It is based on national representative surveys of the adult Arab and Jewish populations within the Green Line, in which scores of questions are asked annually or biannually, using a similar data-collection method. It provides a detailed picture of the attitudes of both sides and makes it possible to explore trends of change of their attitudes over time.

### Radicalization versus Exacerbation

A background of Arab-Jewish relations, a detailed analysis of the Index findings and trends of attitude change were presented in previous publications.<sup>1</sup> This study makes a distinction between radicalization and exacerbation. Radicalization is an attitude or behavior expressing rejection of coexistence like rejection of the right to exist of the state, rejection of the right to exist of the minority to be part of the state, support or use of violence toward the other side, and unwillingness or avoidance of any contact with the other side. On the other hand,

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1 Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2012*, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2013 (Hebrew); Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2013*, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2015 (Hebrew); Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015*, Haifa: Pardes Publishing House, 2017 (Hebrew); *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015*, Online, 2017; *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2017*, Online, 2018.

exacerbation is an attitude or behavior expressing a criticism of coexistence like rejection of the character of the state but not rejection of its very existence, rejection of extension of national rights to the minority but not rejection of its very belonging to the state and not rejection of the linguistic and cultural rights already given to it, support or use of intense struggle but within democratic bounds, support of a strong-hand policy toward the minority but without breaking the law, and unwillingness or avoidance of close contacts with the other side but not refusal to maintain any relation.

The central question that the present study discusses is whether there is a clear trend of radicalization in the attitudes of both sides from one Index year to another and in various time ranges since 2003 when the Index was launched and since 1976 when the conduct of the series of surveys started. Two trends of change were diagnosed: Exacerbation and radicalization. The radicalization trend is the dominant thesis, according to which Arabs and Jews are radicalizing and their relationship is on verge of explosion. Undergoing processes of Palestinization, Islamization and empowerment, Arabs are waging a fight against the Jewish and Zionist character of the state and fighting for Israel's acceptance of the Palestinian demands for resolving the conflict with Israel. Jews are drifting to the right and to religion, becoming less tolerant and more anti-Arab. The country is consolidating its exclusionary and discriminatory character and has been undemocratizing under the rightwing and Netanyahu rule since 2009, and especially since 2017 when Netanyahu has been under investigation and indictment for fraud, breach of trust and bribery. The national rift is deepening and may be so violent as it was in Northern Ireland, Sudan and Sri Lanka.

The leading theories in minority-majority relations support this radicalization thesis.<sup>2</sup> According to the "relative deprivation" theory,

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2 Elia Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979; Ilan Pappé, *The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011; Yiftachel, Oren, "'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine," In *Handbook of Israel: Major Debates, Volume 1*, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael,

the modernization that the Arabs undergo is engendering a growing gap between their rapidly escalating aspirations and expectations and their slowly rising achievements. Another gap is created between their achievements and the achievements of the Jewish majority to which they compare themselves. This continued relative deprivation is radicalizing Arab attitudes. Another theory is the loosening of "control," imposed on the Arabs upon the establishment of the state. Military administration was abolished at the end of 1966 and routine control has since become more liberal, selective and limited. The relaxation of control freed the Arabs from the fear of the authorities and radicalized their positions. The theory of "internal colonialism" explains that the Jewish central government regards the Arabs as an internal colony and oppresses them, so it is only a matter of time before their response develops to radicalized attitudes and violent resistance. "Ethnocracy" is a complementary theory to internal colonialism that holds that the Israeli regime is undemocratic, that it develops the country for the benefit of the Jews only and constantly pushes the Arabs to the margins, so that Arab radicalization and resistance are expected in response. Finally, the theory of "exclusionary democratization" argues that the Arabs should be expected to radicalize because Israel's democratization included Mizrahim, the religious, the ultra-Orthodox and rightwing supporters, but continued to exclude the Arabs from power and to signal to them that they are not equal citizens and do not belong fully to the state.<sup>3</sup>

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Julius H. Schoeps, Yitzhak Sternberg and Olaf Glöckner, Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Publishers, 2016, pp. 643–671; Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980; Andreas Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflicts: Shadows of Modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Andreas Wimmer, "The Politics of Ethnic Exclusion in Nationalizing States," in Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar, *Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, London: Sage, 2006, pp. 334–344.

- 3 Rekhess leads the radicalization thesis: Elie Rekhess, "The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the National Struggle," *Israel Studies* 7 (3) (Fall 2002), pp. 1–44; Elie Rekhess, "The Evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian National Minority in Israel," *Israel Studies* 12 (3), (Fall 2007), pp. 1–28; Elie Rekhess, "The Arab Minority in Israel: Reconsidering the '1948 Paradigm'," *Israel Studies* 19 (2) (Summer 2014), pp. 187–217; Karsh is more explicit in stating this thesis: Efraim Karsh, "Israel's Arabs: Deprived or Radicalized?" *Israel Affairs* (January 2013), pp. 1–19; Schueftan elaborates on the radicalization thesis in his book:

The radicalization thesis is reinforced by various evidence that includes the Arabs' opening of riots in October 2000, participation in terrorist attacks, the al-Aqsa at-Risk Campaign of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement in which thousands of Muslims were bussed to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and a clear process of decreasing the rate of Arab voting for the Knesset and the rate of voting for Jewish political parties. Jews' drift to religion and to the political right reinforce rejection of anyone who is not Jewish or does not accept the supremacy of Jews in the Jewish state. Their radicalization was reflected in "price tag" actions against Arab citizens and in their continued discrimination in employment and housing. The state has also hardened its policy toward the Arabs: Stiffening the occupation of the West Bank and the siege over Gaza Strip, continued ethnic profiling in security checks at exit ports, bills and laws against Arab citizens, and in particular the Nation-State Law, the outlawing of the Islamic Movement, and the anti-Arab statements by the Prime Minister and cabinet Ministers.

Against the radicalization thesis stands the rapprochement thesis, positing that Arabs and Jews are accustomed over the years to live together, to accept each other, to get along in democratic ways, to respect red lines of the other side, and to avoid breaking the rules as much as possible. Against the radicalization forces, checks and balances act upon the Arabs: Rule of law, the possibility to run a modern way of life, Israelization, an option to conduct a democratic struggle, dependence on the welfare state, and security control. Against the forces that draw Jews apart from Arabs, counterbalancing forces also operate: Sharpening of the distinction between Palestinian citizens and Palestinian non-citizens, understanding that an Arab minority will always live in Israel, democracy requires civil equality for all, and Arab quiescence is a Jewish interest. From the 1960s until 2009, Israel

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Dan. Schueftan, *Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State, Or Yehuda.*: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir Publishing House, 2011 (Hebrew); Frisch emphasizes the national security aspect: Hillel Frisch, *Israel's Security and Its Arab Citizens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Halabi also embraces this thesis: Rabakh Halabi, "Towards an Unavoidable Clash," in *Dilemmas in Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel*, edited by Yitzhak Riter, Jerusalem: Schocken, 2005, pp. 190–197 (Hebrew).

underwent a democratization extension to Arab citizens was inevitable. The state realized that it had an interest in reducing the socioeconomic disparities between the Arabs and the Jews in order to increase local gross domestic product and ensure peace and stability.

Various evidence supports the rapprochement thesis. The critical evidence is lack of physical violence, measured in human and property losses, between Arabs and Jews (the October 2000 unrest is an exception); the Arabs did not join the Arab side in its wars against Israel, not even the two Palestinian Intifadas against Israeli occupation; they vote to and are well represented in the Knesset; and conduct a struggle by democratic means. The state also initiated and executed assistance plans for the Arabs, including the five-year development plan (the government decision 922 on December 30, 2015) in the Arab sector with a sum of 10–15 billion new Israeli Shekels (NIS); the five-year plan (the government decision on February 12, 2017) for the socioeconomic development of the Bedouin in the Negev with a sum of 3 billion NIS; the multi-year plan of the Planning and Budgeting Committee for Higher Education, administered since 2012, in a sum of 2 billion NIS, to increase the number of Arab students in institutions of higher education; a state policy of law-enforcement, policing and war against crime and violence in Arab communities; and in 2015, the number of Arab communities, low-income or close to the border, was increased from 11 to 48, where tax benefits were granted to their residents. In addition, initiatives for integration of Arabs in the Jewish high technology have been expanded. The harsh developments in the Arab world (the collapse of the Arab Spring, the continuation of the bloody civil war in Syria and the disintegration of several Arab states) showed to Arab citizens the advantages of quiet and stable life in Israel and drew them closer to the Jews and to the state.

The rapprochement thesis receives support from the theory of "ethnic democracy" and from the theory of politics of contention.<sup>4</sup>

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4 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, Introduction: Dynamics of Contention Ten Years On, *Mobilization* (2011) 16, 1: 1–10; Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow,

According to the ethnic democracy theory, Israel is a Jewish national state whose regime is ethnic democracy in which the superiority of the Jewish majority is institutionalized. But in this un-Western and illiberal regime, individual and collective rights are accorded to the Arabs, enabling them to keep their culture and identity and to conduct an intensive struggle to ameliorate their status without facing state repression. And indeed, the Arab minority wages a struggle to advance its interests and wins gradual and steady improvement in its condition. It chooses to use the politics of a democratic struggle on the understanding that the Jewish public is determined to preserve the Jewish character of the state, so that an undemocratic struggle will not succeed.<sup>5</sup>

The rapprochement thesis interprets differently the evidence presented to confirm the radicalization thesis. All the processes of change like Palestinization of the Arabs and drift to the political right of the Jews may testify to exacerbation but not inevitably to radicalization. A decline in Arab participation in the Knesset elections and a decline in their voting for Jewish political parties can indicate an exacerbation and not necessarily a radicalization, because these changes are taking place without violating coexistence rules. Arab-Jewish relations still exist while respecting the rules of the democratic game, and there is neither intergroup violence nor denial of the fundamental rights of the Arabs.

While the radicalization thesis interprets the attitudes of Arabs and Jews as radicalization that will lead to a violent confrontation, the rapprochement thesis interprets them as an exacerbation resulting

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*Contentious Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Amal Jamal, *Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of Indigeneity*, London: Routledge, 2011; Oded Haklai, *Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011; Sammy Smooha, "The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State", *Nations and Nationalism* 8, 4 (October 2002): 475–503; Sammy Smooha and Priit Jarve (Eds.), *The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, Budapest: Open Society Foundation, 2005.

5 This thesis appeared first in my book *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel*, Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa, 1984; and since then I repeated it in additional publications, including the book *Arabs and Jews in Israel, Vol. 2: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1992.

from deprivations of the Arabs, derived from the inegalitarian Israel's structure as an ethnic democracy and from the Arabs' vigorous and prolonged struggle to change their status. But there may also be radicalization at certain times in response to toughening of discriminatory and exclusionary policies toward the Arab minority, deterioration of occupation, and stagnation in finding an agreement with the Palestinians.

## **Changes between 2017 and 2019**

The question at the center of the study is to ascertain the trend of change in Arab and Jewish attitudes between the 2017 Index (the interviews with the Arabs were conducted in May-August and the interviews with the Jews in June-July) to the 2019 Index (the interviews with the Arabs were held in April-June and the interviews with the Jews in June, i.e., after the Knesset elections in April). These trends are influenced by the changes that have taken place in this period in four areas: The state, the Jewish public, the Arab public and the external arena.

Two major contradictory changes occurred in the state between 2017 and 2019: On the one hand, the process of implementing the large-scale investment program in the Arab sector (government decision 922) continued, and on the other, the process of executing the de-democratization plan also went on. Anti-democratic measures in these years have been aggravated. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his rightwing yes men chose to hurt the gatekeepers of democracy and the public trust in them (the police, the attorney general, the Supreme Court, the media) as a means for underrating the prime minister's accusation of breach of trust, fraud and bribery. As a result, the political rift between the two political blocs deepened and the center-left bloc, headed by the Kahol Lavan list, emerged and seriously threatened the continuation of the rightwing rule. For the first time in a decade, following the Knesset elections on April 9, 2019, Netanyahu was unable to form a government and to secure immunity from criminal prosecution. The incitement of the political right has expanded from law

enforcement institutions to the center-left bloc and the Arab minority. The resulting political stalemate was blamed on the Kahol Lavan list that might form a minority government with the support of the Joint List, that is to say, a government lacking a Jewish majority. This is a grave accusation used by the political right in its de-legitimization campaign of the Rabin government and the Oslo Accords in 1992–1995 and in its creation of the atmosphere for Rabin's murder. Under the pressure of the Prime Minister, the anti-Arab and Kahanist Otzma Yehudit Party ("Jewish power party") was also legitimized by incorporating it into a new rightwing list of all the religious political parties. The highlight of the rightwing activity to reduce democracy is the enactment of the Nation-State Law on July 18, 2018. This law states that the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people only (without recognition of any affiliation of Arab citizens to it), the official language of the state is Hebrew only (the Arabic language was demoted from an official to a "special status" language) and the state will encourage and establish "Jewish settlements" (without any obligation to establish Arab settlements; granting legitimacy to the establishment of settlements for Jews only; and possibly barring Arabs from moving to existing Jewish settlements). The law lacks a balancing principle of equality. It provoked opposition from the center-left bloc and the Arabs. The effect of these changes on the Jewish public is clear: It keeps the Jews away from Arab citizens and increases the political illegitimacy of the Arabs, that is, it exacerbates Jewish attitudes against the Arabs. The de-democratization and the labeling of the Arabs as illegitimate also exacerbate Arabs' attitudes, despite the moderating impact of investments and improvement of living conditions in the Arab sector.

There are also contradictory trends of change in the Jewish public. On the one hand, there was widespread mobilization of Jews to curb the de-democratization measures of the rightwing government: Protection of the gatekeepers of democracy, opposition to the Nation-State Law and unprecedented mass rallying against formation of a government by Netanyahu. On the other hand, supporters of the political right, secular and religious, backed Netanyahu's claim that the police and the prosecution set him up, supported the de-democratization plan, and

warned that a government without a Jewish majority is illegitimate. The process of religionization of the education system, the military and other public institutions continued, but resistance to it also intensified. The proportion of Jews who defined themselves as belonging to the right and moderate right increased significantly from 56.0% in 2017 to 62.5% in 2019 (question 114 in the 2019 Jewish survey at the end of the book). But some Jews (so-called "soft right") stopped supporting rightwing rule, a development that led to political impasse. Indeed, there was no change in voting for rightwing political parties (Likud, Kulanu, Gesher, Shas, Yahadut Hatorah, Ihud Miflagot Hayamin, Hayamin Hehadash, Zehut Yehudit). They won 57.9% of the vote in the April 2019 Knesset elections compared to 56.4% in 2015 (including Kulanu and Yahad). Nor did the proportion of Jews who say in Jewish public opinion surveys that it is important or very important to them that the government be at hands of the political right (56.3% of respondents in 2017 and 58.9% in 2019) (question 112). Although these developments are not unequivocal, their overall impact seems to be exacerbation of the Jewish public's attitudes toward the Arab minority, and in response, the exacerbation of the Arab public's attitudes towards the Jewish majority and the state.

The Arab citizens, like the Jews, experienced contradictory changes. On the one hand, more and more Arabs felt the fruits of development of the government's investment plan, the rise in their standards of living and education, and their incorporation into the middle ranks of the Israeli economy. They also felt hurt, on the other hand, by their portrayal by the political right as illegitimate, disloyal, supporters of terrorism and a fifth column. The Nation-State Law hits them hard. The Druze protested against the law on the grounds that it states that Israel is not their state in spite of their military service and their rejection of any national affiliation to the Palestinian people. The Arabs felt that the law institutionalizes their status as a second class citizens. They were disappointed with the Joint List which, in their eyes, did not address the daily hardships, housing shortages and personal insecurities, they suffer from. The publicized quarrels over the placement of candidates in the Joint List, its disbanding and the running on two lists in the Knesset

election in April 2019 heightened their dissatisfaction. In response, the Arab voter turnout dropped from 63.5% in the March 2015 election to 49.2% in the April 2019 election, and the vote for the Arab political parties went down from 83.2% to 71.6%, respectively. It is assumed that these changes will lead to exacerbation of the attitudes of the Arab public and Jewish public.

Finally, the response to the external arena was also complex. On the one hand, all the changes in the region strongly disturbed Arab citizens. There is no evidence for public identification of the Arabs in Israel with the terrorism of the Palestinian youth from East Jerusalem and the West Bank nor with the attacks of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Jewish communities around Gaza. The Arabs did not respond favorably to the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement with Iran and opposed Israel's bombings in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, aimed at preventing Iran from establishing itself in the region. Iran's support of opposition organizations and the possibility that it develops a nuclear weapon have brought Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states closer to Israel and to their distancing from the Palestinians. Arabs in Israel opposed all these occurrences. More significant was the policy change of the United States under President Trump in favor of Israel. In May 2018, the United States moved its embassy to Jerusalem, a month later resigned from the UN Human Rights Council because of its apparent hostility to Israel, and in March 2019, close to the Knesset elections and to the time of conduct of the Index survey, recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. These developments are supposed to exacerbate Arab attitudes, exacerbation that would be tempered by the realization that life in Israel gives them calm and stability in the face of the turmoil in the region. It is likely that Jews are also adversely affected by these changes.

This review of changes in the country and region leads to the expectation of an exacerbation of Arab and Jewish public attitudes between the 2017 and 2019 Index. Of all the changes that have taken place, the legislation of the Nation-State Law stands out, officially excludes Arabs from owning the state, and bestows a superior status on the Jews. It is then expected that this law will significantly weaken

the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Arabs and decline the legitimacy of the Arabs in the eyes of the Jews. The 2019 Index will allow testing of the hypothesis of exacerbating the attitudes of both sides, and more specifically the specific examination of a mutual decline of their legitimacy. Also, no radicalization should be ruled out in Arab and Jewish attitudes due to the potency of the changes.

## **The Surveys of the 2019 Index**

The 2019 Arab survey includes 718 Arabs aged 18 and over who were randomly selected from the Population Register administered by the Interior Ministry. The national sample includes 28 Arab villages and towns and mixed Arab-Jewish cities representing a representative cross-section of the adult Arab population within the Green Line (not including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights). The Arab respondents were identified by name and address and interviewed face-to-face in Arabic in their homes by Arab interviewers. Interviewees were guaranteed complete confidentiality. The interviews were conducted in April, May and June 2019 at the end of the Knesset elections held on April 9. The Jewish survey was based on a national sample that insured proper representation of the general Jewish public, including ultra-Orthodox, settlers, Russian-speaking immigrants who immigrated from 1999 to 1989 and members of Kibbutzim and Moshavim. The Jewish sample included 752 Jews aged 18 and over from all localities in the country, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Jewish respondents were divided into 179 (23.8%) interviewed by telephone (especially those aged 55 and over) and 573 (76.2%) who filled out the questionnaire online. The Jewish survey was conducted in June 2019.

The survey data were weighted with a view to create correspondence between the actual results of the Knesset election on April 9, 2019, with the voting reported by the respondents in this election. For this purpose, the election results were separated into an Arab population and a Jewish population. Weighting according to the

results of Knesset election was chosen based on the findings of studies showing that political orientation (the party one feels closest to or voted for in Knesset election) is a good predictor of attitudes in Arab-Jewish relations.

Public opinion surveys and election polls in Israel in 2019 are mainly conducted on the Internet and to some extent by telephone in both the Jewish and Arab sectors. The same was true of the Jewish survey in the 2019 Index. In contrast, the Arab survey in the 2019 Index, as in previous surveys, was carried out on the basis of face-to-face interviews with a random sample from the official population register. A face-to-face interview is a method that gains more confidence on the part of Arab respondents, enables more information to be generated and creates more reliable and valid data than a telephone and Internet survey method, but it is much more expensive and takes much longer time.

In recent years, the Arab population has come under attack from the rightwing government. As mentioned, it is marked as a supporter of terrorism, as opposed to the regime and as a suspect of disloyalty to the state. The question arises whether this threatened public will answer survey questions honestly and without fear. Since our interest is in examining an attitude change from 2017 to 2019, the answers to the questions regarding Arab concerns during these years were compared. Table 1.1 shows a fairly high level of fear of the Arab public, but there is no increase in fear from 2017 to 2019. For example, 73.4% of the Arabs in 2017 and 71.9% in 2019 feared violation of their fundamental rights, 33.7% and 36.1%, respectively, feared harassment by the authorities if they take part in protests, 15.3% and 18.4% reported being arrested and interrogated over the past year, and 28.8% and 28.5% attended the Nakba Memorial Day. The respondents do not report an increase in fear of the authorities or refraining from participation in protest actions from 2017 to 2019. A national minority that sees itself as a strong minority (57.6% thought so in the 2019 survey, question 127 in the questionnaire to Arabs) and justified opening its own Intifada if its condition did not improve significantly (57.1% in 2017 and 57.6% in 2019, question 118

in the 2019 Arab questionnaire) will not be afraid to honestly and fearlessly express its views in a confidential interview.

According to the interviewers as well, there was no deterioration in the reliability of the information provided by the interviewees, so that only 6.3% of the information in 2017 and 4.3% in 2019 (question 200 in the Arab questionnaire) was considered inadequate. From this we infer that it will not be correct to attribute a change of trends in Arab attitudes in 2017–2019 to an increase in their fears.

**Table 1.1 Respondents' Fears, Arabs, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	
	2017	2019
Fear of severe infringement of the rights of Arab citizens (question 38 in the Arab questionnaire)	73.4	71.9
Fear of state violence against Arabs (question 40)	74.9	71.5
Fear of persecution of Arabs who speak against the state in the social networks (question 43)	73.8	70.0
Participated in the Nakba Memorial Day this year (question 170)	28.8	28.5
Fear to be personally hurt once or more by threats, humiliations or beatings from Jews (question 173)	28.0	30.0
In the last twelve months were arrested and interrogated by the security forces because of participation in protest actions (question 175)	15.3	18.4
Fear of harassment by the authorities for participation in protest actions (question 177)	33.7	36.1

## Chapter 2

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# Separation, Image of the Other, Alienation, Distrust

### Separation

There is agreement between the Arabs, the Jews and the state about integration without assimilation of the Arabs into Israeli society. Measures for the prevention of Arab-Jewish assimilation include the Millet system (according to which the population is divided by the state into religions and there are no civil marriage and divorce), separate education, residence of about 90% of the Arabs in separate villages and towns, non-establishment of new mixed Arab-Jewish communities, and separation in the army and national service (as a result of not imposing a state service duty on the Arabs). However, there are no anti-assimilation laws that ban intergroup mixing in marriage, residence and education. There is integration of state institutions, public bodies (clinics, hospitals, public transport), workplaces, shopping centers and entertainment venues.

A majority of 71.2% of the Arabs and a majority of 60.9% of the Jews said that "most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society" (Table 2.1). These numbers grant legitimacy to the norm of integration and to integration policies. This is also confirmed by more specific questions about integration in areas where there is almost complete separation. 56.5% of the Arabs in 2017 and 51.7% in 2019 agreed that Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods, 54.9% and 50.4% that Arab children will attend Jewish high schools, and 71.4% and 71.9% that Arabs will join Jewish organizations (Table 2.2). The Jews are less prepared to do so, though 40.9% in 2019 agreed to let Arabs live in Jewish neighborhoods and 51.7% in 2017 to let Arabs attend Jewish high schools. There is stability in Arabs' support for integration, although their agreement to

attend joint recreation places declined from 80.2% in 2017 to 73.6% in 2019. General acceptance of integration is greater than desire for personal integration. For example, 50.4% of the Arabs in 2019 agreed to educational integration, but only 44.7% of them wanted their children to attend Jewish schools (Table 2.3).

Almost complete separation prevails in the political sphere in the 2000s. The Arabs have separate national political parties that receive over 80% of the Arab vote and remain outside government coalitions. The question of Arabs' sharing power is raised by the pressure of the Arab public that is more interested in influence than protest and especially when the political right lost a majority in the Knesset election in 2019 and 2020, enabling the center-left bloc to build a coalition with the support of Arab political parties. Yet, a coalition based on Arab support was not built because of the doubts that have been raised about the political legitimacy of a government without a Jewish majority. A majority of 65.6% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 62.4% in 2017) supported entry of Arab political parties into a government coalition, compared to only 39.0% of the Jews (down from 45.8% in 2017). As expected, political stream makes a lot of difference on this issue: Arabs who agreed in 2019 to integration of Arab political parties into coalition governments constituted 41.9% of followers of the Northern Islamic Movement and the Sons of the Village Movement (both boycott Knesset election), 59.2% of supporters of Arab political parties (all oppose joining government coalitions), and 92.7% of Arabs who support Jewish political parties. These high numbers indicate the intense longing of the Arab public for power-sharing. The Jewish public is similarly divided according to political stream: 12.8% of the Jews on the right, 34.1% on the moderate right, 60.7% on the center, 80.9% on the moderate left and 92.6% on the left agreed to let Arab political parties enter government coalitions. The Jews on the center-left are willing to let Arabs share power because of the dependence of their political bloc on Arab political parties and because they are more committed to democracy than Jews on the political right.

**Table 2.1 Arabs' Will to Integrate into Israeli Society,  
Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)\***

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
Most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society (A 69, J 31):		
Disagree	14.9	11.2
Tend to disagree	12.7	21.1
Tend to agree	49.0	37.6
Agree	22.2	23.3
No answer	1.2	6.8

\* In this and next tables the question number in the questionnaire in 2019 is indicated. For instance, the mark "A 69" means question 69 in the questionnaire for Arabs and "J 31" refers to question 31 in the questionnaire for Jews. The wording of these questions can be found in the questionnaire "Survey of Arabs 2019" and the questionnaire "Survey of Jews 2019," respectively, at the end of the book. Question numbers in surveys before 2019 are not written

**Table 2.2 Collective Social Integration, Arabs and  
Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews				
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2015	2017	2019
Arabs and Jews will have friendly relations between them	89.4	79.6**	*	*	*	*	77.9	69.2**	*	*	*
Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods (A 4, J 2)	66.4	55.3	62.8	51.8	56.7	40.9	34.5	45.7	52.7	*	51.7
Arabs will study in Jewish high schools (A 3, J 1)	70.5	45.1	54.1	46.5	54.9	51.7	51.5	54.9	60.4	50.0	50.4
There will be planned encounters between Arab and Jewish youth	86.2	*	*	*	*	*	75.6	*	*	*	*
Arabs will spend time in Jewish places of leisure (A 2, J 2)	*	*	76.5	72.7	80.2	*	*	*	*	45.0	73.6
Arabs will attend parks and swimming pools in the Jewish sector	78.1	*	*	*	*	*	57.4	*	*	*	*
Arabs and Jews will have Joint organizations (A 1)	87.2	68.8	75.8	77.1	71.4	*	70.5	69.4	*	*	71.9
Arab political parties will participate in government coalitions (A 5, J 3)	80.7	72.8	79.8	72.4	62.4	65.6	47.4	52.8	51.5	45.8	39.0

\* Question not asked

\*\*\* in 2010

**Table 2.3 Arabs' Will to Integrate Personally and Jews' Personal Readiness to Integrate them, Arabs and Jews, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Ready to have Arabs as their workmates	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	76.7	*	*	*
Wishing/ready to have Arab political parties participate in government coalitions	73.5	*	*	*	*	*	44.3	*	*	*	*	*
Personally wishing/ready to let Arabs spend time in Jewish places of leisure (A 6)	68.2	66.7	71.8	69.1	74.3	73.9	58.0	*	63.5	65.1	62.0	*
Personally wishing/ready to let Arabs join Jewish organizations	34.0	*	*	*	*	*	59.0	*	*	*	*	*
Personally wishing/ready to participate in joint Arab-Jewish organizations	*	*	70.4	59.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Wishing their children/ready to let Arab children attend the Jewish schools of their children (A 7, J 4)	33.8	37.1	42.5	38.4	41.7	44.7	55.9	*	54.0	57.5	51.6	47.6
Personally wishing/ready to let Arabs live in their Jewish neighborhoods (A 8, J 5)	34.0	42.4	48.6	39.4	40.7	44.8	42.3	*	49.2	54.1	49.0	39.6

\* Question not asked

About two-thirds of the Arabs (67.9% in 2017) and most Jews (63.5% in 2012) meet daily or frequently, and half of the Arabs (48.5% in 2017 and 52.0% in 2019) have Jewish friends compared to only two-fifths (38.4% and 39.8%) of the Jews who have Arab friends (Table 2.4). There were no changes from 2017 to 2019 in these contact rates.

**Table 2.4 Personal Social Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Meet Jews/Arabs daily or often	69.4	61.6	64.9	65.0	67.9	*	53.8	63.5	*	*	*	*
Arab/Jewish friends (A 166, J 104)												
No friends	36.8	49.0	40.9	47.2	48.2	40.4	65.0	66.5	67.4	67.9	59.8	56.2
Friends but no home visits	25.5	30.8	31.3	28.1	32.5	34.2	18.7	17.9	17.5	16.3	24.4	27.8
Friends and home visits	37.4	18.8	27.2	24.3	16.0	17.8	16.3	15.4	14.5	14.0	14.0	12.0
No answer	0.3	1.4	0.6	0.4	3.3	7.6	0.0	0.1	0.6	1.9	1.8	3.9

\* Question not asked

Communication between the two sides occurs in Hebrew. An overwhelming majority of 79.2% of the Arabs in 2017 know enough Hebrew as compared to only 18.6% (in 2012) of the Jews who know enough Arabic to conduct a simple conversation in Arabic (Table 2.5). Knowledge of Hebrew is an existential need for Arabs because this is the language in which life in Israel is run, whereas the Jews get along well without knowing Arabic. Knowledge of Hebrew is especially low among Arabs with low education, the aged and housewives who have never worked for wages. Lack of full command of Hebrew is a serious drawback for Arab students in Jewish institutions of higher education and for Arabs who seek top posts in the Jewish economy and public service.

**Table 2.5 Knowledge of Hebrew/Arabic at the Level of Conversation, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews		
	2003	2006	2012	2013	2015	2017	2003	2006	2012
Know enough Hebrew/Arabic for conducting a conversation on different topics with a Jew/an Arab	78.4	81.5	80.4	78.0	81.2	79.2	19.0	19.2	18.6

Not only does religion separate Arabs from Jews, but also observance of religion. Only 23.7% of the Arabs in 2017 and 22.7% in 2019 defined themselves not religious (Table 2.6), only 29.5% in 2017 did not pray (Table 2.7) and only 10.1% in 2019 (down from 18.3% in 2017) opposed the Islamic Movement (Table 2.8). These percentages indicate a strong affinity for religion and a very low rate of secularism among Arabs.

**Table 2.6 Religiosity, Arabs, 1980–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs								
	1980	1985	1995	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Religiosity (A 184)									
Very religious	19.2	11.9	8.4	7.4	8.9	7.4	7.7	11.9	7.0
Religious	28.8	24.7	24.3	30.6	31.4	26.3	33.6	29.3	35.0
Religious to some extent	34.4	32.3	36.2	27.5	32.9	38.4	34.9	34.7	32.2
Not religious	17.2	30.8	30.7	34.1	23.5	25.6	22.3	23.7	22.7
No answer	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	3.3	2.3	1.5	0.5	3.2

**Table 2.7 Prayer, Arabs, 2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2017
Pray:	
Regularly	46.0
Often	23.9
Seldom	16.0
Not at all	13.5
No answer	0.5

**Table 2.8 Attitude toward the Islamic Movement in Israel, Arabs, 1995–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						
	1995	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Attitude toward the Islamic Movement in Israel (A 185)							
Opposed	22.7	14.5	6.8	16.3	7.6	18.3	10.1
Neither opposed nor sympathetic	50.7	51.4	50.4	44.0	48.8	43.7	45.7
Sympathetic	20.5	25.6	29.6	23.7	28.7	28.7	31.1
Member	3.7	4.7	6.1	9.3	8.6	5.7	8.1
Active member	0.8	1.6	3.4	3.5	4.9	2.2	2.0
No answer	1.5	2.2	3.7	3.2	1.4	1.2	3.1

Most Jews are not religious compared to only a minority of Arabs. According to the routine classification, about half (50.5%) of the Jews in 2019 defined themselves as secular, less than one-third (30.5%) traditional, about one-tenth (8.9%) religious and one-tenth (10.1%) ultra-Orthodox (Table 2.9). When traditionalists were asked to classify themselves further, 8.3% defined themselves in 2019 to be “traditional-religious” compared to 23.2% as “traditional-non-religious.” Dichotomization of Jews would therefore show a minority

of 26.7% of religious (traditional-religious, national-religious and ultra-Orthodox), compared to a large majority of 71.5% of not religious. Only the religious pray regularly but also a third of the traditional-non-religious (Table 2.10). The great non-religious majority among Jews is in contradiction to the strong position of religion in public life, the process of religionization, the lack of public transportation on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, and the absence of civil marriage and divorce, and in contrast to what is common in all secular Western countries to which Israel thinks it belongs.

**Table 2.9 Self-Definition on Religious Observance, Jews, 1980–2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews								
	1980	1985	1995	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Religiosity (J religiosity)									
Haredim	5.5	2.0	2.5	7.3	10.3	10.2	12.0	8.6	10.1
Datiyim	11.9	10.9	15.9	7.3	12.8	10.0	12.9	12.9	8.9
Masortiyim	40.8	32.6	29.4	28.4	18.7	24.4	24.5	23.9	30.5
Helonim	40.5	52.5	51.3	56.8	57.2	54.4	50.1	54.6	50.5
No answer	1.3	2.1	0.9	0.3	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Religiosity (J 115)									
Haredim								8.7	10.2
Datiyim								12.0	8.2
Masortiyim Datiyim								7.6	8.3
Mosortiyim Lo Datiyim								19.0	23.2
Helonim								51.9	48.3
No answer								0.8	1.8

**Table 2.10 Praying Regularly or Often by Religious Observance, Jews, 2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews
	2017
All Jews (J 115)	
Haredim (ultra-orthodox)	94.2
Datiyim (national-religious)	92.7
Masortiyim Datiyim (traditional-religious)	71.4
Mosortiyim Lo Datiyim (traditional-not-religious)	33.0
Helonim (secular)	3.9

The process of Israelization made the Arabs bilingual and bicultural. 53.2% of the Arabs in 2017 and 55.4% in 2019 compared to 34.4% and

40.2% of the Jews said that Arabs and Jews should adopt values and customs from each other and 61.2% and 69.5% compared to 56.0% and 56.6% respectively agreed that Arabs and Jews must create together new common values and customs in addition to their own values and customs (Table 2.11). A majority of 68.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 70.4% in 2019 felt close to foreign Arab TV channels (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Miadin and television channels in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, BBC and Sky News) versus a minority of 29.0% and 28.8% who felt close to Israeli television channels in Arabic and Hebrew (Table 2.12). The great sense of closeness to foreign Arab media stems from knowledge of the Arabic language, from a desire to know what is going on in the Arab world and its stands on questions at issue, and from the availability of variety of entertainment programs.

**Table 2.11 Collective Cultural Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Jews/Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Arabs/Jews should adopt (A 17, J 14)	65.8	52.3	60.7	63.3	53.2	55.4	43.2*	41.8	36.1	45.7	34.4	40.2
Arab citizens and Jews must create together new common values and practices in addition to their own values and practices (A 18, J 15)	60.4	63.9	67.2	67.7	61.2	69.5	57.6	54.0	51.9	58.6	56.0	56.6

\*In 2004

**Table 2.12 Exposure to Television Channels, Arabs, 2013–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs			
	2013	2015	2017	2019
Watch Al-Jazeera channel daily or often	31.8	*	*	*
Feeling close to a Television channel (A 178):				
Al-Jazeera	18.2	19.2	24.1	21.3
Al-Arabia	15.0	11.0	8.3	12.2
Al-Miadin	*	*	11.6	16.3
TV channels from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt	30.6	36.5	21.8	17.3
The Arabic TV channels of the BBC and Sky News	*	*	3.1	3.3
Israeli TV channel in Arabic	8.8	7.9	9.5	13.9
One of the Israeli TV channels in Hebrew	24.8	23.8	19.5	14.9
No answer	2.6	1.6	2.1	0.9

\*Question not asked

## Image of the Other

The image of the other is examined in the 2019 Index in two ways: How each party perceives the other's attributes and what each party thinks the other attributes to it. Let's start with the images held by the Arabs. A majority of 60.2% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 50.6% in 2017) think the Jews are racist and 41.8% are violent (unchanged from 38.8% in 2017) (Table 2.13). Racism attributed to the Jews is rooted in their discrimination and exclusion of the Arabs and in their "racist and colonial" Zionism, while Jewish violence is seen as the result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Table 2.13 Image of Jews, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Most Jews in Israel are disposed to violent behavior (A 32)	42.4	50.7	30.5	42.6	38.8	41.8
Most Jews in Israel are racist (A 33)	55.7	69.5	51.4	55.1	50.6	60.2
Most Jews in Israel are swindlers	52.5**	56.1	35.6	45.8	*	*
Most Jews in Israel are intelligent	*	41.2	*	*	*	*
Most Jews in Israel are industrious	*	53.3	*	*	*	*
Most Jews in Israel are pragmatic	*	61.0	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2009

The negative images attributed to the Jews are also reflected in what the Arabs think the Jews think of them. 56.7% of the Arabs in 2019 felt that most Jews hate them, 52.9% thought most Jews do not accept their very existence as a minority in Israel, 65.0% believed most Jews do not consider the Arabs loyal to the state, and 39.0% viewed most Jews as regarding Arab citizens as identified with Palestinian terror (Table 2.14). These negative images ascribed to the Jews indicate the sense of many Arabs that the Jews reject them.

Two of every five Jews in 2019 thought that Arab citizens are violent (41.8%), not law-abiding (37.0%) and will never reach the cultural level of Jews (37.0%) (Table 2.15). These images have worsened from 2017 to 2019. A majority of over half of the Jews in 2019 believed that most

Arab citizens hate them (50.6%), do not reconcile themselves with the existence of the State of Israel (57.2%) and want a Palestinian state to replace it (59.5%) (Table 2.16).

**Table 2.14 What Arabs Think That the Jews Think of Them, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
Most Jews in Israel hate Arab citizens (A 34)	56.7
Most Jews are reconciled with the existence of an Arab minority in Israel (A 35)	52.9
Most Jews do not believe that Arab citizens are loyal to the state (A 37)	65.0
Most Jews believe that most Arab citizens identify themselves with what in Jews' eyes is Palestinian terrorism (A 36)	39.0

**Table 2.15 Image of Arabs, Jews, 2003, 2012–2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Most Arab citizens are disposed to violent behavior (J 27)	39.9	35.8	35.8	33.6	35.5	41.8
Most Arab citizens are not law-abiding (J 29)	33.5	31.8	34.4	31.7	33.3	37.0
Most Arab citizens are not intelligent	28.5	*	*	*	*	*
Most Arab citizens would never achieve the Jews' cultural level (J 28)	33.0	31.3	31.4	30.4	31.0	37.0
Most Arab citizens are especially sensitive to honor	*	81.5	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

**Table 2.16 What Jews Think That the Arabs Think of Them, Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews
	2019
Most Arabs in Israel hate the Jews (J 30)	50.6
Most Arabs are not reconciled with the existence of the State of Israel (J 32)	57.2
Most Arabs want that a Palestinian state be instead of Israel (J 33)	59.5

The perception of media content and leadership behavior also expresses the image that each side has of the other side. It was found

that each side negatively perceives the opposite party's media: 73.0% of the Arabs in 2019 compared to only 13.6% of the Jews said the Jewish media spread hate against Arabs in Israel, and vice versa – 26.7% and 67.8%, respectively, said the Arab media in Israel spreads hate against the state (Table 2.17). These very negative and contradictory perceptions were also found against Arab Knesset Members and Jewish government ministers.

**Table 2.17 Image of Media, Knesset Members and Government Ministers, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
The Jewish media spreads hate against Arabs in Israel (A 70, J 49)	73.0	13.6
The Arab media in Israel spreads hate against the state (A 71, J 50)	26.7	67.8
Arab Knesset Members incite against the state (A 73, J 52)	25.2	80.5
Government Ministers incite against Arab citizens (A 74, J 53)	76.6	28.1

We also examined the images about the Arab minority: How strong it is and whether it deserves special rights. Most Arabs and quite a few of the Jews imagine the Arabs as a powerful minority entitled to special rights. 62.5% of the Arabs in 2019 compared to 42.9% of the Jews estimated that the Arab minority is a strong minority, 71.8% and 47.2% that the Israeli economy cannot survive without it, 76.6% and 68.0% that it can disrupt life in the country if it wishes, and 57.7% of the Arabs (the question was not presented to the Jews) also believed that the state will pay a heavy price if it expropriates a lot of lands from the Arabs (Table 2.18). About half (48.8%) of the Arabs and about a third (31.9%) of the Jews attributed to the Arabs political power that influences which of the two political blocs will be in power. This assessment concerns the power of the Arab public, but the Jews do not think that exercising this power is legitimate. Most Arabs believe they also have special rights as a minority: 77.6% of the Arabs in 2019 thought so for being an indigenous minority and 77.1% for being part of a regional majority (Table 2.19). There is no doubt that a vast majority of Jews reject the notion that the Arab minority deserves special rights.

**Table 2.18 Image of the Arab Minority's Power, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
The Arab minority is a strong minority (A 127, J 84)	62.5	42.9
The economy in Israel cannot survive without the labor of Arab citizens (A 129, J 86)	71.8	47.2
Arab citizens can disrupt life in the country if they wish (A 130, J 87)	76.6	68.9
The state will pay a heavy price if it expropriates a lot of lands from Arabs (A 131)	57.7	*
Arab citizens have considerable influence on which of the two political blocs (the Left-Center or the Right) will be in power (A 128, J 85)	48.8	31.9

\*Question not asked

**Table 2.19 Image of the Arabs as a Minority Entitled to Special Rights, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
As an indigenous minority that lives in the country for generations, Arabs in Israel are entitled to special rights (A 132)	77.6
Since most inhabitants in the Middle East are Arabs, Arabs in Israel are entitled to special rights in the state (A 133)	77.1

Despite the mutual negative images and disagreements, there is agreement between most Arabs (71.2% in 2019) and most Jews (60.9%) that “most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society” (Table 2.20). This positive image softens the negative images towards the Arabs and does not necessarily contradict them. The Arabs perceive themselves as loyal to the state and wanting to integrate into it, while the Jews perceive them as citizens who are interested in integration but also as members of the Palestinian people who support Palestinian terror and the destruction of Israel.

**Table 2.20 Image of the Arabs as a Minority Wanting to Integrate into Israeli Society, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
Most Arabs in Israel want to integrate into Israeli society (A 69, J 31):		
Disagree	14.9	11.2
Tend to disagree	12.7	21.1
Tend to agree	49.0	37.6
Agree	22.2	23.3
No answer	1.2	6.8

## Alienation

Alienation from the other side and from the state takes different forms. Most Arabs and most Jews feel comfortable meeting each other in the public sphere such as workplaces, public transport, government offices, medical centers, shopping malls, parks, and beaches, but significant minorities feel uncomfortable. For example, 26.0% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 29.8% in 2017) and 37.0% of the Jews (up from 31.3%) felt not at ease in intergroup encounters at shopping malls (Table 2.21). There is some increase in discomfort from 2017 to 2019. The proportion of people who feel uncomfortable when they speak or hear Arabic in Jewish places rose among the Arabs from 30.3% in 2017 to 36.3% in 2019 and among the Jews from 35.3% to 43.2%, respectively.

**Table 2.21 Not Feeling at Ease in Places in which Arabs and Jews Happen to Be at the Same Time, Arabs and Jews, 2011, 2015, 2017, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews		
	2011	2015	2017	2019	2011	2017	2019
In a shopping mall (A 9, J 6)	25.2	33.6	29.8	37.0	33.1	31.3	37.0
In public transportation (a bus, a cab, a train)	25.9	*	*		36.3	*	*
In a medical institution (a clinic, a hospital)	20.1	*	*		23.6	*	*
In a government office	24.5	31.1	26.6		20.6	20.1	*
In a public park	24.0	*	*		29.4	*	*
In a workplace	22.7	26.6	*		20.7	*	*
In Jewish areas (localities, institutions) when speaking/hearing Arabic (A 10, J 7)	*	*	30.3	43.2	*	35.3	43.2

\* Question not asked

Alienation is more pronounced in a sense of estrangement. 49.6% of the Arabs in 2017 and 52.4% in 2019 felt alien and rejected in Israel (Table 2.22). 62.9 of the Jews felt afar from the Arabs.

**Table 2.22 Feeling Afar of Jews/Arabs and the State, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews				
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017
I feel afar from Jews/Arabs in Israel	50.0	50.8	42.7	41.2	43.5	*	69.5	62.2	65.9	57.9	62.9
As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel (A 23)	54.3	55.5	43.7	48.0	49.6	52.4	*	*	*	*	*

\*Question not asked

Various events create a feeling of distance. In 2017, most Arabs reported feeling afar of Jews under the influence of the outlawing of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement, the destruction of Arab buildings without permits, the Intifada of Palestinian youth since October 2015, and other events (Table 2.23). The terrorism of the Palestinian youth alienated 70.6% of the Jews in 2017 from Arab citizens. On the other hand, the proportion of Arabs who felt close to Jews following the government's decision to implement a big plan of development in the Arab sector increased from 37.3% in 2017 to 54.0% in 2019, a change which indicates that a positive event may reduce Arab alienation.

**Table 2.23 Feeling of Alienation from Jews/Arabs in the Aftermath of Recent Events, Arabs and Jews, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		Jews
	2017	2019	2017
Feeling afar of Jews/Arabs in the aftermath of the outlawing of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement	64.7	*	26.4
Feeling afar of Jews/Arabs in the aftermath of the eruption of the Palestinian youth Intifada since October 2015	64.8	*	70.6
Feeling close to Jews in the aftermath of the government resolution to implement a grand plan for development of the Arab sector (A 134)	37.3	54.0	*
Feeling afar of Jews in the aftermath of the destruction of unapproved buildings in Arab localities (A 135)	76.9	77.5	*

Feeling afar of Jews in the aftermath of Jewish public figures' pronouncements concerning a wave of fires in 2016	69.9	*	*
Feeling afar of Jews in the aftermath of the court trial of the soldier Elor Azaria	63.1	*	*
Feeling afar of Jews in the aftermath of the Moathin bill	77.6	*	*
Feeling afar of Jews in the aftermath of the killing of Ya'akub Abu-Ki'an by the police	75.5	*	*

\* Question not asked

Another general expression that indicates alienation is dissatisfaction with life in the state and lack of pride in its achievements. While dissatisfaction among Jews is negligible (only 11.2% in 2015), 48.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 50.8% in 2019 were dissatisfied with their lives in the country (Table 2.24). However, 61.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 57.2% in 2019 said "Israel is a good place to live" and 60.0% and 55.6% said they "prefer to live in the State of Israel than in any other country in the world" (Table 2.25). These are high rates of state acceptance by members of a minority who is basically alien from the state and under a rightwing government that works to increase its alienation. However, when Arabs and Jews are asked if they are proud to be Israeli, we find that in 2019 only 27.5% of the Arabs compared to 87.9% of the Jews were proud to be Israeli (Table 2.26). In order to feel proud Israelis, the Arabs must first adopt an Israeli identity and prefer it to a Palestinian identity, a difficult task for most of them. In any case, the differences in the Arabs' answers to these questions reveal the complexity of their feeling of alienation.

**Table 2.24 Satisfaction with Life in the State, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews	
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2015
Satisfaction with life as Israeli citizen (A 160):								
Very satisfied	28.9	10.1	16.3	15.3	13.2	14.7	39.6	50.2
Sufficiently satisfied	35.0	32.3	35.4	28.4	37.6	33.8	38.1	37.5
Not sufficiently satisfied	26.9	36.4	35.2	38.3	32.3	36.2	15.2	6.5
Not satisfied at all	7.9	20.1	12.6	17.4	16.1	14.6	5.9	4.7
No answer	1.2	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	2.3	1.1

**Table 2.25 Pride of the State's Achievements, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews		
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013
When Israel wins an achievement in any area like sports, science and economy, I feel proud of the state	65.7	43.4	48.9	48.3	*	*	*	*	*
Israel is a good place to live (A 12)	74.5***	58.5	70.7	64.0	61.9	57.2	85.9***	87.8****	*
I prefer to live in the State of Israel than in any other country in the world (A 13)	70.9***	54.7	63.5	58.8	60.0	55.6	85.0***	90.2	85.5
Israel is my home/homeland	62.0**	46.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2006

\*\*\* In 2007

\*\*\*\* In 2008

**Table 2.26 Pride to Be Israeli, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
Are you proud or not proud to be Israeli? (A 161, J 100):		
Not proud at all	22.6	1.6
Not proud	48.7	6.2
Proud	23.5	33.5
Definitely proud	4.0	54.4
No answer	1.2	4.3

Severe expression of alienation is contact avoidance. 28.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 32.4% in 2019 and similarly 34.5% and 31.5% of the Jews disagreed to friendship with the other side; and 31.8% and 41.1% of the Arabs (an increase in their alienation) and 48.0% and 49.8% of the Jews refused to live next door to the other side (Table 2.27). Particularly serious are the fact that 42.4% of the Jews in 2019 (unchanged from 39.8% in 2017) who were not prepared to have an Arab as a superior at work and 60.4% (unchanged from 63.7%) who refrained from entering Arab communities within the Green Line. These high numbers point not only to alienation of the Jews from the Arabs, but also to boycott, fear and deviation from the basic norms of democracy and Zionism.

**Table 2.27 Rejection of the Other Side, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
I am not ready to have a Jewish/Arab friend (A 15, J 11)	15.7	27.8	20.7	24.3	28.9	32.4	31.3	*	37.7	*	35.4	31.5
I am not ready to have a Jewish/Arab neighbor (A 16, J 12)	27.2	37.6	29.7	39.2	31.8	41.1	47.4	46.9	45.7	41.0	48.0	49.8
I am not ready to have an Arab as a superior in a job (J 13)	*	*	*	*	*	*	40.3	38.0	38.2	29.0	39.8	42.4
I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel (J 34)	*	*	*	*	*	*	73.1	57.6	58.0	59.3	63.7	60.4

\* Question not asked

## Distrust

As expected in a society so deeply divided as Israel, 49.1% of the Arabs in 2017 and 52.1% in 2019 and 41.8% and 47.4% of the Jews did not trust each other (Table 2.28). While Arab distrust did not change from 2017 to 2019, Jewish distrust increased significantly.

**Table 2.28 Distrust of the Other Side, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
It is impossible to trust most Jews/Arab citizens (A 31, J 26)	55.6	62.4	55.3	54.2	49.1	52.1	52.1	48.3	45.8	41.8	41.8	47.4

Distrust varies according to the nature of the institution. It is very small in professional institutions that operate according to universal standards and are open to the Arabs: Only 14.1% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 20.8% in 2017) and 23.0% of the Jews in 2015 (up from 12.1% in 2012) did not trust health institutions (Table 2.29). The large proportion of Arabs' trust in health services can be explained by their

provision of equal treatment and the high Arab representation in their medical staff. About 40% of the Arabs and Jews did not trust the courts, indicating moderate trust; and about 60% did not believe in the Knesset and the government, political institutions that their impartiality is highly in doubt (but rightwing Jews have more faith in the Knesset and in the rightwing government that are controlled by the political right) (Table 2.30). The biggest distrust, which reached 69.7% in 2019 (up from 59.4% in 2017), is that of the Arabs in the police that stems from the tremendous personal insecurity of life in Arab communities, a difficult issue that has arisen to the public agenda. The Arabs accuse the police of failing to address the problem.

**Table 2.29 Distrust of Professional Public Institutions, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015
Do not trust health services (A 61)	6.7	10.7**	18.7	15.6	11.0	14.1	15.6	16.2**	18.1	23.0
Do not trust institutions of Higher Education	*	33.9	25.8***	20.8	12.4	*	*	17.9	12.1***	21.1

\* Question not asked      \*\* In 2007      \*\*\* In 2012

**Table 2.30 Distrust of State Institutions, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs							Jews						
	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Do not trust the courts (A 62, J 45)	27.5	34.6**	*	38.7	37.9	40.6	39.6	29.9	41.1**	*	35.9	38.1	34.7	40.5
Do not trust the Institute of Social Security	*	42.5	46.1	*	*	*	*	*	37.4	41.1	*	*	*	*
Do not trust local government	*	57.4	63.2	*	*	*	*	*	41.9	29.8	*	*	*	*
Do not trust the police (A 63, J 46)	*	59.2	64.7	*	64.2	59.4	69.7	*	49.8	36.0	*	51.9	38.0	42.2
Do not trust the Knesset (A 64, J 47)	58.3	62.7**	64.6	66.3	63.7	62.6	63.1	64.2	71.7**	64.4	51.8	54.7	58.8	57.2
Do not trust the government (A 65, J 48)														
	71.5	70.0**	70.4	73.1	67.8	68.0	68.9	57.2	72.9**	50.4	51.8	55.7	56.8	58.2

\* Question not asked      \*\* In 2007

## Chapter 3

# Deprivation, Threats, Collective Memory

## Deprivation

The Arabs in Israel are concentrated in the working and poor strata, their children's achievements in education are low, the municipal services they receive are poor, they suffer from housing shortages and lack of personal safety because of the spread of crime and violence in their communities, they are discriminated against, excluded from various spheres of life and do not share power. On the other hand, they enjoy steady improvement in the level and quality of living, social mobility into the middle class and reduction of discrimination and exclusion.

Improving living conditions is the supreme goal of the Arab public. A vast majority of 80.4% of the Arabs in 2019, up from 69.1% in 2017, agreed that the Arabs should fight more for civil and socioeconomic equality and less for peace and change of the state's character (Table 3.1). This is also what they expect their leaders and the state to do. Arabs, whose pragmatism is growing stronger, feel that their national aspirations are less urgent than their daily lives.

**Table 3.1 Preference of Civil and Socioeconomic Equality to Peace and Change of the Character of the State, Arabs, 2012–2019**

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Arabs should prefer a struggle for civil and socioeconomic equality to a struggle for peace and change of Israel's character (A 67):					
Definitely support	22.3	19.8	16.6	23.1	24.1
Support	40.1	41.5	43.0	46.0	56.3
Oppose	16.3	15.9	20.3	14.7	8.2
Definitely oppose	9.2	11.4	7.5	7.6	11.1
No answer	12.2	11.5	12.6	8.6	0.2

There is serious disagreement between the Arabs and the Jews about the appraisal of government policy towards the Arab minority. A majority of 63.2% of the Arabs in 2019 compared to just 24.5% of the Jews said that the state does not treat Arab citizens fairly (Table 3.2). Furthermore, 65.7% of the Arabs in 2017 and 67.2% in 2019 compared with 30.8% and 31.6% of the Jews believed that the state treats Arabs as second-class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality (Table 3.3). While most Arabs are aware of the discrimination policy against them, Jews think that the Arabs get what they “deserve” for their lack of identification and lack of contribution to the state. Accordingly, 72.3% of the Arabs in 2017 and 78.3% in 2019 compared to 49.4% and 44.8% of the Jews agreed that “there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel” (Table 3.4). 56.5% of the Arabs said there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs trying to move to a Jewish city (Table 3.5). It seems that the disagreement in the assessment of the magnitude of the discrimination intensified from 2017 to 2019. Despite the appreciable discrimination, a majority of 56.5% of the Arabs in 2019 and a majority of 78.4% of the Jews believed that an Arab youth has a good chance to fulfill his occupational aspirations in the country today. This belief in the chances of Arab social mobility went up from 44.2% in 1980 to 56.5% in 2019 among the Arabs and from 72.7% to 78.4%, respectively, among the Jews (Table 3.6). Both sides perceive Israel as a society that has become more open over the years, and this is thanks to the Arab struggle for equality, steady economic growth and democratization.

**Table 3.2 Fairness of the State’s Treatment of Arabs,  
Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
The state treats Arab citizens fairly (A 47, J 42):		
Disagree	32.6	7.1
Tend to disagree	30.6	17.4
Tend to agree	16.0	32.1
Agree	8.2	39.8
No answer	12.6	3.7

**Table 3.3 Evaluation of Government Policy toward Arab Citizens, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews						
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
The government treats Arabs in Israel (A 159, J 99):													
As equal citizens	7.4	6.6	6.9	7.5	4.9	7.8	20.7	25.9	29.2	28.9	27.9	27.2	
As equal citizens that are discriminated against in certain areas	29.9	21.4	25.2	24.1	28.7	23.8	36.6	38.0	33.9	35.0	34.4	31.2	
As second class citizens	44.0	42.8	44.0	40.2	40.3	42.0	29.4	24.2	24.5	19.8	22.1	23.3	
As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	18.3	27.7	22.7	26.8	25.4	25.2	8.5	6.8	5.9	8.9	8.7	8.3	
No answer	0.4	1.5	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.2	4.8	5.2	6.5	7.4	6.8	10.0	

**Table 3.4 Discrimination in Israel against Arabs, Arabs and Jews, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		Jews	
	2017	2019	2017	2019
There is a lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel (A 14, J 9):				
Disagree	7.6	7.4	33.4	30.3
Tend to disagree	19.0	13.0	15.0	21.7
Tend to agree	38.3	30.4	24.2	25.1
Agree	34.0	47.9	25.2	19.7
No answer	1.1	1.4	2.2	3.3

**Table 3.5 Discrimination in Israel against Arabs who Try to Move to a Jewish City, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
Is there or is there no discrimination in Israel against Arabs trying to move to a Jewish city? (A 84, J 25):		
No discrimination at all	8.1	14.7
Some discrimination	34.7	45.7
Appreciable discrimination	33.7	17.4
A lot of discrimination	22.8	10.7
No answer	0.6	11.4

**Table 3.6 Chances of An Arab Youth to Fulfill His Occupational Aspirations in Israel Today, Arabs and Jews, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					Jews			
	1980	1988	1995	2001	2019	1980	1988	1995	2019
Chances of an Arab youth to fulfill his occupational aspirations in Israel today (A 83, J 94):									
No	33.4	27.0	13.5	24.5	8.1	9.5	11.4	4.8	6.1
Doubtful	22.2	30.8	15.6	27.9	34.7	16.8	17.7	22.1	12.5
Possible	25.5	27.3	35.1	29.0	33.7	29.4	34.1	37.6	33.4
Yes	18.7	14.3	34.5	16.9	22.8	43.3	35.0	35.0	45.0
No answer	0.2	0.6	1.3	1.8	0.6	1.0	1.9	0.7	3.1

Arab deprivation was also measured by negative family and personal experiences. 45.9% of the Arabs in 2019 reported that land had been expropriated from their families and 20% reported that their families became internal refugees as a result of the 1948 war (Table 3.7). 29.8% of the Jews in 2012 reported that they or a person close to them had been personally injured in a war or a terrorist activity over the past ten years, an injury attributed to Arabs in general and not to Arab citizens. However, 34.6% of the Arabs in 2017 and 30.1% in 2019 and 28.0% and 30.0% of the Jews were reported to have been personally once or more affected by threats, humiliations or beatings from the other side (Table 3.8). There was a significant increase in the rate of mutual harm on both sides – from 19.4% in 2003 to 30.1% in 2019 among the Arabs and from 14.9% to 30.0% among the Jews. The increase can also result from greater sensitivity and from expansion of what is perceived as personal injury (for example, when public incitement is perceived as personal injury). In any rate the phenomenon is severe. A third of the Arabs and Jews who feel personally hurt by the other side is a very high rate. Since for every Arab citizen in Israel there are four Jews, the absolute total number of offended Jews is several times greater than the total number of offended Arabs. This shows that the Arabs are not a weak and submissive minority that passively contains vulnerability but rather a powerful, militant minority that responds strongly to any harm done to it. This is a state of mutual intolerance.

**Table 3.7 Negative Family Experiences, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012
Lands were expropriated from their families (A 188)	45.9	44.6	37.6	40.4	36.8	45.9	
Internal refugees (A 189)	20.3	18.8	22.0	25.3	19.5	20.0	
They or a close person were personally hurt in a war or a terrorist action in the last ten years	*	*	*	*	*	*	29.8

\* Question not asked

**Table 3.8 Encountering with Threats, Humiliations or Beatings from the Other Side, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Have personally encountered threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews/ Arab citizens (A 173, J 107)	19.4	26.4	22.7	26.7	34.6	30.1	14.9	18.8	18.7	20.5	28.0	30.0

The Arabs report a rate of suffering personally from discrimination from Jews and state institutions higher than a rate of suffering personally from threats, humiliations and beatings, 44.8% compared to 30.1% in 2019 (Table 3.9). Arab protest against manifestations of discrimination and the continued occupation of Palestinian areas is checked by steps of control taken by the authorities. 15.3% of the Arabs in 2017 and 18.4% in 2019 reported being arrested and interrogated, and 13.3% and 12.5% were harassed by the security forces for participating in protest activities. These general rates are much higher among men aged 22–24, of whom 32.3% said they were arrested and interrogated in 2019 and 41.9% were harassed. They testify to the vigorous protest and the rapid empowerment of the Arab minority and the intensification of law enforcement actions by the authorities.

**Table 3.9 Negative Personal Experiences, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions (A 174)	44.9	52.5	52.9	48.9	54.7	44.8
In the last twelve months were arrested and interrogated by the security forces because of participation in protest actions (A 175)	*	*	*	*	15.3	18.4
During the past three years have been harassed by the authorities for participation in protest actions (A 176)	3.7	8.5	10.3	12.0	13.3	12.5
During the past three years their livelihood has been hurt by for participation in protest actions	3.5	6.1	9.1	11.5	13.8	*

\* Question not asked

The respondents were also asked questions about positive experiences with the other side. 44.2% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 60.0% in 2017) and 15.7% of the Jews (unchanged from 17.0% in 2017) said they received help from the other side, and 57.6% (down from 73.0%) and 28.4% (unchanged from 30.5%) spent time together (Table 3.10). Despite their decline, these positive experiences are impressive because they bring both sides closer to one another and moderate their views. In many of the studies of the Index over the years, spending time with the other side is a good predictor of positive attitudes toward Arab-Jewish coexistence.

**Table 3.10 Positive Personal Experiences, Arabs and Jews, 2008, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Have received help from Jews/Arab citizens (A 171, J 104)	46.2	48.5	62.2	58.3	60.0	44.2	16.4	20.1	12.3	18.8	17.0	15.7
Have spent leisure time with Jews/Arab citizens (A 172, J 105)	44.2	68.7	79.3	72.6	73.0	57.6	22.2	29.7	26.6	26.8	30.5	28.4

## Threats

Arabs and Jews feel threatened. Arabs feel insecure because of the spread of crime and violence in their place of residence. A majority of 76.6% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 80.4% in 2017) felt lack of personal safety because of the growing violence in their communities (Table 3.11). The many causes for the high rate of crime in the Arab sector include lack of policing, inadequate law-enforcement and the loosening of social control in a society undergoing partial modernization and in situ urbanization.

**Table 3.11 Feeling of Personal Insecurity because of Violence in Arab Localities, Arabs, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	
	2017	2019
Feeling personally insecure because of the violence in Arab localities (A 187):		
Yes, definitely	26.2	24.7
Yes	54.2	51.9
No	15.5	18.8
No, definitely	2.5	3.6
No answer	1.6	1.0

Most Arabs fear serious harms to them. 73.4% of the Arabs in 2017 and 71.9% in 2019 are afraid of severe violations of their basic civil rights, 77.7% and 75.7% of mass land expropriation, 62.6% and 60.6% of population transfer, 63.3% and 59.7% of the annexation of the Triangle to a future Palestinian state, 74.9% and 71.5% of state violence, and 73.8% and 70.0% of persecution of Arabs who speak against the state on social networks (Table 3.12). There is no increase in the rate of fear from 2017 to 2019. The Nakba consciousness, the incitement of Jewish public figures and the intimidation of the radical right feed on the feeling of fear and the self-perception of victimization in Arabs. Although the feasibility of threats is low, 66.2% of the Arabs fear that one of these collective threats may happen to them personally (Table 3.13). These fears contribute to Arabs' deterrence from crossing red lines in their relations with the state and the Jews.

**Table 3.12 Fear of Collective Threats to Arab Citizens, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Fear of severe infringement of the rights of Arab citizens (A 38)	81.1	77.8	70.7	67.9	73.4	71.9
Fear of numerous confiscations of Arab lands (A 39)	79.2	79.5	78.2	69.6	77.7	75.7
Fear of annexation of the Little Triangle to future Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents (A 41)	50.6	66.5	53.6	53.5	63.3	59.7
Fear of population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens (A 42)	55.4	68.0	58.4	54.5	62.6	60.6
Fear of state violence against Arabs (A 40)	71.1	75.9	67.0	67.1	74.9	71.5
Fear of violence by the Jewish extreme right against Arabs	*	80.0**	*	*	*	*
Fear of persecution of Arabs who speak against the state in the social networks (A 43)	*	*	*	*	73.8	70.0

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2011

**Table 3.13 Fear that One of the Collective Threats to Arab Citizens May Happen to Them Personally, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs 2019
Fear that one of the collective threats to Arab citizens may happen to them personally (A 44):	
Do not fear	32.6
Not so fear	30.6
Fear to some extent	16.0
Fear	8.2
No answer	12.6

Between a third to two-fifths of the Arabs are personally concerned that the authorities will harass them (33.7% in 2017 and 36.1% in 2019) or that their livelihood will be harmed (38.2% in 2017) for participating in protest actions (Table 3.14). Furthermore, 39.9% of the Arabs in 2019 felt a danger to their own safety from the Jews (Table 3.15), in addition to 66.2% who, as mentioned, felt insecure from Arabs in their place of residence (Table 3.11 above). These personal concerns are more realistic than the concerns about collective threats, but they are also exaggerated. For example, 36.1% of the Arabs in 2019 were concerned

about government harassment, but only 12.5% reported being harassed (Table 3.9 above).

**Table 3.14 Fear of Personal Threats, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Fear of harassment by the authorities because of participation in protest actions (A 177)	18.8	21.9	24.9	29.3	33.7	36.1
Fear that one's livelihood will be hurt because of participation in protest actions (A 171)	20.4	22.0	26.4	31.0	38.2	*

**Table 3.15 Fear of Danger to One's Personal Safety from Jews/  
Arab Citizens, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
Fear of danger to one's personal safety from Jews/Arab citizens (A 186, J 108):		
Always	14.6	12.0
Often	25.3	19.4
Seldom	33.7	47.4
Never	24.7	16.6
No answer	1.8	4.6

As most Arabs feel threatened by Jews and the state, most Jews feel threatened by Arab citizens as well. 60.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 54.7% in 2019 were concerned about the Arab struggle to change the Jewish character of the state and 62.8% and 55.3% about Arab popular revolt (Table 3.16). Jews are also afraid of the support of Arab citizens for the struggle of the Palestinian people (73.5% in 2015). In addition, 31.4% of the Jews in 2019 felt that Arab citizens are jeopardizing their own safety (Table 3.15). Like the collective threats that the Arabs feel, the collective threats the Jews feel are not realistic. Jewish fears feed on the notion that Israel is a defensive democracy surrounded by enemies from the inside and outside. The strong sense of threat reflects the distrust of Jews in Israel's Arabs.

**Table 3.16 Fear of Collective Threats to Jews,  
Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their high birthrate	70.1	51.5	*	*	*	*
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character (J 35)	71.8	64.9	59.4	61.2	60.1	54.7
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because they may start a popular revolt (J 36)	73.8	63.8	60.6	63.4	62.8	55.3
Fear of Arab citizens endangering the state because of their support for the struggle of the Palestinian people	83.1	76.0	67.5	73.5	*	*

\* Question not asked

## Collective Memory

The conflict between Palestinian nationalism and Zionism leads Arabs and Jews to opposing narratives about the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In Arabs' eyes, Zionism is a "colonial racist" movement (77.1% in 2015) and "the Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, will be doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians" (47.8% in 2019, down from 58.4% in 2017) (Table 3.17). Most Jews (62.8% in 2017 and 66.2% in 2019) also believe that "the Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants" and that the land belongs only to them (67.6% in 2017) (Table 3.18). To put these findings in bright light, they also show that about half of the Arabs do not see the Jews as Crusaders and about a third of the Jews believe that the Arabs also have national rights over the land.

**Table 3.17 Historical and National Rights to the  
Land, Arabs, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Zionism is a colonial and racist movement	85.3	85.3	75.5	77.1	*	*
The Jews are foreign settlers who robbed the land from the Arabs	77.5	75.7***	*	*	*	*

	Arabs					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, will be doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians (A 116)	62.5**	57.0	47.3	54.7	58.4	47.8

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2011

\*\*\* In 2010

**Table 3.18 Historical and National Rights to the Land, Jews, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Palestinians are Arabs who settled in the Land of Israel that belongs to the Jewish people	65.5	64.2	58.7	62.0	67.6	*
The Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants (J 58)	61.7	60.5	61.1	61.8	62.8	66.2

\* Question not asked

The culprit of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another facet of the contradiction between the historical narratives of Arabs and Jews. A majority of 62.2% of the Arabs in 2019 (a decrease from 68.1% in 2017) blamed the Jews for the conflict compared to 65.3% of the Jews in 2019 (unchanged from 69.4% in 2017) who blamed the Palestinians (Table 3.19). Despite the mutual accusation, there is a consensus among 63.3% of the Arabs in 2019 and 55.0% of the Jews that “in all Israeli, Arab and Jewish, schools, the history of the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians must be taught from the viewpoint of both sides” (Table 3.20). This finding shows that both sides recognize the complexity of the conflict and hope that exposure to the other party’s narrative will draw them closer.

**Table 3.19 Guilt of the Conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Jews/Palestinians are the main guilty party for the protracted conflict between the Palestinians and Jews (A 114, J 80)	61.1	77.2	64.8	68.2	68.1	62.2	64.8	68.6	59.6	72.2	69.4	65.3

**Table 3.20 Teaching of the History of the Conflict from the Viewpoint of Both Sides, Arabs and Jews, 2010–2012, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews			
	2010	2011	2012*	2019	2010	2011	2012	2019
In all Israeli, Arab and Jewish, schools, the history of the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians must be taught from the viewpoint of both sides (A 115, J 81):								
Disagree	14.9	7.1		14.7	19.0	20.3	20.2	25.6
Tend to disagree	10.1	9.4		13.0	3.0	3.8	3.6	14.4
Tend to agree	28.6	33.5		35.7	12.1	9.2	12.0	29.5
Agree	45.6	49.7		27.6	62.3	64.6	62.2	25.5
No answer	0.8	0.3		8.9	3.6	2.1	1.9	5.0

\* Question not asked

An acute polemic exists on the Nakba. As expected, a majority of 70.5% of the Arabs in 2015 blamed the Jews for the Nakba disaster that happened to the Palestinians in 1948, while 65.0% of the Jews in 2003 blamed the Palestinians (Table 3.21). But the critical question for each side is the recognition of the very occurrence of the two grand catastrophes that happened to both nations: The Nakba for Palestinians and the Holocaust for the Jews. The Arabs were asked about the very occurrence of the Holocaust. About 30% of the Arabs in the years 2006 to 2019 (29.7% in 2017 and 29.1% in 2019) did not believe that “there was Shoah in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis” (Table 3.22). At the same time, most Jews, in the range of 52.5% in 2012 to 61.1% in 2019, did not believe that “in 1948 a disaster (Nakba) occurred to the Palestinian Arabs in which they lost the war against the Jews, became refugees, their localities were destroyed, and they did not establish a state of their own.” Jews’ non-recognition of the Nakba aims to keep them from being blamed. In the eyes of the Jews, the Nakba is an event that the Palestinians are responsible for and therefore is not a disaster that the Jews inflicted. The gap between the Arabs’ non-recognition of the Holocaust and the Jews’ non-recognition of the Nakba stems from the marginalization and de-legitimization of the Nakba motif by the state versus the centrality and legitimacy of the Holocaust motif. The failure to recognize the Holocaust is the Arabs’ objection to the use of the Holocaust as a tool for legitimizing Israel. However, contrary to the Holocaust denial in Europe, the Arabs’ non-recognition of the Holocaust

and the Jews' non-recognition of the Nakba are not manifestations of deep hatred but rather a means to strengthen the position of each side on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Table 3.21 The Nakba Narrative, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Jews/Palestinians are the main guilty party for the Nakba/ disaster that occurred to the Palestinians in 1948	65.3	82.2	69.3	70.5	65.0	*	*	*	*	*
I believe that in 1948 a disaster (Nakba) occurred to the Palestinian Arabs in which they lost the war against the Jews, became refugees, their localities were destroyed, and they did not establish a state of their own (J 59):	*	*	*	*	*					
Disagree, tend to disagree						52.5	54.5	54.3	57.1	61.1
Agree, tend to agree						41.1	37.9	38.8	35.7	30.2
No answer						6.4	7.5	6.9	7.2	8.7

\* Question not asked

**Table 3.22 The Shoah Narrative, Arabs, 2006–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs										
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
I believe that there was Shoah in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis (A 57):											
Disagree, tend to disagree	28.0	25.9	40.5	29.6	37.8	23.8	31.0	34.5	31.0	29.7	29.1
Agree, tend to agree	71.1	72.9	58.9	69.1	60.9	74.8	67.4	63.9	67.0	68.7	69.5
No answer	0.9	1.2	0.6	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	1.6	1.3
It is justified that Israel sets up Yom Hashoah as a memorial day for the murder of millions of Jews by the Nazis	72.0	74.1	57.8	60.9	57.6	68.6	60.9	58.8	67.8	61.9	*
Israel should have teachings of Hashoah also in Arab schools (A 58)	*	*	33.6	47.0	47.0	45.9	36.0	42.1	47.2	32.8	39.8

\* Question not asked

## Chapter 4

# Legitimacy of Coexistence

In Israel, there is a general agreement on integration without assimilation between Arabs and Jews. This meaning of coexistence is reflected in the principles that have been translated into attitudes held by most of the Arab public and most of the Jewish public. A majority of 54.9% of the Arabs and 84.7% of the Jews in 2019 said that they are “reconciled with Israel as a state in which Arabs and Jews live together” and 72.0% and 54.8%, respectively, said that “it is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel” (Table 4.1). There is also agreement on equality of rights and a duty of loyalty to the state (63.6% of the Arabs in 2019 and 75.4% of the Jews), changes in relations in democratic ways only (70.4% and 85.0%), maintenance of voluntary relations (74.7% and 76.9%) and non-avoidance of intergroup contacts (76.4% and 73.7%). Coexistence does not require the Arabs to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and to identify with it, nor does it require the Jews to grant the Arabs national rights and to make Israel a bi-national state.

**Table 4.1 Acceptance of Coexistence, Arabs and Jews, 2008, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Israel as a state has a right to exist**	63.3	60.0	65.7	65.8	58.7	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Two states to two peoples**	*	*	*	*	*	*	70.6	66.7	61.5	60.0	53.4	*
I'm reconciled with Israel as a state in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 25, J 19)	*	*	*	*	*	54.9	*	*	*	*	*	84.7
It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens always live together in Israel (A 26, J 20)	63.3	62.7	66.4	66.0	63.1	72.0	*	57.2	55.8	58.9	52.4	54.8
Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state (A 27, J 21)	62.8	59.0	69.2	64.0	63.6	57.8	57.2	81.1	79.2	84.7	78.4	75.4

	Arabs						Jews					
	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act for changing their relations by legal and democratic means only (A 28, J 22)	63.0	58.3	77.4	77.8	73.6	70.4	83.7	91.8	83.7	88.9	88.4	85.0
Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendship and activity in joint organizations (A 29, J 23)	78.7	80.5	84.0	81.3	85.3	74.7	93.7	82.8	76.7	82.0	79.9	76.9
Do not avoid as much as possible any personal contact with Jews/Arabs (A 30, J 24)	81.7	73.9	82.4	73.6	64.2	76.4	86.6	69.0	66.1	69.0	72.6	73.7

\* Question not asked

\*\* Instead of the two marked questions, a question was presented in 2019 about reconciliation with Israel as a state where a Jewish majority and an Arab minority live together

## Arab Attitudes toward Coexistence

The Arabs were asked if they recognize the Jews' right to a state, the Jews' right to a Jewish state, and the Jews' right to a Zionist state. A Jewish state is a nation-state in which the Jews are the majority and in which their language, culture and symbols prevail, while a Zionist state is run by the Zionist ideology and uses laws and policies to preserve forever a Jewish majority in the state and its Jewish character. Jews expect the Arabs to recognize of or at least be reconciled with these three Jewish collective rights, even without becoming Zionists.

On the one hand, one would not expect most Arabs to recognize Jewish national rights because a Palestinian nation-state does not exist and Israel denies the Arab minority national rights. On the other hand, one would expect an Arab majority recognizing Jewish national rights because both the PLO and the political and intellectual leadership of the Arab citizens recognize the Jews in Israel as a people (who were created only during their colonial settlement in Palestine), not just a religion, and also as a people who has a right to a state. We found a majority, albeit a small one, among the Arabs who accept Jews as a people with a right to a state and the rate of acceptance did not change from 2017 to 2019. 58.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 61.7% in 2019 agreed that Jews

are a people with a right to a state, 54.3% and 56.1% agreed that Jews have historical and national rights to the land, and 49.8% and 53.2% agreed that the land between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews (Table 4.2).

**Table 4.2 Acceptance of Jews' National Rights, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Jews in Israel are a people who have a right to a state (A 49)	75.5	58.6	56.5	62.2	58.8	61.7
Jews, like Arabs, have historical and national rights to the land (A 48)	56.3*	46.2	57.5	58.7	54.3	56.1
The country between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews (A 11)	67.1	48.5	63.0	53.6	49.8	53.2

A large majority of the Arabs recognize the right of existence of the State of Israel. 79.6% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 72.6% in 2017) said (with or without reservations) that Israel has a right to exist. For most Arabs the very existence of Israel is a fact that should be accepted. 65.4% in 2019 (up from 58.4% in 2017) recognized Israel's right of existence as "an independent state in which Jews and Arabs live together" as against 33.8% (down from 40.4% in 2017) who did not recognize this right (Table 4.3). Hence, the legitimacy of the state's existence in Arab eyes rose from 2017 to 2019. A breakdown of the population into groups shows that compared to the average of 33.8% of Arabs who deny Israel's right to exist, the rate of deniers is 63.8% among supporters of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement, 57.7% among internal refugees, 63.2% among families disaffected by land expropriations, 66.7% among Arabs who had suffered from threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews, 48.6% among Arabs who do not have Jewish friends, 53.8% among Arabs who had never spent pastime with Jews, 49.1% among Arabs who had never received any help from Jews, 62.3% among Arabs whose identity is Palestinian only and not Israeli at all, and 47.4% among Arabs who did not vote in the Knesset election in April 2019. This is the profile of Arabs who deny Israel's very right to exist.

**Table 4.3 Acceptance of Israel's Right to Exist, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Does Israel have a right to exist? (A 147)						
Yes	64.2	32.2	30.9	38.8	32.1	33.1
Yes, with reservation	23.2	38.2	39.2	31.4	40.5	46.5
No	11.0	22.8	13.5	26.9	24.8	19.4
No answer	1.5	6.8	16.4	3.6	2.5	1.1
Israel has a right to exist as an independent state in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 50)	81.1	58.0	55.6	56.4	58.4	65.4

Most Arabs accept Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state. A majority of 69.8% of the Arabs in 2019, an increase from 49.1% in 2017, agreed that "Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together" (Table 4.4). Most are also willing to come to terms with Israel as a Jewish and democratic state if they are granted full civil rights (51.7% in 2017 and 56.0% in 2019) and most are also willing to support a "constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and guarantees full civil rights to the Arabs" (up from 47.2% in 2017 to 56.0% in 2019). The minority of Arabs who deny Israel as a Jewish and democratic state think that it does not grant Arabs equal rights.

**Table 4.4 Acceptance of Israel's Right to Exist as a Jewish and Democratic State, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 51)	65.6	47.4	52.8	53.6	49.1	69.8
Arab citizens will have a status of a national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and will come to terms with it (A 80)	60.9	51.2	58.1	56.7	51.7	58.2
If there were a referendum regarding a constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and guarantees Arabs full civil rights, I would support it (A 52)	70.9*	48.2	53.2	51.7	47.2	56.0

\* In 2006

Let's move to reconciliation with the state which is less demanding than recognition of it. Indeed, 57.8% of the Arabs in 2019 (an increase

from 44.6% in 2017) said that they “reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state with a Jewish majority,” 60.3% (a high rise from 49.7%) said they accept Hebrew as the state language, and 73.7% (up from 63.0%) said they justify the Jewish symbols of the state if they are supplemented by Arab symbols that Arabs could identify with (Table 4.5). These numbers indicate a serious increase from 2017 to 2019 in the proportion of Arabs who give legitimacy to the state.

**Table 4.5 Reconciliation with Israel as a Jewish State, Arabs, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state with a Jewish majority (A 55)	57.7	55.9	52.1	60.3	44.6	57.8
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state whose dominant language is Hebrew (A 56)	56.6	60.6	52.3	63.4	49.7	60.3
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state with its dominant culture	51.1	53.2	52.1	56.2	45.6	*
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state that Sabbath is its day of rest	57.9	60.2	55.9	60.7	46.0	*
It is justified that state symbols will be Jewish symbols, but the state should also have Arab symbols to enable Arabs to identify with them (A 59)	75.4	67.2	64.3	70.9	63.0	73.7

It is also surprising to see an increase in Israel’s legitimacy as a Zionist state, although 64.7% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 59.2% in 2017) thought that “Israel as a Zionist state, in which Jews and Arabs live together, is racist” (Table 4.6). An Arab majority of 54.7% in 2019 (up from 43.4% in 2017) accepted, without or with reservation, Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state, and 51.6% (up from 36.2%) agreed with the statement expressing the core idea of Zionism that “Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a state that keeps a Jewish majority.” The majority from among the Arabs who accept Zionist Israel as legitimate in 2019 are at odds with only a minority from among them who, in previous years, said that they are reconciled to it as a state under Jewish control, that Jews control its security forces and lands, where the Law of Return is practiced, and as a state that serves the needs of the Jews in Israel and around the world (Table 4.7).

**Table 4.6 Acceptance of Israel's Right to Exist as a Zionist State, Arabs, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Israel as a Zionist state, in which Arabs and Jews live together, is racist (A 60)**						
Disagree	18.1	12.2	22.6	17.1	14.1	13.6
Tend to disagree	9.1	20.0	20.3	25.1	26.1	20.7
Tend to agree	21.8	28.7	27.8	26.4	33.1	29.8
Agree	48.0	38.5	28.3	31.1	26.1	34.9
No answer	2.9	0.5	1.1	0.2	0.7	1.1
Does Israel within the Green Line have a right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state? (A 148)						
Yes	12.2	11.9	11.0	19.8	15.5	20.2
Yes, with reservation	24.8	24.5	26.9	22.8	27.9	37.2
No	59.6	54.0	54.2	53.9	53.8	41.6
No answer	3.4	9.5	7.9	3.6	2.8	1.1
Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that keeps a Jewish majority (A 53)	*	29.6	43.1	42.7	36.2	51.6
Israel with the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that is in Jewish control (A 54)	*	29.3	34.5	45.7	32.0	43.7
Israel with the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that serves the needs of Jews in Israel and the world	*	26.4	34.3	40.5	*	*

\* Question not asked      \*\* In 2003 the wording of the question was "Israel as a Zionist state is racist"

**Table 4.7 Reconciliation with Israel as a Zionist State, Arabs, 2013–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		
	2013	2015	2017
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state that Jews control its lands	38.9	48.7	
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state that Jews control its all security forces	45.5	*	*
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state that Jews make the decisions in it	42.1	52.1	*
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state in which the Law of Return is in effect (the law that grants Jews only the right to immigrate to Israel and to get Israeli citizenship instantly)	31.6	39.0	25.2
Reconcile themselves with Israel today as a state that serves the needs of Jews in Israel and in the world	45.5	47.7	41.2

\* Question not asked

The findings on Arab attitude toward Israel's legitimacy of the state lead to a number of conclusions. First, the Arabs in 2019 gave more

legitimacy to Israel than in previous years. This increase is not expected because the Netanyahu government's harsh anti-Arab policy since 2016 was supposed to raise the alienation of the Arabs from the state and to adversely affect their attitudes. Contrary to expectations, it actually reinforced in the Arabs the affinity for the state, the importance of Israeli citizenship to them and the legitimacy of the state in their eyes. Second, in 2019 a majority of Arabs recognizing the entire set of Jewish rights to the state emerged, testifying to the pragmatism of the Arab public. Third, the Arabs make a clear distinction between Jewish rights abusive and not abusive to Arabs. This can be seen in the decreasing order of the following recognition rates: 79.6% of the Arabs in 2019 recognized Israel's right to exist as a state (Table 4.3), 69.8% recognized its right to exist as a Jewish state (Table 4.4), and 51.6% recognized its right to exist as a Zionist state (as a state that retains a Jewish majority) (Table 4.6). And fourth, the Arab leadership who ideologically denies Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state does not faithfully represent the pragmatic Arab public on the issue of Israel's legitimacy.

## **Jewish Attitudes toward Coexistence**

The Arab minority rights can be divided into three categories: Individual rights, ethnic collective rights and national collective rights. A vast majority of 82.0% of the Jews in 2017 and 80.5% in 2019 were reconciled "today with the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel" (Table 4.8) and 73.8% and 71.3% agreed that "Arab citizens have a right to live in Israel as a minority with full civil rights" (Table 4.9). A smaller Jewish majority of 68.7% in 2017 and 64.9% in 2019 agreed to give the Arabs "equality in individual rights, in state budgets and in opportunities for education and employment" and 61.1% and 61.6% accepted them "as full members of Israeli society" (Table 4.9). These numbers also indicate that between 15% and 25% of the Jews deny the right to exist in Israel to an Arab minority with full individual rights. The examination of the background of the 15.3% of the Jews who rejected in 2019 "the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel" shows that their

percentage is 32.4% of those who define themselves as rightwingers, 33.3% among Jews without full high school education, 31.5% among the ultra-Orthodox and 27.0% among the religious. Although there was no exacerbation from 2007 to 2019 of the denial of legitimacy to the Arabs as a minority with full individual rights in Israel, the exacerbation that occurred in 2017 remained as was.

**Table 4.8 Reconciliation with Existence of an Arab Minority in the State of Israel, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
I'm reconciled today with the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel (A 96):						
Yes	54.7	53.3	57.2	53.5	49.1	45.2
Yes, with reservation	27.4	27.9	26.5	29.5	32.9	35.3
No	17.2	15.2	15.3	14.8	15.4	15.3
No answer	1.4	1.6	1.1	2.3	2.6	4.2

**Table 4.9 Arabs' Right to Live in Israel as a Minority with Full Individual Rights, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
There is a right to exist in Israel for a national Arab minority with full citizenship rights (yes, yes with reservation) (J 95)	79.5	76.3	76.0	82.4	76.0	75.7
Arab citizens have right to live in Israel as a minority with full citizenship rights (J 38)	72.6	75.0	73.7	79.7	73.8	71.3
Arab citizens will have a status of a minority with full citizenship rights in a Jewish and democratic state and reconcile themselves with it (J 55)	76.9	70.9	64.9	74.9	68.1	61.3
There should be equality in individual rights, in state budgets and in opportunities for education and employment between Arab citizens and Jews (J 37)	68.8	67.9	72.8	74.2	68.7	64.9
Accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society (J 10)	63.1	67.0	66.7	69.5	61.1	61.6

A large majority of the Jewish public not only accepts the Arabs as a minority with full individual rights, but also accepts the accordance to them of ethnic collective rights that are not usually granted to non-assimilating minorities in liberal democracies. In the surveys conducted before 2019, most Jews agreed to provide Arabs with separate and

state-funded education and religious services, as well as assistance to Arab cultural institutions and to Arab artists and writers (Table 4.10). The Jews respect the Arab right to maintain a separate existence, culture and identity.

**Table 4.10 Justification of Granting Ethnic Collective Rights to Arabs in Israel, Jews, 2010–2012, 2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews			
	2010	2011	2012	2017
It is justified that the state grants separate Arab education to Arab citizens	66.7	67.2	67.4	*
It is justified that the state supports Arab cultural institutions, artists and writers	73.0	69.3	74.7	67.1
It is justified that the state funds religious services to Arab citizens	58.4	54.9	57.1	*

\* Question not asked

The Jewish public is so Zionist as Israel is Zionist. In 2015, 84.7% of the Jews agreed that “Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that keeps a Jewish majority” and 87.1% agreed that “Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state under Jewish control” (Table 4.11). 50.3% of the Jews in 2017 also said that as Jews they deserved preference not only as a collective but also as individuals. Furthermore, 58.1% of the Jews in 2019, up from 50.3% in 2017, said “the state should give some preference to Jews over Arab citizens.” Presumably they meant that in a Zionist state, Jews are entitled to favorable collective rights. Most Jews take another step, as the state does in the Nation-State Law, in denying national rights to the Arabs. Indeed, only a minority of 34.4% of the Jews in 2017 and 34.5% in 2019 agreed that “Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land” and only 34.0% and 30.0% agreed that “the land between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews” (Table 4.12). This uni-national view entails a denial of both the rights of the Palestinian people to the land and the affinity of Arab citizens to it.

**Table 4.11 Acceptance of Israel's Right to Exist as a Zionist State, Jews, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a state that keeps a Jewish majority	90.2	83.2	84.7	*	*
Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a state that serves the needs of Jews in Israel and the world	91.8	87.7	*	*	*
Israel within the Green Line has the right to exist as a state under Jewish control	92.2	85.6	87.1	*	*
The state should give certain preference to Jews over Arab citizens (J 18)	52.7	48.3	46.8	50.3	58.1

\* Question not asked

**Table 4.12 Acceptance of Arabs' National Rights, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land (J 43)	68.5*	41.9	41.2	36.5	34.4	34.5
The country between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews (J 8)	43.9	33.6	41.2	45.3	34.5	30.0

\* In 2006

Support for granting a certain state preference to Jews over Arab citizens and denial of national rights to Arabs does not prevent 60.7% of the Jews in 2017 from agreeing with the “government resolution to implement a grand plan for development of the Arab sector in the coming five years,” a decision adopted at the end of 2015, but they correspond with the 83.1% of the Jews in 2017 who agreed with “the government resolution to outlaw the Northern Faction of the Islamic movement” (Table 4.13).

**Table 4.13 Attitude toward Government Resolutions, Jews, 2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews
	2017
Approve of the government resolution to implement a grand plan for development of the Arab sector in the coming five years	60.7
Approve of the government resolution to outlaw the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement	83.1

Moreover, the Zionist uni-national conception of Israel encourages Jews to question the loyalty of the Arabs and to restrict their individual rights. 24.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 26.3% in 2019 opposed allowing Arabs to vote for the Knesset, and 44.9% in 2013 supported the outlawing of Hadash (Table 4.14). Since, according to their Zionist view, the land in the country should be under Jewish control, it is not surprising that 60.5% of the Jews in 2017 and 63.5% in 2019 opposed “allowing Arab citizens to buy land wherever they want.” This objection to a fundamental right given to every citizen in a procedural democracy is intended to ensure continued Jewish control of land and homogeneity of Jewish communities.

**Table 4.14 Restrictions of Arabs’ Citizenship Rights, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Do not allow Arabs to vote to the Knesset (J 16)	33.7	27.9	30.5	21.1	24.1	26.3
Do not allow Arabs to buy land wherever they want (J 17)	67.6	41.0	56.8	55.8	60.5	63.5
The state should expropriate Arab lands for development for Jews	32.3	36.1**	*	*	*	*
Support the outlawing of Hadash	52.0	44.6	44.9	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2011

Jews perceive the Arabs as opponents of the regime whose rights should be restricted. 59.9% of the Jews in 2019, down from 69.8% in 2017, denied the right of Arab citizens to live in the country as a minority with full civil rights if they do not accept Israel as a Jewish state. Similarly, 69.4% of the Jews in 2019, unchanged from 69.5% in 2017, saw the Arabs as not loyal to the state if they adopt the identity of “Palestinians in Israel” (Table 4.15).

**Table 4.15 Attribution of Disloyalty to Arab Dissidents, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Disagree with the statement that Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or not accept Israel's right to be a Jewish state (J 39)	70.2	70.1	66.0	63.2	69.8	59.9

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Disagree with the statement that an Arab citizen who defines oneself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws (J 40)	75.6	69.4	68.1	66.5	69.5	69.4
Think that an Arab citizen who views Jews as foreign settlers who usurp lands from the Arabs cannot respect the Jews and their rights	74.1**	75.5***	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2008

\*\*\* In 2010

The Jews generally accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, but this does not mean that they favor the balance between these two components. It is clear that support for the superiority of the Jewish character of the state leads to a less equitable attitude towards the Arab minority. A majority of 63.2% of the Jews in 2017 and 61.7% in 2019 preferred the Jewish to the democratic aspect of the state when they are in conflict and 68.3% and 68.4% demanded a majority of the Jews to make decisions about the nature and borders of the state (Table 4.16). A majority of two-thirds in 2017 supported legislation of "a law stating that democracy would prevail in Israel on the condition that it does not harm the Jewish state" (Table 4.17).

**Table 4.16 Preference in Case of Conflict between a Jewish State and Democracy, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
In case of contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, I would prefer the Jewish character (J 56)	69.7	64.5	61.7	65.3	63.2	61.7
In decisions on the character and borders of the state there should be a majority from among the Jews and it is not sufficient to have a majority from among the population at large (J 44)	81.9	69.2	65.3	69.4	68.3	68.4

**Table 4.17 Priority of Jewish State to Democracy, Jews, 2013–2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews		
	2013	2015	2017
Agree that Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state and only then a democratic state	66.9	68.6	*
Agree that a law is required stating that democracy would prevail in Israel on the condition that it does not harm the Jewish state	64.2	67.3	67.6

\* Question not asked

In its original form, the National-State Law placed superiority of the Jewish state over the democratic state, but in its softened version, that was adopted in the Knesset in July 2018, the principles of equality and democracy were eliminated from the law. The enactment of the Nation-State Law is highly controversial. The political right views the Nation-State Law as a counterbalance of the two pro-democracy laws enacted in 1992 (Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) and as a factor in restraining the excessive liberalism of the Supreme Court. In contrast, the center-left bloc condemns the law as unnecessary, undemocratic and racist. The Arabs, including the Druze, reject the Nation-State Law altogether (Table 4.18). The controversy over the Nation-State Law is well evident in the Jewish public's position: 41.8% of the Jews in 2019 were in favor of leaving it as is or strengthening it, 39.3% were in favor of repealing or softening it by adding an equality clause, and 18.9% did not have opinion. The political stream to which the respondent belongs largely determines his or her stance on the Nation-State Law: Supporting the law as is or strengthening it constitutes 83.2% of Jews who define themselves on the right, 62.7% moderate right, 17.5% center, 7.5% moderate left and 3.8% left; 71.7% of the Jews who wish to keep or strengthen it felt close to rightwing political parties as compared to only 11.6% who felt close to center-left political parties.

**Table 4.18 A Stand on the Nation-State Law,  
Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
A stand on the Nation-State Law (A 102, J 57):		
It should be abolished	65.2	16.1
The principle of equality must be added in legislation to it	25.2	23.2
It should remain as is	0.8	15.1
The Jewish character of the state must be strengthened in it	0.0	26.7
No answer	8.7	18.9

In summary, Jews accept the state's position that Arabs are given individual and cultural collective rights, but not national collective rights. This differentiating position stands out in the decreasing order

of the following percentages of agreement: 71.3% of the Jews in 2019 accepted the right of Arabs to live in the country as a minority with full civil rights (Table 4.9), 67.1% in 2017 supported state provision of separate education for Arabs (Table 4.10) and 30.0% in 2019 agreed that the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews (Table 4.12). The state and most Jews deny Palestinian citizens of Israel national rights that bind them to the Palestinian people but may cast a shadow on the uni-national, Jewish and Zionist character of the state. The findings of the surveys also show that the 2017 exacerbation of Jewish attitudes is maintained and to some extent strengthened in 2019. The rightwing government's policy is successful in causing Jews to give less legitimacy to the existence and rights of Arabs in Israel.

## Chapter 5

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# Regional Disputes, Regional Integration, Identity

### Regional Disputes

The main regional conflict over which Arabs and Jews are deeply divided is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 70.5% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 63.6% in 2017) compared to only 45.4% of the Jews (down from 53.4%) agreed with the internationally accepted two-state solution (Table 5.1). But there is sharp disagreement not only about the solution but also about the ways to implement it, one of which is Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders with land swaps, a way that is acceptable to a majority of 64.9% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 56.1% in 2017) and only to a minority of 27.2% of the Jews (down from 37.7%). The Arabs generally favor the dismantling of all the Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line, but only 27.5% of the Jews in 2019 (down from 35.2% in 2017) agreed with the more restricted dismantling of Jewish settlements outside Jewish settlement blocs. There is allegedly agreement on other ways to settle the conflict, but in fact there is a profound rift. Most Arabs and most Jews oppose dividing Jerusalem into two separate capitals but for opposite reasons – the Arabs want Jerusalem a bi-national city for the mosques to be accessible to them, while the Jews want Jerusalem to remain united and in exclusive Jewish control. Both sides oppose the return of Palestinian refugees to the State of Palestine only for the opposite reasons – the Arabs because they support the right of return of the refugees to Israel as well, while the Jews oppose the right of return not only to Israel but also to Palestine. The exacerbation of the attitudes on the conflict issue took place among the Jews in 2019, while the attitude change among the Arabs was inconsistent over time.

**Table 5.1 Solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews						
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
Two states to two peoples (A 96, J 71)	88.8	68.7	63.7	71.3	63.6	70.5	71.3	66.7	61.5	60.0	53.4	45.4	
The pre-1967 boundaries will be the boundaries between the two states with an option of land swaps (A 96, J 71)	82.0	62.7	51.2	60.6	56.1	64.9	44.2	43.2	40.3	40.3	37.7	27.2	
Jewish settlements outside settlement blocks across the Green Line will be dismantled (J 73)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	36.5	35.2	27.5
Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab (A 98, J 74)	61.0**	48.8	43.2	38.2	39.8	34.0	23.3**	21.4	22.6	20.2	17.4	18.2	
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only (A 99, J 75)	72.2	46.8	47.5	53.3	45.2	39.1	62.6	47.1	48.2	43.8	35.9	35.7	
Some of the Arab localities in the Triangle will be annexed to a Palestinian state (A 101, J 77)	16.7	22.8	26.6	24.6	24.6	*	45.3	39.4***	40.4	40.5	39.4	*	
The borders between Israel and the Palestinian state will be open borders	76.2	73.1***	*	*	*	*	30.6	*	*	*	*	*	
After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over (A 100, J 76)	80.5	58.6	51.0	57.3	47.0	49.6	64.8	44.4	46.1	48.5	46.4	39.1	

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2004

\*\*\* In 2011

The dispute over the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is greatly influenced by the distrust between Arabs and Jews. The gap between Arabs who have and Arabs who do not have trust in Jews in 2019 is 31.4% to 66.8% regarding the image of the Jews as colonial settlers who are doomed to perish like the Crusaders, 83.1% to 57.2% regarding support for a two-state solution, 56.4% to 21.8% regarding return of Palestinian refugees to a Palestinian state only (not to Israel), and 46.1% to 76.7% regarding justifying a third Palestinian Intifada if the political deadlock persists (Table 5.2). Similarly, the gap between the Jews who trust Arab citizens and those who do not trust them is 55.3% to

83.2% for the image of the Palestinians not being the original inhabitants of the country, 63.6% to 33.0% for supporting a two-state solution, but almost no gap (41.8% to 37.7%) regarding the right of refugees to return to Palestine only. However, unlike the Arab political parties that have a broad consensus about the conflict, the conflict is the core dispute between Jewish political parties. This is why the Jews vary a great deal by political stream. For example, support for a two-state solution for two peoples is 26.0% among Jews on the right, 38.4% the moderate right, 74.8% the center, 83.6% the moderate left, and 90.0% the left (Table 5.3). The fault line is between the right bloc and the center-left bloc. This polarization can be illustrated by the gap at the edges between Jews who define themselves as “right” and Jews who define themselves as “left”: 12.5% vs. 66.7% on the issue of the 1967 borders, 7.6% vs. 57.1% on the redivision of Jerusalem, 9.7% vs. 90.0% on the dismantling of the settlements outside settlement blocs, and 27.5% vs. 75.0% regarding the belief in the end of claims of both sides and the conflict by reaching an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

**Table 5.2 Stand on the Israeli-Arab Conflict by Trust between Arabs and Jews, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		Jews	
	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Trust	Distrust	Trust	Distrust
The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, will be doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians (A 116)	31.4	66.8		
The Palestinians lack national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants (J 58)			55.3	83.2
Believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to permanent settlement in the coming years (A 113, J 79)	60.2	24.8	39.1	18.7
Two states to two peoples (A 105, J 73)	83.1	57.2	63.6	33.0
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only (A 108, J 77)	56.4	21.8	41.8	37.7
It is justified that the Palestinians will open a Third Intifada if the political stalemate continues (A 117)	46.1	76.7		
Will support a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians even if it does not include a solution to the lands expropriated from Israeli Arab citizens and to the internal refugee problem (A 110)	52.7	14.5		

**Table 5.3 Stand on the Israeli-Arab Conflict by Political Stream, Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews				
	2019				
	Right	Moderate Right	Center	Moderate Left	Left
Support the solution of two-state to two peoples (J 73)	26.0	38.4	74.8	83.6	90.0
Agree that the pre-1967 boundaries will be the boundaries between the two states with an option of land swaps (J 74)	12.5	25.2	53.8	73.0	66.7
Agree that the Jewish settlements outside settlement blocks across the Green Line will be dismantled (J 75)	9.7	17.9	52.3	73.8	90.0
Agree that Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab (J 76)	7.6	14.7	35.1	40.9	57.1
Agree that the Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only (J 77)	29.6	36.6	49.7	55.4	61.5
Agree that after the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over (J 78)	27.5	35.2	69.0	76.6	75.0
Disagree that Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants (J 58)	15.0	21.8	38.5	64.6	74.2
Do not believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent settlement (J 79)	16.8	19.2	44.9	52.9	53.3

Only a minority of Arabs and a minority of Jews believe that negotiations can reach a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite the negotiations that took place in 2013 between the Palestinian Authority and the Netanyahu government, 57.0% of the Arabs in 2013 and 81.8% of the Jews did not believe that a settlement could be reached because it was not conducted in good faith, and the non-believers rate was 56.3% among the Arabs in 2019 and 69.1% among the Jews (Table 5.4). As a result, 59.4% of the Arabs in 2019 thought that “it is justified that the Palestinians open a third Intifada if the political stalemate continues,” a possibility that Jews completely ruled out (Table 5.5).

**Table 5.4. Belief that Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians Will Lead to Permanent Settlement, Arabs and Jews, 2013–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews			
	2013	2015	2017	2019	2013	2015	2017	2019
Believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to permanent settlement in the coming years (A 113, J 79)	*				*			
Agree, tend to agree		50.8	46.6	56.3		58.1	62.5	69.1
Disagree, tend to disagree		49.2	53.1	43.3		37.8	31.7	25.4
No answer		0.0	0.3	0.5		4.0	5.8	5.5
Believe that the negotiations underway between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to permanent settlement		*	*	*		*	*	*
Definitely believe	4.7				2.1			
Believe	21.2				13.5			
Do not believe	37.6				35.3			
Definitely do not believe	19.4				46.5			
No answer	17.2				2.7			

\* Question not asked

**Table 5.5 Justification of a Third Intifada If Political Stalemate Persists, Arabs, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
If the UN declaration of a Palestinian state does not advance Palestinian affairs, it is justified that the Palestinians will open a third Intifada	54.9**	*	*	*	*
It is justified that the Palestinians open a third Intifada if the political stalemate continues (A 117)	58.6	48.6	58.7	61.3	59.4

\* Question not asked      \*\* In 2011

The claims of the Arab citizens from the state regarding the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians are part of the conflict. They include the right of return of the internal refugees (one-fifth of the Arabs in Israel) to their villages and towns destroyed by the IDF in 1948, compensation for their expropriated land and accordance of national rights to the Arab minority. Only 34.3% of the Arabs in 2019 (no change from 38.6% in 2017) said they would support a peace agreement that would not include compensation for the expropriated land, but 56.3% (up from 51.0%) would support an agreement that would guarantee them civil equality despite recognizing Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (Table 5.6). Most Arabs will, therefore, reconcile themselves with

Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, if they are granted civil equality, compensation for the expropriation of property and a policy of fair distribution of resources. They will probably also play an important and positive role in a referendum on approving an agreement with the Palestinians on which the Jews will probably be divided.

**Table 5.6 Peace Agreement with the Palestinians that Disregards Arabs in Israel, Arabs, 2012–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Support a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even though it includes recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state but insures full civil equality to Arabs (A 111)	52.6	58.4	58.4	51.0	34.3
Support a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even though it does not include solution to the problem of the lands confiscated from Arab citizens in Israel and to the problem of the internal refugees (A 110)	34.8	42.3	47.1	38.6	56.3

Arabs and Jews also disagree on other conflicts in the region. Contrary to the Jewish consensus that does not consider Israel an aggressive state in the region, 44.3% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 53.6% in 2017) said that “as long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there should be a strong power, Arab or Muslim, that faces Israel and hurts it hard if this is necessary,” 53.7% in 2012 supported “strengthening of Hezbollah forces against Israel,” opposed (55.9% in 2019) to the “recent rapprochement between Israel and Arab and Muslim states,” supported (35% in 2017) the outbreak of the Palestinian young Intifada since October 2015, opposed (89.3% in 2019) to Israeli military operations in Syria against Iran’s establishment there, and 18.7% in 2019 (down from 28.1% in 2013) were in favor of Iran’s development of nuclear weapons (Table 5.7). The majority of Arabs (58.9% in 2011) supported the fall of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt which was friendly to Israel and opposed (90.1% in 2017) “to the continued rule of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt” who is also friendly to Israel (Table 5.18). The Jews feel antagonistic towards all these Arab positions and a testimony, even if only a minority of Arabs hold them, that Arab citizens

are part of the enemy. On the other hand, like the Jews, only 1.5% of the Arabs in 2017 felt close to ISIS and only 1.9% supported it (Table 5.9).

**Table 5.7 Forces of Resistance to Israel in the Region,  
Arabs and Jews, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews		
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012	2013
Agree as long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there should be a strong power, Arab or Muslim, that faces Israel and hurts it hard if this is necessary (A 112)	*	52.7	33.2	49.6	53.6	44.3	*	*	*
Support the strengthening of Hezbollah forces against Israel	*	53.7	*	*	*		*	*	*
Oppose recent Israeli-Arab and Muslim rapprochement (A 123)						55.9			
Support the eruption of the Palestinian youth Intifada since October 2015					35.0				
Oppose Israel's military actions in Syria (A 125)						89.3			
Think if other countries do not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon, Israel should do so by force	26.0**	*	*	*	*		57.5	60.6	60.0
Think that development of nuclear weapon by Iran is justified	42.0								
Disagree that Israel should act to prevent Iran from replacing it as the strongest state in the region				58.1					
I welcome the nuclear agreement between the superpowers and Iran				62.8					
Support the development of nuclear weapon by Iran (A 127)		36.7	28.1			18.7			

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2010

**Table 5.8 Developments in Arab Countries since the Arab  
Spring, Arabs and Jews, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews	
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012
Israel should welcome the downfall of Mubarak's rule in Egypt	58.9						*	18.2
Support the ousting of the Islamic Brotherhood Movement from rule in Egypt			44.6					

	Arabs						Jews	
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012
Oppose the continued rule of Abdul al-Fatah Al-Sisi in Egypt					90.1	*		
Think that the struggle in Syria against Assad's rule is justified	64.5							
Do not support the continued Assad's rule in Syria		71.4	65.4			*		
Oppose the continued Bashar al-Assad's rule in Syria (A 124)					76.2	59.0		
Expect development of democracy in Arab countries in which regime change took place recently	74.7						54.4	
Support the rise to power of Islamic movements in a number of Arab countries after comparing the good and the bad of the rise		62.7	59.4					8.0

**Table 5.9 Da'ash (Islamic State), Arabs, 2015–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	
	2015	2017
Da'ash is an extreme terrorist organization and I as an Arab feel ashamed of it:		
Agree	57.3	
Tend to agree	25.1	
Tend to disagree	11.3	
Disagree	5.6	
No answer	0.8	
Feeling close to Da'ash (Islamic State)		
To a great extent		0.1
To an appreciable extent		1.4
To some extent		3.9
Not at all		93.7
No answer		0.9
Support of Da'ash (Islamic State) (A 116)		
Definitely support		0.5
Support		1.4
Oppose		27.0
Definitely oppose		70.9
No answer		0.3

Despite the disagreements between the two sides about developments in the region, a majority of 58.7% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 55.8% in 2017) said that “when I see the unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in

2011, I feel good that I live in Israel” (Table 5.10). There is no doubt that much greater than 58.7% of the Arabs in 2019 think this way. Some of them refrain from saying so in order not to feel shame in the failure of the Arab world and not to admit the priority of living in Israel despite discrimination and exclusion. Arab citizens of Israel are deeply disappointed with the Arab world and cherish the stability and tranquility they enjoy in Israel.

**Table 5.10 The Impact of the Downfall of the Arab Spring on Arabs in Israel, Arabs, 2015–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		
	2015	2017	2019
When I see the unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, I feel good that I live in Israel (A 122)			
Disagree, tend to disagree	35.0	43.9	40.8
Agree, tend to agree	64.2	55.8	58.7
No answer	0.8	0.3	0.6

## Regional Integration

Israel is Western in its self-image, in Jewish elites’ orientation and to some extent in the way the state conducts itself, and it also ties its fate with the West. On the other hand, Israel is envisaged by the Arab world and Arab elites in Israel as a colonial and foreign body in the region. An examination of public attitudes shows, however, a more complex and dynamic picture. A majority of 56.8% of the Arabs in 2019, up from 47.0% in 2003 and unchanged from 61.5% in 2017, said that “Israel should integrate into the Western world more than into the Arab and Muslim states in the region” and 62.3%, up from 53.1% in 2003 and down from 69.8% in 2017, said that “in the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East” (Table 5.11). The existence of an Arab majority, growing since 2003, in favor of Israel’s integration into the West reveals once again the bitter disaffection of the Arabs in Israel with the Arab region, their desire to

get rid of its underdevelopment and disputes and their preference to integrate into a developed, democratic, prosperous and stable West.

Paradoxically the Jews are divided in their attitude towards the West. On the one hand, they are positively oriented to the West and are well aware of the state's dependence on it and also dislike the region. On the other hand, they fear the West's threat to the uniqueness of their Israeli-Hebrew culture and to the Jewish-Zionist character of their state. The complexity and ambivalence of this approach is reflected in the attitudes of the Jewish public. Only about half of the Jews (48.0% in 2019, unchanged from 51.1% in 2017) believed that "Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries" and only half (50.6%, unchanged from 55.1%) supported cultural integration in the West (Table 5.11). The inconsistency and confusion among the Jews is so great that no significant differences were found by political stream, education, community, age and gender, so that every population group was internally divided by integration into the region. The only significant differentiation between Jews is by religious observance (62.8% of secular people in 2019 were for integration into Western culture, 57.1 % of the traditional, 53.6% of the religious and 36.5% of the ultra-Orthodox).

The fierce controversy between the Arab and the Jewish public about integration in the West versus integration in the region has been waning as the Arab public comes close to the West and the Jewish public becomes divided in its position. Both sides seem to be interested in some synthesis.

**Table 5.11 Israel's Regional Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries (A 112, J 81)	*	46.8	48.2	52.9	63.9	42.0	*	63.4	60.1	60.6	51.1	48.0
Israel should integrate into the Western world more than into the Arab and Muslim states in the region (A 120)	47.0	49.7	45.2	59.6	61.5	58.6	76.3	*	*	*	*	*

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East (A 110, J 80)	53.1	55.1	49.7	62.0	69.8	62.3	66.4	65.0	59.3	58.9	55.1	50.6
Israel has much to learn from the West and only little from Arab countries	*	48.4	54.7	*	*	*	*	55.1	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

## Identity

It is not expected that a common Israeli identity will be developed in the country to bind Arabs and Jews. The serious obstacles that stand in its way are the deep rift in the determinants of identity formation (language, religion, religiosity, culture, nationality), the Millet system that divides the population by religion, Zionism that inhibits the making of all Israeli citizens to an “Israeli people,” the ethnic nature of democracy that creates inequality between citizens, and the divisive collective memory of the Holocaust and the Nakba.

### **Arab Identity**

Arab, Palestinian, Israeli and Nakba memory are four permanent components of Arab identity in Israel. When faced with the choice between affiliations, 45.7% of the Arabs in 2017 and 43.0% in 2019 chose the Palestinian people, 38.0% and 39.0% religion and only 13.9% and 14.3% Israeli citizenship, all of which are unchanged from 2012 (Table 5.12). Israeli citizenship is weak in competition with nationality and religion, but it is an important component of Arabs’ identity sets as reflected in their choice of specific identities offered to them. The three of the nine most attractive identities to the Arabs are: Palestinian Arabs in Israel – 27.1%, Israeli Arabs – 14.9% and Palestinian Arabs – 12.8% (Table 5.13). These three identities represent three categories: 35.9% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 31.6% in 2017) chose Israeli Arab identities without a Palestinian component (Israeli, Arab, Arab in Israel, Israeli Arab), 47.1% (increase from 38.4%) chose Palestinian

identities with an Israeli component (Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab in Israel), and 14.8% (down from 21.9%) chose Palestinian identities without an Israeli component (Palestinian, Palestinian-Arab). The identity of 83.0% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 75.5% in 2017) has an Israeli component and 61.9% (unchanged from 60.3%) has a Palestinian component. However, when these two components were presented as competitors, 69.0% of the Arabs in 2019 chose exclusive or primary Palestinian identity, compared with 29.8% who chose exclusive or primary Israeli Arab identity (Table 5.14). Also, a majority of 65.9% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 71.8% in 2017) said that “the identity of ‘Palestinian Arab in Israel’ is appropriate to most Arabs in Israel” (Table 5.15). We learn that the Arabs integrate Israeliness with Palestinianness as permanent components of their identity and that the Palestinian component is the dominant of the two.

**Table 5.12 Citizenship, Religion and Nationality as Components of Personal Identity, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The most important affiliation (A 165):						
Israeli citizenship	29.6	12.2	18.7	13.4	13.9	14.3
Religion	48.2	45.2	45.2	46.5	38.0	39.0
Nationality (Palestinian/Jewish people)	18.8	41.3	33.9	39.5	45.7	43.0
No answer	3.4	1.3	2.2	0.6	2.3	3.6

**Table 5.13 Personal National Identity, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Define their personal national identity as (A 163):						
Arab	9.1	8.5	6.2	11.5	8.5	10.0
Israeli Arab	29.7	11.9	17.0	12.3	16.0	14.9
Arab in Israel	9.5	9.8	16.1	6.5	8.2	8.0
Israeli	4.8	2.4	3.2	5.9	4.4	3.0
Palestinian Arab	3.7	18.0	15.0	20.3	17.1	12.8
Israeli Palestinian	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.7	2.6	9.0
Palestinian in Israel	3.7	7.4	5.8	6.6	4.2	11.0
Palestinian Arab in Israel	33.7	34.4	30.0	26.8	31.6	27.1
Palestinian	1.9	3.5	2.6	5.5	4.8	2.0
No answer	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0	2.6	2.1

**Table 5.14 Personal Identity as Palestinian-Arab versus Israeli-Arab, Arabs, 2013–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs			
	2013	2015	2017	2019
See themselves as:				
Only Palestinian-Arab and not Israeli-Arab at all	24.4	31.0	32.4	
Mainly Palestinian-Arab and also Israeli-Arab to some extent	33.8	32.0	29.1	
Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab equally	16.7	15.8	15.3	
Mainly Israeli-Arab and also Palestinian-Arab to some extent	14.6	11.6	14.5	
Only Israeli-Arab and not Palestinian-Arab at all	7.5	8.5	7.2	
No answer	2.8	1.0	1.5	
See themselves as (A 164):				
Only Palestinian-Arab and not Israeli-Arab at all				27.8
Mainly Palestinian-Arab and also Israeli-Arab to some extent				41.2
Mainly Israeli-Arab and also Palestinian-Arab to some extent				18.3
Only Israeli-Arab and not Palestinian-Arab at all				11.5
No answer				1.2

**Table 5.15 Appropriateness of the Identity “Palestinian Arab in Israel” to Arabs, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The identity “Palestinian Arab in Israel” is appropriate to most Arabs in Israel (A 20)	62.2	63.8	64.4	63.2	71.8	65.9

The Nakba element is also interwoven in the Arab identity in Israel. 56.6% of the Arabs in 2015 said that the Nakba was central or very central to their lives and additional 29.8% said that it was central to some extent to them (Table 5.16). These numbers show that the Nakba is a formative event in the identity of the Arab citizens even though the state uses a policy of its disregard in school textbooks and of fining public institutions that fund Nakba commemoration events.

**Table 5.16 Importance in Life of the Nakba Memory, Arabs, 2013–2015 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	
	2013	2015
The Nakba memory is important in your life:		
To a very great degree	28.9	29.8
To a great degree	22.9	26.8
To some degree	39.6	29.8
Not at all	7.9	13.4
No answer	0.7	0.2

Identity is not just what I am but also what I am not, that is, who I differentiate myself from. Since the identity of the state and the identity of the Jewish majority is Zionist, the Arabs were asked how they define themselves on Zionism. Obviously, an Arab cannot identify as Jewish, but there is no impediment to adopting a Zionist identity. Since the Jews and the state neither demand nor expect the Arabs to embrace a Zionist identity or ideology, it is no wonder that only a negligible proportion of the Arabs (2.0% in 2017 and 1.0% in 2019), consisting mainly of Druze, define themselves as Zionist or very Zionist, and by so doing they signal that they do not share the identity of the Jews and the identity of the state (Table 5.17). More significant is the division between the other two opposite categories of identity: 76.9% of the Arabs in 2003 chose “non-Zionist” versus 19.6% who chose “anti-Zionist,” and this was the choice of 45.1% versus 51.7% in 2017 and 56.2% versus 41.5% in 2019. Exacerbation in the choice of identity from 2003 to 2017 and moderation from 2017 to 2019 are evident. The increase over the years also stands out in the rise of the Arab “anti-Zionist” identity from 19.6% in 2003 to 41.5% in 2019.

**Table 5.17 Zionism as a Component of Personal Identity, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Self-definition on Zionism (A 165):						
Very Zionist	0.4	2.7	1.9	2.5	1.2	0.5
Zionist	0.6	4.0	1.5	3.8	0.8	0.5
Not Zionist	76.9	48.2	52.9	56.7	45.1	56.2
Anti-Zionist	19.6	43.6	42.5	36.0	51.7	41.5
No answer	2.5	1.4	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.3

We can learn about the Palestinianness and Israeliness of Arab citizens from the connection they feel to the Palestinians and to the Jews. On the one hand, a majority of 56.1% of the Arabs in 2017 (an increase from 46.6% in 2015) estimated that most Arab citizens would be loyal to a future Palestinian state than to the State of Israel (Table 5.18). Although loyalty to Palestine indicates an emotional tie, not willingness to violate the laws of the State of Israel, in Jews’ and State’s

eyes it means a declaration of disloyalty to Israel. On the other hand, the strong affinity of the Arabs to Israel is expressed in the 60.3% of them who said in 2019 (unchanged from 62.9% in 2017) that the Arabs in Israel are more like the Jews in way of life and behavior than like the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and in the 59.5% who said in 2017 (unchanged from 57.3% in 2015) that “when Arab citizens evaluate their achievements, most of them compare themselves mainly with Jews” (Table 5.19).

**Table 5.18 Affinity of Arabs in Israel to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017
Most Arab citizens will be more loyal to a Palestinian state in which they do not live than to Israel	39.2	50.2	47.0	46.6	56.1
Arab citizens have a right to support an armed struggle by the Palestinians also within the Green Line	17.8	39.5**	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2011

**Table 5.19 Affinity of Arabs in Israel to Jews, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
In their way of life and behavior, Arab citizens are more similar to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (A 19)	71.5	54.4	59.5	58.1	62.9	60.3
When Arab citizens evaluate their achievements, most of them compare themselves mainly with Jews	*	*	*	*	59.5	*

\* Question not asked

This dual relationship is also evident in 53.8% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 45.9% in 2017) who felt closer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza than to the Jews (Table 5.20). Interestingly, 64.8% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 72.0% in 2017) did not feel rejection from the Palestinians. They are no longer accused of collaborating with Israel, but are rather welcome by the Palestinians in the West Bank as buyers, spenders of leisure time and students in higher education institutions. 20.1% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 21.9% in 2017) stated

their willingness to move to Palestine upon its establishment. The distribution of respondents by region reveals the extent to which this statement expresses protest, not intention to immigrate: Only 10.0% of the residents of the Triangle in 2019 for whom annexation of the Triangle to Palestine is on the political agenda were ready to move to Palestine, compared to 22.5% of residents of other regions. Indeed, every time the proposal is raised to annex the Triangle to Palestine as part of a permanent settlement, the Arabs in Israel feel insulted and express fierce opposition.

**Table 5.20 Feelings of Arabs in Israel toward the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Feel closer to the Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza than to Jews in Israel (A 21)	51.1	55.7	41.8	43.7	45.9	53.8
As an Arab citizen in Israel, I feel alien and rejected by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (A 24)	*	62.5	60.8	43.9	72.0	64.8
Ready to move to a Palestinian state (A 22)	13.8	24.1	20.9	27.5	21.9	20.1

\* Question not asked

### ***Jewish Identity***

As with the Arabs, the most important affiliation among the Jews is nationality – 48.7% of the Jews in 2017 and 45.1% in 2019 chose to belong to the Jewish people and another 10.7% and 17.1% chose to belong to Jewish religion, in which nationality is also interwoven because the Jews do not have separation between nation and religion (Table 5.21). 30.2% of the Jews in 2019 (unchanged from 34.9% in 2017) chose Israeli citizenship twice as many as Arabs (14.3% in 2019 and no change from 13.9% in 2017). However, for the Jews, Israeli citizenship also includes national belonging because Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and not the state of all its citizens.

**Table 5.21 Citizenship, Religion and Nationality as Components of Personal Identity, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The most important affiliation (J 101):						
Israeli citizenship	29.6	42.2	41.0	35.1	34.9	30.2
Religion	18.9	15.0	15.4	15.6	10.7	17.1
Nationality (Palestinian/Jewish people)	43.6	40.6	40.6	45.6	48.7	45.1
No answer	7.9	2.1	3.1	3.8	5.7	7.6

When asked to choose between the two components of their identity, 60.4% of the Jews in 2017 (unchanged from 61.1% in 2015) chose “Jewish and Israeli equally,” testifying to the feeling of most Jews that the two components complement each other (Table 5.22). When the option “Jewish and Israeli equally” was deleted, 51.4% of the Jews in 2019 chose either exclusive or main Jewish identity, compared to 41.0% who opted for exclusive or main Israeli identity, confirming what is already known that the percentage of Jews on the right (a political stream that stands for more Jewish than Israeli identity) is greater than their percentage on the center-left. Those who chose exclusive identities (2.9% who chose “Jewish only” and 5.1% who chose “Israeli only”) are a negligible minority because there is an overlap between Jewish and Israeli. The division between the first and foremost as Jews and the first and foremost as Israelis is significant and highly correlated with many attitudes, so that those who identify primarily as Jewish are clearly religious, rightwing, hawkish and prefer Israel as more Jewish than democratic.

**Table 5.22 Personal Identity as Jewish versus Israeli, Jews, 2013–2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews		
	2013	2015	2017
See oneself as:			
Jewish only and not at all Israeli	3.1	6.8	4.1
Mainly Jewish and also Israeli to some extent	15.2	13.9	13.9
Jewish and Israeli equally	63.5	61.1	60.4
Mainly Israeli and also Jewish to some extent	13.0	12.6	16.4
Israeli only and not at all Jewish	3.5	3.3	3.6
No answer	1.7	2.3	1.5

	Jews		
	2013	2015	2017
See oneself as (J 102):			
Jewish only and not at all Israeli			2.9
Mainly Jewish and also Israeli to some extent			48.5
Mainly Israeli and also Jewish to some extent			35.9
Israeli only and not at all Jewish			5.1
No answer			7.7

Jews in Israel also have two other hidden identities: 84.2% of the Jews in 2017 and 82.9% in 2019 defined themselves as Zionists (Table 5.23) and 94.8% in 2013 said the Holocaust memory was central to their lives (Table 5.24). The small minority of non-Zionists is comprised of Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox and Russian non-Jews that most of them agree to Zionist practices such as Israel's right to retain a Jewish majority. All Jews, including Mizrahim, deeply internalize the memory of the Holocaust because it is institutionalized in Israeli culture in such a way that its nationalistic and particularistic lessons (victimhood, Iron Wall mentality and "Never Again") overshadow its humanistic and universalistic messages (human rights, respect for the other and Tikkun Olam).

**Table 5.23 Zionism as a Component of Personal Identity, Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Self-definition on Zionism (J 103):						
Very Zionist	33.4	38.8	36.0	41.2	40.5	36.3
Zionist	46.4	43.3	47.3	40.0	43.7	46.6
Not Zionist	16.6	12.2	8.7	12.5	11.6	11.3
Anti-Zionist	1.7	2.1	3.7	2.8	1.0	1.5
No answer	1.9	3.6	4.3	3.6	3.2	4.3

**Table 5.24 Importance in Life of the Memory of the Shoah, Jews, 2013**

	Jews
	2013
The memory of the Shoah is important in life:	
To a very great degree	74.3
To a great degree	20.5
To some degree	4.7
Not at all	0.5
No answer	0.1

Most Jews see Arab citizens as having a strong affinity for the Palestinians. They believe that Palestinian identity is appropriate for Arabs in Israel (64.3% in 2003), which for Jews is a subversive and hostile identity. They also think that the Arabs will be more loyal to the State of Palestine than to the State of Israel (59.1% in 2013). Only a minority (46.5% in 2013) agree that Arabs are more like Jews in way of life and behavior than Palestinians. These images of the Jews keep them away from Arab citizens.

### ***The Problematics of Accepting the Identity of the Other***

Arabs and Jews deny important elements in the identity of each other. The Arabs totally reject the Zionist identity of the Jews: They not only lack Zionist identity in a country where Zionism is hegemonic (56.2% in 2019 defined themselves as non-Zionist and 41.5% as anti-Zionist) (Table 5.17) but also 77.1% of them in 2015 rejected Zionism as a colonial and racist movement, 47.8% in 2019 condemned Jews as foreign and colonial settlers whose fate will be like the Crusaders who disappeared (Table 3.12), 64.7% in 2019 said that Israel as a Zionist state is racist (Table 4.6), and 60.2% in 2019 denounced most Israeli Jews as racist (Table 2.13). The Arabs also find it difficult to come to terms with the memory of the Holocaust as a component of Jewish identity because it is used to legitimize the Jewish character of the state and to strengthen its Jewish self-image as a victim vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

At the same time, the Jews reject important elements in Arab identity. 69.4% of the Jews in 2019 believed that Arabs who identify as Palestinians cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws (Table 4.15), 61.1% in 2019 did not believe that the Nakba had happened (Table 3.20) and 65.0% in 2003 blamed the Palestinians themselves in its occurrence (Table 3.20). This negative view stems from the fact that Palestinian citizens of Israel are considered part of the Palestinian people who is still defined as an enemy.

To sum up, Arabs and Jews do not fully accept the identity of each other, and specifically, Arabs reject the Zionist and Holocaust identity of the Jews, while the Jews reject the Palestinian and Nakba identity

of the Arabs. This reciprocal rejection hurts the chances of coexistence between Arabs and Jews.

## Chapter 6

# Minority Leadership, Autonomy, Means of Struggle

### Minority Leadership

For the minority struggle to remain democratic and effective, the leadership institutions and leaders of the minority must be seen by the majority group, the state and the minority itself as credible, representative and legitimate. This situation does not exist in Israel. The representativeness of the Arab leadership institutions suffered a severe blow by the breakup of the Joint List shortly near and after the April 2019 elections, the date of the 2019 Index surveys. The percentages of trust given by the Arabs in 2019 were as follows: Confidence of 39.9% (a sharp decrease from 59.1% in 2013) in the Arab political parties, 45.0% (a decrease from 58.3% in 2017) in the Committee of Arab Local Authorities, 44.9% (a decrease from 57.5% in 2017) in the Higher Follow-Up Committee, and 52.8% (down from 58.5%) in the Islamic Movement (Table 6.1). The trust of the Jewish public in the institutions of Arab leadership is even lower because it is only slightly or negatively exposed to them. Only 24.3% of the Jews in 2019 (down from 36.6% in 2013) trust Arab political parties and 25.3% in 2017 (down from 34.4% in 2015) trust the Committee of Arab Local Authorities.

**Table 6.1 Confidence in Arab Leadership Institutions in Israel,  
Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Arab political parties truly represent Arab citizens (A 139, J 88)	53.1	61.9	59.1	*	*	39.9	53.1	35.4	36.6	*		24.3

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities truly represents Arab citizens (A 137)	*	55.0	60.7	60.9	58.3	45.0	*	36.0	39.6	34.4	25.3	*
The Higher Follow-Up Committee truly represents Arab citizens (A 136)	58.9	62.7	59.5	59.6	57.5	44.9	*	*	*	*	*	*
The Islamic Movement truly represents Arab citizens (A 138)	51.8	61.8	56.8	57.0	58.5	52.8	*	*	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

Most Arabs also do not trust their leaders. 66.0% of the Arabs in 2019 (a sharp increase in distrust from 47.1% in 2017) did not trust Arab leaders and 71.0% (a sharp increase from 53.9%) thought that Arab leaders do not serve the Arab population in promoting practical solutions to its problems (Table 6.2). Jewish distrust of Arab leaders reached a peak of 88.7% in 2019 (unchanged from 86.6% in 2017). This total Jewish distrust undoubtedly applies to Arab Knesset Members, whom even a majority of 61.7% of the Arabs in 2019 did not trust (Table 6.3).

**Table 6.2 Distrust of Arab Leadership in Israel, Arabs and Jews, 2011–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Do not trust Arab leaders in Israel (A 140, J 91)	59.6	58.2	63.3	59.8	47.1	66.0	82.5	83.2	84.8	80.0	86.6	88.7
Arab leaders in Israel do not serve the Arab population in advancing practical solutions to its problems (A 141)	62.4	63.2	66.5	67.5	53.9	71.0	61.3	65.9	62.4	*	*	*
Arab leaders in Israel do not serve the Arab population by voicing protest against the state and its policy	59.3	61.1	62.2	*	*	*	34.3	*	*	*	*	*
Arab leaders in Israel should deal more with solving daily problems of the Arabs than dealing with the conflict with the Palestinians	84.1	76.0	80.3	*	*	*	85.6	86.4	*	*	*	*

	Arabs						Jews						
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
The impact of Arab leaders in Israel on the relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel													
Contribution	69.3	69.5	57.9				18.4	18.4					
Damage	25.8	26.0	35.2				70.9	73.4					
No answer	5.1	4.5	6.6	*	*	*	10.7	9.3	*	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

**Table 6.3 Distrust of Arab Knesset Members, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
Trust in Arab Knesset Members (A 66):	
Not at all	19.3
To a small degree	42.4
To a sufficient degree	22.9
To a great degree	14.9
No answer	0.3

The Arab leadership institutions and leaders gained the trust of the Arab public in the period between the establishment of the Joint List towards the 2015 Knesset elections and its dissolution before the April 2019 Knesset elections. The Joint List symbolizes Arab national unity and the ability to influence what the Arabs so long for. The List had some impact on the government's decision from the end of 2015 to implement a five-year plan for large investments in the Arab sector. It won the support of 83.2% of Arab voters in the 2015 Knesset elections. Indeed, 65.0% of the Arabs in 2017 said that the Joint List faithfully represents the Arabs in Israel, 88.2% demanded that it focus on solving the daily problems of the Arabs, 75.8% wanted it to cooperate with the Jewish authorities and political parties to advance the affairs of the Arab population, and 75.9% felt it is very important that it continue to exist (Table 6.4). A small majority of 55.8% of the Arabs in 2017 also expressed satisfaction with the Joint List (Table 6.5). A large majority of 71.8% of the voters for the Joint List in 2017 were also satisfied with it and 84.8% even said they would vote for it in the next election. Jews, unlike Arabs, opposed the Joint List: Only 23.9% of the Jews in 2017 recognized it as a true representative of the Arabs, only 32.9% agreed

to its participation in a coalition government and 41.3% even supported its outlawing. The Joint List has become a serious controversy between Arabs and Jews.

**Table 6.4 A Stand on the Joint List, Arabs and Jews, 2015–2017 Percentages)**

	Arabs		Jews	
	2015	2017	2015	2017
The Joint List of Arab political parties truly represents the Arabs in Israel	55.9	65.0	39.0	23.9
It is important to me that the Joint List continues to exist as one body and will not break up	67.9	75.9	*	*
The Joint List should concentrate on solving the daily problems of the Arab population	79.2	88.2	*	*
The Joint List would rather talk to the authorities and Jewish political parties in order to advance the interests of the Arab population	75.7	75.8	*	*
If an opportunity will emerge that the left-center block will construct the government, the Joint List should be ready to join the coalition headed by the left-center block and assume the common responsibility for all the decisions and actions of the government	57.6		*	*
The Jewish political parties should accept the Joint List as a legitimate candidate for membership in coalition government like any other party (J 89)	*		46.7	32.9
Expect the Joint List to improve the situation of the Arab population in Israel	52.5		*	*
Fear lest the Joint List deepen the separation between Arabs and Jews in Israel	45.0		*	*
The Joint List should be outlawed	*		29.5	41.3

\* Question not asked

**Table 6.5 Satisfaction with the Joint List, Arabs, 2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2017
Feel satisfied or disappointed with the Joint List:	
Definitely satisfied	6.2
Satisfied	49.6
Disappointed	31.4
Definitely disappointed	9.2
No answer	3.6

As stated above, at the time of the April-June 2019 surveys the Joint List was disbanded (and only in the run-up to the September 2019 election it was re-established). A large majority of the Arabs were in favor

of the Joint List: 75.9% of the Arabs in 2019 expressed disappointment with its dissolution and 70.8% supported its re-establishment (Table 6.6). These are high percentages of support for the Joint List.

**Table 6.6 A Stand on the Joint List, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
Disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List in the Knesset election in April 2019 (A 142)	75.9
Agree that the Arabs ought to run in a Joint List in the next Knesset election (A 143)	70.8

Arabs and Jews were asked in 2019 about their position towards “an Arab political party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel.” This question includes three conditions: A government that acts with equality and fairness towards the Arab minority, Arabs’ acceptance of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and open striving of an Arab political party to join a government coalition under these conditions. A majority of 57.1% of the Arabs in 2019 and a majority of 56.7% of the Jews support an Arab political party that behaves in this way (Table 6.7). These are impressive consensus rates regarding a theoretical scenario because no such an Arab political party exists. Arabs who support more than the average of 57.1% in 2019 this type of political party include those who are not disappointed with the Joint List (67.2%), Arabs who voted for Jewish political parties (87.0%), whose identity is Israeli Arab and not Palestinian (72.8%), have Jewish friends and visited their homes in the past two years (71.7%), received help from Jews (66.4%), spent time three or more times with Jews (78.7%), and never encountered threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (70.9%). Jews who support this kind of a political party more than the average of 56.7% include those on the moderate right (65.1%), the center (82.8%), the moderate left (89.2%), the left (100.0%), have full higher education (77.5%), are over 55 (79.6%), secular (74.3%) and whose identity is mainly Israeli (82.1%).

**Table 6.7 A Stand on an Arab Party That Acts for Joining a Government Coalition, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
A stand on an Arab Party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel (A 156, J 90):		
Definitely support	15.8	19.2
Support	40.9	37.9
Oppose	14.0	20.1
Definitely oppose	16.5	21.6
No answer	12.7	1.2

The turnout of Arabs in the April 2019 Knesset elections dropped to an unprecedented rate of 49.2%. Eligible voters who did not vote were asked to indicate the main reason for not voting. Respondents were divided into two groups. The “moderate” or a “non-ideological” group includes Arabs who said “I am not interested in politics,” “my vote is ineffective,” “I am disappointed with the Joint List in the previous Knesset.” The “non-moderate” or “ideological” group includes those who said “there is no party or list that represents me,” “I am disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List,” “I am in principle boycotting the Knesset election.” The moderate group made up 40.5% of the non-voters and the non-moderate group made up 58.2% (Table 6.8). All the voters and non-voters in Knesset election in April 2019 can be divided into four groups: Arabs who voted for Jewish political parties, Arabs who voted for Arab political parties, Arabs who did not vote for non-ideological reasons, and Arabs who did not vote for ideological reasons.

**Table 6.8 Main Reason for Not Voting to the Knesset in April 2019, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
(To eligible Arabs who did not vote in the Knesset election in April 2019) Why did you not vote in the recent election? (A 182):	
I am not interested in politics	20.6
My voting is ineffective	11.2
There is no party or list that represents me	11.1
I am in principle boycotting the Knesset election	29.5
I am disappointed with the Joint List in the previous Knesset election	8.7
I am disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List	17.6
No answer	1.3

There is both a difference and a similarity in the attitudes and background of the four groups distinguished by voting to the Knesset in April 2019. In Arab politics, there is general disappointment with the dissolution of the Joint List – 48.2% of the Arabs who voted for Jewish political parties compared to 80.4% of the Arabs who did not vote for ideological reasons. There is also a majority of 70.8% of Arabs who said that Arabs should run on a Joint List in the next election (Table 6.9). Almost all Arabs who voted in April 2019 said they would also vote in the next election like most Arabs who did not vote who said they would continue not to vote (71.7% of those who did not vote for non-ideological reasons and 80.4% of those who did not vote for ideological reasons). A minority of those who voted compared to about 60% of those who did not vote supported boycott of the election in protest of the enactment of the Nation-State Law. Even those who did not vote are in favor of Arab political parties joining government coalitions – 61.7% of non-voters for non-ideological reasons and 51.3% of non-voters for ideological reasons. Only a minority of 26.8% of those who did not vote for ideological reasons compared to a majority of all others support “an Arab party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel.” Most Arabs in all groups do not trust Arab Knesset Members and most Arabs believe that Arab political parties, apart from the one they voted for, do not truly represent the Arabs in Israel. It can be generalized with regard to Arab politics that there are significant differences between voters and non-voters, between voters to Jewish political parties and voters to Arab political parties, and between non-ideological non-voters and ideological non-voters.

The differences between the four groups are also noticeable in certain positions in Arab-Jewish relations. For example, agreeing with the central sentence “I’m reconciled with Israel as a state where a Jewish majority and an Arab minority live together” was 91.9% in 2019 of those who voted for Jewish political parties, 65.7% of those who voted for Arab political parties, 56.8% of those who did not vote for non-ideological reasons and only 31.1% of those who did not vote for

ideological reasons (Table 6.10). The average scores of each group on the scale of coexistence and the scale of militancy (discussed in Chapter 8) illustrate these differences very well. The percentage of those with a high score on the coexistence scale in each group was 91.9%, 60.9%, 51.8% and 38.9%, respectively, and the percentage of those with a low score on the militancy scale was 87.2%, 37.8%, 32.6% and 17.0%, respectively. In other attitudes, however, there is actually agreement, such as, for example, regarding the feeling of an increase in distance from the state following the destruction of houses without a permit in Arab localities.

**Table 6.9 Attitudes toward Arab Politics by Voting in the Knesset Election in April 2019, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2019	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Voted to Jewish Parties	Voted to Arab Parties	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Total*
Disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List in the Knesset election in April 2019 (A 142)	48.2	78.1	82.7	80.4	75.9
Arabs should run in a Joint List in the next Knesset election (A 143)	61.2	76.0	80.6	62.8	70.8
Say that they will not vote in the next Knesset election (A 180)	3.5	3.8	71.7	80.4	37.9
Agree to participation of Arab political parties in coalition governments (A 5)	94.1	71.5	61.7	51.3	65.6
Support an Arab party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel (A 156)	87.1	54.3	61.7	47.7	57.1
Arab citizens have a great impact on which political bloc (left-center or right) will be in power (A 128)	57.1	61.9	60.4	26.8	48.8
Agree to Arabs' boycott of Knesset election against the Nation-State Law (A 103)	7.1	30.7	59.7	63.8	44.3
Arab political parties do not truly represent Arab citizens (A 139)	81.2	39.7	74.4	63.8	59.6
Do not trust Arab Knesset Members (A 66)	76.5	52.7	59.7	67.7	61.9

\* All respondents in the survey, including those who were not classified into anyone of the four groups

**Table 6.10 Attitudes toward Arab-Jewish Relations by Voting in the Knesset Election in April 2019, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2019	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Voted to Jewish Parties	Voted to Arab Parties	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Total*
As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel (A 23)	10.6	57.0	52.2	64.3	52.4
I'm reconciled with Israel as a state in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 25)	91.9	65.7	56.8	31.1	54.9
Fear of severe infringement of the rights of Arab citizens (A 38)	23.5	82.6	76.1	77.9	71.9
Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for the Arab citizens as well (A 45)	94.1	61.7	53.7	40.2	56.3
Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 51)	91.9	78.2	80.6	48.5	70.1
Prefer a struggle for civil and socioeconomic equality to a struggle for peace and change of Israel's character (A 67)	90.6	92.4	82.2	64.3	80.4
Agree to Arabs' use of all means, including violence, to improve their situation in Israel (A 79)	9.3	42.1	16.4	49.8	34.7
There are good chances for an Arab youth to fulfill his occupational aspirations in Israel today (A 83)	88.2	56.7	58.5	43.4	56.8
There is in Israel a lot of discrimination against Arabs who try to move to a Jewish town (A 84)	14.3	63.9	50.0	71.9	56.5
In favor of two states to two peoples (A 105)	88.1	79.7	82.8	47.7	70.5
Believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to permanent settlement in the coming years (A 113)	78.8	47.7	36.6	29.9	43.3
It is justified that Arab citizens will open an Intifada of their own if their situation will not improve appreciably (A 118)	29.8	61.8	70.9	57.7	57.6
The Arab minority is strong (A 127)	78.6	68.9	68.7	46.8	62.5
Feeling close to Jews in the aftermath of the government resolution to implement a grand plan for development of the Arab sector (A 134)	88.1	55.3	63.4	35.9	54.0
Feel afar from the state in the aftermath of destruction of unapproved buildings in Arab localities (A 135)	89.3	86.9	82.7	62.5	77.5
Do not trust Arab leaders in Israel (A 140)	83.5	47.9	72.4	76.3	66.0
Arab leaders in Israel do not serve the Arab population in advancing practical solutions to its problems (A 141)	88.1	51.5	79.9	80.2	71.0

	Arabs				
	2019	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Voted to Jewish Parties	Voted to Arab Parties	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Total*
The government treats Arabs in Israel as second class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality (A 159)	25.9	72.2	73.9	75.3	67.2
Dissatisfied with being an Israeli citizen (A 160)	11.8	53.8	42.9	67.9	50.8
Define their identity as Palestinians in Israel or Israeli Palestinians (A 163)	11.8	65.4	66.4	35.9	47.1
Rank high (scores 5–6) on the coexistence scale (coexist_scale)	91.9	60.9	51.8	38.9	55.7
Rank low (scores 0–3) on the militancy scale (militancy_scale)	87.2	37.8	32.6	17.0	36.4

\*All respondents in the survey, including those who were not classified into anyone of the four groups

The differentiation in social background is mainly between those who voted for Jewish political parties and everyone else. 28.4% of the Arabs who voted for Jewish political parties in the Knesset elections in April 2019 are distinguished by a high percentage of Druze (41.9%) and low rates of Arabs without Jewish friends (12.3%), exposed to Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Al-Myadin television channels (8.4%), those who personally encountered threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews (10.6%), and those who encountered discrimination (15.4%) (Table 6.11). There are also differences between the other groups but are not so significant.

**Table 6.11 Background of Arab Voters and Non-Voters in the Knesset Election in April 2019, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2019	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Voted to Jewish Parties	Voted to Arab Parties	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Total*
Do not have Jewish friends (A 166)	12.3	48.9	44.9	49.3	40.4
Has suffered personally from threats, humiliations or beatings from Jews (A 173)	10.6	32.7	20.2	41.7	30.1

	Arabs				
	2017	2019	2019	2019	2019
	Voted to Jewish Parties	Voted to Arab Parties	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Did Not Vote for Non-Ideological Reasons	Total*
Had suffered from discrimination by Jews or state institutions (A 174)	15.4	48.0	51.2	49.7	44.8
Feel as Arabs danger to their personal safety from Jews in Israel (A 186)	7.2	42.2	31.3	56.1	39.9
Feel personally insecure because of the violence in Arab localities (A 187)	57.6	79.8	77.9	82.0	76.6
Feel closest to the Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia and Al-Miyadin TV channels (A 178)	8.4	47.5	56.0	66.4	49.8
Non-Bedouin Moslems (A com)	39.5	71.4	59.5	65.7	62.4
Christians (A com)	5.8	9.7	12.2	7.3	8.8
Galilee Bedouin (A com)	4.7	2.1	0.8	9.4	4.6
Negev Bedouin (A com)	8.1	15.5	26.0	16.3	16.5
Druze (A com)	41.9	1.3	1.5	1.3	6.9
Religious or very religious (A 184)	9.8	47.4	38.3	54.9	42.0
Men (A 198)	63.5	46.8	48.1	56.4	51.8
Have a partial or complete secondary education (A 193)	63.9	49.4	56.9	63.7	56.7
18–24 years old (A 191)	17.4	22.6	23.1	20.1	21.0
Live in mixed towns (A 199)	7.1	7.1	13.4	13.6	10.5

\* All respondents in the survey, including those who were not classified into anyone of the four groups

## Autonomy

If we define autonomy as the authority that the state grants to the minority to run its institutions, the Arab minority in Israel does not have autonomy. Most of its institutions, including schools, religious courts, state broadcast channels, the Muslim Waqf and more are separate but not under its control. The Arabs control their separate civil society but this is not autonomy in the sense of delegation of powers by the state.

The vast majority of the Arabs support autonomy but there has been a decline in their support from 2017 to 2019. A majority of

72.5% of the Arabs in 2019 (down from 82.9% in 2017) said that “the state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions,” and 70.2% (down from 79.5%) also said that “the state should recognize the Higher Fellow-Up Committee as a representative body of Arab citizens” (Table 6.12). This finding indicates support not only for cultural autonomy but also for broad institutional autonomy. The Jews oppose this view. Only 39.1% of the Jews in 2019 (down from 49.3% in 2017) agreed that the state would grant Arabs religious, educational, and cultural autonomy (Table 6.13). In the past, most Jews accepted autonomy for Arabs (for example, 61.7% in 2003 and 59.0% in 2015), probably due to their confusion between autonomy and separation and due to a lack of awareness of the strong opposition to giving autonomy to Arabs by the authorities in general and the security services in particular. The decline also indicates an increase in Jews’ fear of Arab exacerbation of attitudes and growing Arab empowerment.

**Table 6.12 Autonomy for Arabs in Israel, Arabs,  
2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions (A 146)	90.9	86.5	80.4	77.6	82.9	72.5
Arab citizens will enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of budgets and administer their own religious, educational and cultural institutions (A 81)	66.4	60.4	65.8	54.1	58.3	59.8
The state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them (A 144)	89.6	84.2	74.1	81.5	87.2	77.6
The state should recognize the Higher Fellow-Up Committee as a representative body of Arab citizens (A 145)	*	76.1	72.8	72.1	79.5	70.2

\* Question not asked

**Table 6.13 Autonomy for Arabs in Israel, Jews,  
2003, 2008, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews						
	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions (J 89)	61.7	62.7**	58.3	52.6	59.0	49.3	39.1
Arab citizens will enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of budgets and administer their own religious, educational and cultural institutions	62.0	*	*	*	*	*	*
The state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them	53.2	40.2	*	*	*	*	*
The state should recognize the Higher Follow-Up Committee as a representative body of Arab citizens	59.2	52.6	*	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

\*\* In 2009

## Means of Struggle

Although Israeli society is deeply divided, there is almost no physical violence between Arabs and Jews. Various factors contribute to the order and quiet in these relations, of which the democratic regime is the most important factor. The Arabs, as citizens of the state, have at their disposal all the means of the democratic struggle to make their voices heard and to advance their interests. Indeed, a majority of 61.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 56.3% in 2019, and 78.8% and 79.0% of the Jews, respectively, believed that “despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for Arab citizens as well” (Table 6.14). Also, 68.0% of the Arabs in 2017 and 64.9% in 2019 thought that “Arab citizens can improve their situation by using persuasion, political pressure and voting.” These numbers point to the belief of Arabs and Jews in parliamentary democracy as a means of effective struggle for the Arabs as well. However, only 38.3% of the Arabs in 2019 and 62.6% of the Jews believed that “it is possible in Israel to express different political opinions without fear,” which indicates an increase in political intolerance in Israel. And again the Arabs’ weaker belief in freedom of expression reflects the fact that they are a minority opposing a regime

that pays a higher price for expressing its positions. In any case, both sides perceive Israel as a parliamentary democracy for the Arabs as well.

**Table 6.14 Parliamentary Means of Struggle, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for the Arab citizens as well (A 45, J 41)	63.1	54.2	54.0	56.2	61.9	56.3	76.6	79.9	78.4	77.2	78.8	79.0
Arab citizens can improve their situation by using persuasion, political pressures and voting (A 46)	81.4	65.6	67.5	57.7	68.0	64.9	68.1	*	*	*	*	*
It is possible in Israel to express different political opinions without fear (A 72 J 51)							38.3					62.6

\* Question not asked

While there is agreement between Arabs and Jews on Arabs' use of parliamentary politics, there is no agreement on the use of extra-parliamentary politics. A majority of 62.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 66.6% in 2019 compared to a minority of 32.2% and 22.2% of the Jews supported the use of general strikes and 62.7% and 57.0% of the Arabs compared to 19.5% and 20.5% of the Jews supported protests abroad (Table 6.15). These are two protest measures that the Jews have already learned to live with, even though the protest abroad of Arab citizens against their discrimination adds to Israel's international delegitimization due to the occupation. Much more serious is the support of 44.3% of the Arabs in 2019 for the boycott of the Knesset elections and 57.2% for a prolonged general strike against the Nation-State Law (Table 2.16). These two protest steps against the Nation-State Law are radical and may be interpreted by the state and most Jews as an undemocratic crossing of red lines. The Arabs' support for harsh extra-parliamentary measures indicates both a deep sense of deprivation and a growing empowerment.

**Table 6.15 Extra-Parliamentary Means of Struggle, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
In favor of general strikes (A 75, J 92)	62.6	81.0	70.3	70.5	62.8	66.6	46.1	29.3	30.5	34.0	32.3	22.2
In favor of protest abroad (A 76, J 93)	49.9	70.9	49.0	58.9	62.7	57.0	40.8	23.5	30.3	20.7	19.5	20.5

**Table 6.16 Protest Steps against the Nation-State Law, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2009
In favor of boycotting Knesset election as a protest step against the Nation-State Law (A 103)	44.3
In favor of prolonged general strike as a protest step against the Nation-State Law (A 104)	57.2

The Arabs' extensive participation in memorial and protest events validates their support for severe extra-parliamentary means of struggle. 28.7% of the Arabs in 2017 and 30.0% in 2019 participated in the Land Day events and 24.8% and 25.6% in the Nakba Day events (Table 6.17). The cumulative participation rates over the years in these two major memorial events are higher – 44.7% of the Arabs in 2017 on Land Day and 39.2% on Nakba Day (Table 6.18). The participation of 23.2% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 20.2% in 2017) in illegal demonstrations and violent processions also shows a vigorous Arab struggle. These participation rates indicate empowerment, national unity and active citizenship.

**Table 6.17 Participation in Commemoration Events in the Same Year, Arabs, 2015–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs		
	2015	2017	2019
Participated in Land Day commemoration in the same year (A 169):			
Did not participate	56.0	67.8	67.0
Participate	40.7	28.7	30.0
No answer	3.2	3.5	3.0

Participated in Nakba Day commemoration in the same year (A 170):			
Did not participate	65.1	71.2	71.5
Participate	32.1	24.8	25.6
No answer	2.7	4.0	2.9

**Table 6.18 Participation in Protest Actions and Commemoration Events, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Have ever participated in legal demonstrations and processions (A 167)	28.7	50.8	52.4	51.3	47.7	36.2
Have ever participated in illegal demonstrations and violent processions (A 168)	5.6	20.9	21.1	30.1	20.2	23.2
Have ever participated in Land Day commemoration	17.9	50.1	54.6	50.7	44.7	*
Have ever participated in the Nakba Day commemoration	12.9	47.9	49.4	47.3	39.2	*

To all this must be added the large support of 46.4% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 37.4% in 2017) for boycotting Knesset elections, a destructive step of democracy whose realization will endanger the foundations of Arab-Jewish coexistence (Table 6.19). Arab support rates for illegal means of struggle are also very significant: 28.9% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 27.5% in 2017) supported illegal demonstrations and 34.7% (doubling the support rate from 18.5%) supported all means including violence (Table 6.20). And a majority of 57.6% of the Arabs in 2019 (unchanged from 57.1% in 2017) said that “it is justified that Arab citizens in Israel will launch an Intifada of their own if their condition would not improve appreciably.”

**Table 6.19 Boycott of Knesset Elections by Arabs in Israel, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
In favor of boycott of Knesset elections by Arabs in Israel (A 78)	32.8	41.3	29.7	32.5	37.4	46.4

**Table 6.20 Illegal Means of Struggle, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Illegal demonstrations (A 77)	9.9	25.8	19.0	29.3	27.5	28.9
All means, including violence (A 77)	5.4	16.6	16.0	18.5	18.5	34.7
It is justified that Arab citizens in Israel will launch an Intifada of their own if their condition would not improve appreciably (A 118)	*	58.2	51.7	54.0	57.1	57.6

\* Question not asked

As mentioned before, 57.0% of the Arabs in 2019 supported protest abroad as a means of struggle to advance their interests (Table 6.15 above), but the more crucial question is to what extent they support the internationalization of their struggle. The questions presented to the Arabs in 2019 show relatively strong support for the internationalization of their complaints and demands. A majority of 57.9% of the Arabs in 2019 supported an international boycott of Israel, support that can be interpreted as assistance to the BDS (Table 2.21). An even larger majority of 75.9% said that “Arabs in Israel should mobilize the institutions of the United Nations and the European Union to change Israeli government’s policy towards them” (Table 6.22). As for the possible involvement of the Arab minority in the Palestinian resistance to Israel, the Arabs were divided: 41.9% of the Arabs in 2019 said that the Arabs should not be part of the Palestinian resistance, 40.1% said they should be part of the non-armed resistance and 13.9% said they should be part of the Palestinian resistance in all its forms, that is to say, also the use of terrorism. However, only 39.8% of the Arabs in 2019 thought that the Palestinian Authority should represent them in peace negotiations, probably because most of them do not have the confidence that the Palestinian Authority would represent them faithfully. There is a strong link between representation and involvement in resistance. The rate of those who say that the Palestinian Authority should represent the Arabs in Israel in peace negotiations is 24.0% among those who say that the Arabs should not be part of the Palestinian resistance, 45.3% among those who say that the Arabs should be part of the non-armed

resistance and 70.0% among those who say the Arabs should be part of the Palestinian resistance in all its forms.

**Table 6.21 Boycott of Israel by the International Community, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
The international community will impose boycott on Israel (A 68):	
Definitely support	25.7
Support	32.2
Oppose	31.8
Definitely oppose	10.1
No answer	0.2

**Table 6.22 Use of International Means of Struggle, Arabs, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs
	2019
Arabs in Israel should mobilize the institutions of the United Nations and European Union for changing Israeli government policy toward them (A 155):	
Definitely should	33.3
Should	42.6
Should not	16.6
Definitely should not	5.9
No answer	1.6
Arabs in Israel should be part of the Palestinian resistance (A 153):	
No	41.9
Yes, but only part of the non-armed resistance	40.1
Yes, part of the resistance in all its forms	13.9
No answer	4.0
The Palestinian Authority should represent the Arabs in Israel in peace negotiations (A 154):	
Sure it should represent them	16.0
Think it should represent them	23.8
Think it should not represent them	27.6
Sure it should not represent them	32.0
No answer	0.6

It can be concluded from the findings that there are sharp disagreements between Arabs and Jews about the attitudes regarding the means of the Arab struggle in Israel. Since the Jews believe that the use of parliamentary means is effective, they do not support the Arabs' use of non-parliamentary means and protest abroad. As mentioned, only 22.2% of the Jews in 2019, compared to 66.6% of the Arabs,

support the use of Arabs in general strikes and only 20.5% of the Jews, compared to 57.0% of the Arabs, support protest abroad (Table 6.15). Needless to say, Jews oppose Arab use of illegal and violent politics.

What does it mean for Arabs to have a significant rate of support for strong and illegal means of struggle and also for the internationalization of their demands? Is this not a contradiction with acceptance of a large part of them of life as a minority and with avoidance of disruptions and violent struggle? It seems that it is precisely the comprehensive and in-depth Israelization that the Arabs are going through, which ties their destiny and future with the state, that pushes them into a more vigorous struggle for attaining equality with Jews and peace with the Palestinians, the two agreed upon top goals. The more they are aware of the fact that they are doomed to live in Israel and their fate is connected with the fate of the Jews and the state, the more they need to intensify their struggle in order to have their lives be a life of integration, equality, respect and fulfilment of national aspirations.

## Chapter 7

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# Options of Change, Evaluation of State of Relations

### Options of Change

The status quo in Arab-Jewish relations is based on the status of the Arabs as a minority in the state and on Israel within the Green Line as a Jewish and democratic state, where the Jews constitute a dominant majority that determines its language, culture and symbols. The Arabs find it difficult to accept coexistence under the existing conditions and are interested in bringing about significant or revolutionary change in it. In contrast, the Jews are determined to maintain the status quo but some would like to change it.

The most revolutionary change is the abolition of the regime of a Jewish and democratic state. This may happen within the framework of one-state solution and the granting of the right of return to Palestinian refugees. In one-state the Jews will lose their numerical majority and the Jewish character of the state. From the Arabs' point of view, one-state may be a bi-national state, supported by 81.5% of the Arabs in 2003, or a Muslim state, supported by 30.7% of them in 2019 (down from 41.9% in 2017) (Table 7.1). The Jewish political parties on the left and right support a Jewish state even within one state in all of Palestine, Palestinians in the West Bank will not be granted citizenship, the Jews will continue to be a political majority, but the regime as a whole will cease to be democratic. Another expression of the elimination of the Jewish and democratic state may also take place within the framework of a two-state solution. This idea is presented in the Future Vision Documents, in which the academic elite of Arab citizens presented a demand that Israel within the Green Line will become a binational state like Belgium and Canada. The Arabs support this vision which may only

benefit them. Half of the Arab respondents in the 2011 Index said that the Arab political parties should adopt the idea of a binational state even if they risk outlawing by the government and the Arabs must fight for its realization even if the struggle leads to a rupture in Arab-Jewish relations. The Jews vehemently opposed the Future Vision Documents and supported steps that the state should take to suppress any Arab struggle to advance them. Some Jews are also not satisfied with the current situation of a Jewish majority and an Arab minority in a Jewish and democratic state – 29.9% of the Jews in 2017 and 33.8% in 2019 believed that “Arab citizens should leave the country and receive appropriate compensation” and 19.2% in 2017 wanted that “the Jews will rule and the Israeli Arabs will not receive democratic rights” (Table 7.2). The dilution of the Arab population, which is supported by a third of the Jews, is not a forced transfer but an improper call for Arab citizens to emigrate from the country. The feasibility of all these revolutionary ideas, both of the Arabs and of the Jews, is low.

**Table 7.1 Options for Regime Change, Arabs, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Agree to rise of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel (A 82)	18.9	48.5	41.7	45.7	41.9	30.7
Agree that Israel will cease to be the state of the Jews and become a state of two peoples	81.5	*	*	*	*	*

\* Question not asked

**Table 7.2 Options for Regime Change, Jews, 2003, 2012–2017 (Percentages)**

	Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Agree that Arab citizens should leave the country and receive appropriate compensation (J 47)	38.9	31.0	29.7	32.2	29.9	33.8
Agree that Jews will rule and Israeli Arabs will not receive democratic rights	21.4	17.4	20.2	17.8	19.2	*

Some Arabs hold two other ideas that could collapse Arab-Jewish coexistence. One idea is to boycott the elections which were supported by 46.4% in 2019 (Table 6.19 above). This idea is incompatible with the 65.6% of the Arabs in 2019 who supported the entry of Arab political

parties into government coalitions (Table 2.2 above). Its implementation will also lead to Arabs' de-legitimization of the state and to their renunciation of parliamentary politics, ending with the boomerang of perpetuation of the anti-Arab rule of the political right. The other idea is the establishment of a "separate society" promoted by the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement. According to this idea, the Arabs will become detached from the state and the Jews by establishing and controlling their own institutions. The chances of realization of these two Arab ideas are also slim because the Arabs will understand that the boycott of the elections will harm them severely and that the state will not allow them to establish a separate society.

The Arabs were presented with 16 steps they need to take in order for the state and the Jews to treat them with equality, respect and trust. The steps in Table 7.3 were sorted into several areas such as peace with the Palestinians, means of struggle and the nature of the state. No step received the consent of 50% or more of the Arab respondents. Consent rates were in the range of only 19.1%–46.9% in 2009, 16.7%–35.9% in 2012, 19.8%–45.0% in 2013, 27.5%–46.7% in 2015, 17.3%–42.2% in 2017 and 20.3%–45.6% in 2019 (Table 7.3). The consent rate of 40% or more of the Arabs was 4 only of the 16 steps in 2013, 7 in 2015, 1 in 2017 and 2 in 2019. The hardening trend in the Arab stand in 2012–2009 was replaced by a softening of certain positions in 2013 and 2015, a return to severe hardening in 2017 and a retention of the hardening in 2019 with a moderation in a number of steps. Interestingly, the measures that received the greatest agreement include the step "Arab citizens will accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state" (45.6% in 2019) and the step "Arab citizens will recognize the Jews' right to determine the language, culture, symbols and state policy while the state recognizes the needs of Arab citizens" (40.6%). This is a pragmatic approach by the silent majority of the Arab public who are willing to accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state if it takes their needs into account and recognizes them as a Palestinian-national minority (only 20.3% of the Arabs in 2019 were willing to give up the demand that the state recognizes them as a Palestinian-national minority).

**Table 7.3 Steps That Arabs Are Ready to Take in Order That the State and the Jews Will Treat Them with Equality, Respect and Trust, Arabs, 2009–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
<b>Peace and Palestinian Question</b>									
Arab citizens will not identify publicly with the Arab side if Israel is attacked verbally or physically (A 93)	32.0	27.0	33.2	23.2	28.7	35.6	26.0	35.9	
Arab leaders will condemn unequivocally violent actions by Arabs against Jews in Israel (A 95)	46.9	33.2	46.5	35.7	44.3	40.6	39.0	33.4	
Arabs will see in Israel their state and support it in case of dispute with the Palestinian state (A 100)	32.3	25.6	25.1	20.3	19.8	28.7	22.7	21.8	
<b>Transitional Justice</b>									
Arab citizens will not publicly observe the Nakba Day, i.e., the disaster that occurred to the Palestinians in the 1948 war (A 91)	23.8	30.8	19.2	17.5	23.7	31.9	25.0	22.8	
Arab citizens will not demand that the displaced (internal refugees) will be allowed to reconstruct their villages that were ruined in 1948 (A 92)	22.1	25.2	20.2	18.8	24.8	34.8	25.3	31.8	
Arab citizens will not see the Jews as alien settlers who usurped the lands of the country from the Arabs (A 97)	34.2	30.3	28.3	29.0	39.1	43.4	33.4	34.7	
<b>Equal Duties</b>									
Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of any kind of service to the state (A 86)	43.0	34.2	47.0	34.4	41.5	39.5	38.3	36.0	
<b>Means of Struggle</b>									
Arab citizens will avoid protest abroad against the state (A 90)	33.9	28.3	27.9	31.0	39.2	41.2	29.2	31.5	
Arab leaders will avoid severe pronouncements against the state (A 94)	44.4	36.2	42.0	33.6	45.0	44.3	37.6	38.0	
<b>Identity</b>									
As long as there are no peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab citizens will not define their identity as "Palestinian-Arabs in Israel" (A 98)	27.3	30.9	30.4	26.3	36.5	40.0	31.5	35.2	
Arab citizens will not demand to be recognized as a Palestinian national minority (A 99)	21.6	23.2	23.7	19.3	27.4	27.7	17.3	20.3	
<b>Israel's Legitimacy</b>									
Arab citizens will accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (A 87)	40.3	34.8	38.8	35.3	42.9	42.9	42.2	45.6	

	Arabs							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Arab citizens will accept Israel as the state of all Jews in the world, and not just Jews in Israel (A 88)	25.7	27.1	24.6	22.8	29.4	34.9	27.0	39.0
Arab citizens will avoid struggle to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state (A 89)	25.2	20.9	26.3	27.8	28.4	39.0	29.4	29.7
Arab citizens will renounce the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel (A 96)	19.1	20.4	16.5	16.7	21.4	27.5	24.8	20.9
Arab citizens will recognize the Jews' right to determine the language, culture, symbols and state policy while the state recognizes the needs of Arab citizens (A 101)	41.5	38.0	41.1	35.9	36.2	46.7	38.4	40.6

The Jews were presented with 17 (13 in 2019) steps that the Arabs are demanding and they were asked to indicate if they accept any of them. The agreement found among the Jews was greater than the parallel agreement among the Arabs. Consent rates were in the range of 15.5%–80.1% in 2009, 12.7%–65.8% in 2012, 12.5%–57.6% in 2013, 11.6%–65.8% in 2015, 12.3%–57.8% in 2017 and 10.1%–51.0% in 2019 (Table 7.4). These numbers reveal relative stability in 2009–2015 and a sharp decline in 2017–2019 in the proportion of the Jews who agree with the steps that the Jews and the state need to take so that Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and they are equal citizens in it. However, 40% or more of the Jews in 2013 and 2015 agreed with 12 of the 17 steps, in 2017 11 of 17 and in 2019 7 of 13. These consent rates are significantly higher than the consent rates of the Arabs. Most Jews are open to change as long as it does not harm the security of the state and its Jewish character and does not give affirmative action to Arabs. The following findings in the 2019 Index illustrate these red lines that restrict Jewish agreement rate to make concessions to the Arabs to only about one-fifth to one-quarter: Only 25.9% of the Jews in 2019 agreed that Arabs and Jews will be equally treated at border checkpoints, only 22.4% agreed that the state should give Arab citizens proper expression in its symbols, flag and anthem, and only 20.3% agreed that affirmative action will be given to Arab citizens in admission to work in state institutions and to studies at universities and colleges.

**Table 7.4 Steps That Jews Are Ready to Take in Order That Arab Citizens Would Feel That Israel Is Their State and They Are Citizens with Equal Rights in It, Jews, 2009–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
<b>Peace and National Security</b>									
The Jews and Palestinians will make painful concessions and a Palestinian state will be established in the pre-1967 borders with a land swap option	42.0	43.5	43.5	42.3	42.7	43.7	35.5	*	
There will be no differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks in border crossings (J 64)	33.2	25.8	27.2	26.9	27.7	26.4	25.0	25.9	
<b>Transitional Justice</b>									
In the framework of peace with the Palestinians, the state will compensate Arab citizens in land or money for the lands it expropriated from them (J 60)	49.6	44.1	49.8	44.0	48.4	47.0	42.6	30.8	
The state recognizes its responsibility for the Nakba, i.e., the disaster that happened to the Palestinians during the 1948 war (J 70)	15.5	14.4	15.6	12.7	12.5	11.6	12.3	10.1	
<b>Civil Rights</b>									
The state will guarantee that Arab citizens may live in any locality they would like	42.0	37.6	37.2	42.8	43.0	47.2	43.8	*	
<b>Resources</b>									
The state will recognize the unrecognized Arab localities that today do not have official status and grant them resources such as connection to the water and electricity grids as accorded to recognized localities (J 61)	65.1	55.1	55.2	51.9	49.5	56.2	43.9	45.4	
The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive proper representation in all state institutions and public bodies (J 65)	66.3	52.4	56.3	54.9	51.2	55.1	50.1	51.0	
The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive their proportional share of state budget (J 67)	69.0	54.9	51.0	55.9	53.6	59.2	51.4	45.7	
Arab political parties will be invited to participate in government coalitions like Jewish political parties (J 66)	54.6	48.1	44.0	49.9	48.9	48.0	44.5	10.1 41.6	
The state should launch an emergency program to bridge the gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens (J 72)	61.6	51.3	49.6	51.0	44.1	55.0	50.9	30.8 43.3	
<b>Affirmative Action</b>									
Arab citizens will be granted corrective preference in admission to state institutions and universities and colleges (J 71)	34.9	29.0	27.2	29.9	24.7	31.3	24.1	20.3	

	Jews								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	
<b>National Minority Status</b>									
The Arabic language should be in use in state institutions as the Hebrew language and its study should be required in Jewish schools (J 68)	51.2	49.5	47.7	48.5	42.2	49.9	48.0	42.6	
The state should recognize Arab citizens as Palestinians and guarantees their right to maintain relations with the Palestinian people and Arab nation (J 69)	35.0	30.9	27.5	28.2	28.2	25.2	20.1	21.0	
<b>Autonomy</b>									
The state should allow Arab citizens to manage their own educational, religious and cultural affairs (J 63)	60.6	51.3	49.3	55.8	50.2	55.8	45.2	40.2	
The state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them	55.7	43.8	43.3	47.5	41.2	47.1	38.6	*	
The state should consult* leaders of Arab citizens about important decisions pertinent to them	80.1	65.0	60.7	65.8	57.6	65.8	57.8	*	
<b>State Character</b>									
The state should give Arab citizens proper expression in its symbols, flag and anthem (J 62)	36.3	22.4	27.2	24.5	26.4	28.1	25.0	22.4	

\* The wording in 2009 was "The state will consult"

The high potency of the measures to improve the relationship between Arabs and Jews is expressed in the consent of 62.1% of the Arabs in 2009 that if most of their demands are met, they will feel that Israel is their country and they are equal citizens in it, and in the consent of 83.8% of the Jews if most of their demands are met, they will treat Arab citizens with equality, respect and trust (Table 7.5).

**Table 7.5 The Feeling Following the Meeting of the Demands by Each Side, Arabs and Jews, 2009 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2009	2009
If most of these demands are met, I will feel that Israel is my state and I am an equal citizen in it/I will be able to treat Arab citizens with equality, respect and trust:		
Agree	3.9	10.9
Tend to agree	12.5	2.4
Tend to disagree	31.5	17.8
Disagree	30.6	66.0
No answer	21.5	3.0

One of the sharp disagreements between the Arabs and the Jews is the inequality in duties to the state. Only 36.0% of the Arabs in 2019 agreed that “Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of any kind of service to the state” and this degree of support did not change since 2009 (Table 7.3 above). Since there is agreement between the Arabs and the Jews on an exemption for Arabs from compulsory military service, civil service may serve as a reasonable alternative. For decades, there has been voluntary civil service for religious girls, and only in 2007 was it opened to Arabs as well. The number of Arab volunteers increased year by year and reached over 4,000 in 2014. Most of the volunteers are Arab girls for whom the year of volunteering provides a satisfying experience of contribution to the Arab community, personal development, a significant pursuit and valuable benefits (as given to military veterans). The Jewish public sees the civil service as a way to equalize duties between Arabs and Jews. 68.3% of the Jews in 2013 supported “enactment of a law that would stipulate that every citizen, including an Arab, who is exempt from military service will fulfill a civil service duty and receive the benefits given to those who have done military service.” Most Arabs oppose voluntary civil service by Arabs, and even more so if it will become obligatory. Only 36.1% of the Arabs in 2019 (up from 29.8% in 2017) supported young Arabs volunteering for civil service (Table 7.6). Yet, one-third or more of the Arab public who support Arabs volunteering for civil service is extremely significant in the face of the uncompromising antagonism and the harsh campaign against it by Arab leaders. They totally reject it because it serves as a substitute for military service, is practiced without their participation and is believed to harm the Palestinianness of the servants (although this fear of Israelization has no basis).<sup>6</sup>

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6 For a comprehensive discussion and a research report on the civil service of Arab volunteers, see: Sammy Smooha and Zohar Lechtman, *Civil Service of Arabs in Israel: Research Project 2007–2011*, Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa, 2012; Sammy Smooha and Zohar Lechtman, "Crossing a Red Line: Imposing a Civil Service Duty on Young Arabs in Israel," in: *A Service Duty or a Duty to Serve? Scenarios of Compulsory Civil Service in Israel*, edited by Yagil Levy, Ra'anana: The Open University, 2015, pp. 121–152 (Hebrew).

**Table 7.6 Voluntary Civil Service for Arabs, Arabs, 2010–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Readiness of an Arab youth to volunteer to a year of civil service and to receive the benefits given to a person who has done military service (A 85):							
Certainly yes			13.0	9.3	10.6	9.0	14.9
Think so			24.1	23.3	20.7	20.8	21.2
Do not think so			23.4	22.2	25.0	28.3	31.0
Certainly not			38.8	30.3	29.0	29.8	30.9
No answer			0.7	14.9	14.7	12.1	2.1
I'm ready for an Arab youth to volunteer to a year of civil service and to receive the benefits given to a person who has done military service							
Agree	45.6	38.2					
Tend to agree	23.8	20.7					
Tend to disagree	15.0	23.2					
Disagree	14.5	17.8					
No answer	1.2	0.1					

## Evaluation of State of Relations

56.5% of the Arabs in 2017 and 48.4% in 2019 compared to 70.1% and 64.7% of the Jews perceived the relationship as not good, and 63.8% and 57.5% compared to 39.4% and 36.9%, respectively, expected worsening of relationship (Table 7.7). There is a certain moderation, which is difficult to explain, in the assessments of Arabs and Jews about the state of relations and about the expectation of change in the future. Despite the moderation, a significant part of both sides did not believe that the relations are good and will improve. The assessment of the situation is also influenced by the perception of the government's policy towards the Arab minority. Among the Arabs who say the government treats Arabs as second-class or hostile citizens, 55.0% perceived the relationship as not good and 65.6% expected worsening of the relationship. The corresponding numbers among the Jews were 76.0% and 59.5%, respectively.

**Table 7.7 Evaluation of the State of Arab-Jewish Relations, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs						Jews					
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Evaluate the state of relations today between Arab citizens and Jews as not good (A 157, J 97)	58.3	61.4	53.5	57.6	56.5	48.4	85.8	69.3	63.6	70.2	70.1	64.7
Expect worsening of the state of relations between Arab and Jewish citizens over the next five years (A 158, J 98)	43.0	66.2	52.3	61.8	63.8	57.5	54.2	49.6	40.5	49.1	39.4	36.9

The Arabs were also asked to assess the change in their personal situation. A majority of 57.5% in 2017 (unchanged from 56.6% in 2015) estimated that their personal situation as Arabs in Israel had worsened over the years compared to 40.9% (42.6%) who thought their situation had improved (Table 7.8). Although the ratio of better to worse is 1 to 1.4, in practice these numbers can be interpreted as better because the Arab public finds it difficult to admit improvements in its situation so as not to undermine the validity of its complaints about discrimination and exclusion and of its harsh criticism of government policy.

**Table 7.8 Evaluation of the Personal State as an Arab in Israel, Arabs, 2015–2017 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	
	2015	2017
Feel that one's personal state as an Arab in Israel has become over the years:		
Much better	7.4	4.5
A bit better	35.2	36.4
A bit worse	38.5	36.6
Much worse	18.1	20.9
No answer	0.7	1.6

## Chapter 8

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### **Scales, Internal Differences, Predictors**

So far we have ignored the internal differences among the Arabs and among the Jews because there was no point in repeating them with each and every question and seeing that they are consistent and unchanging. These differences will now be presented. In addition, three scales will be presented: A “coexistence scale” for measuring the attitude toward basic coexistence between Arabs and Jews, a “militancy scale” for measuring how critical are Arab attitudes toward the Jews and the state, and a “rejection scale” for measuring rejection of Jewish attitudes toward the Arabs. The results of statistical tests will also be presented to determine the influence of various factors on the attitudes of Arabs and Jews.

#### **Scales of Coexistence, Militancy and Rejection**

Two scales of coexistence, common to Arabs and Jews, were constructed: The old one in 2009 and the new one in 2019. The old scale is based on six items for measuring Arab-Jewish coexistence, as presented in Table 4.1 in chapter 4. Each answer in support of coexistence is assigned one point, yielding a scale from 0 to 6. One point is given in the old coexistence scale to agreement with each of the following items:

1. Agree that Israel has a right to exist (question 50 to Arabs) or agree to two states to two peoples (question 73 to Jews);
2. Agree that it is good that Arab and Jewish citizens always live together in Israel (question 26 to Arabs and question 20 to Jews);
3. Agree that Arabs and Jews in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state (question 27 to Arabs and question 21 to Jews);

4. Agree that Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act to changing their relations by legal and democratic means only (question 28 to Arabs and question 22 to Jews);
5. Agree that Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendship and activity in joint organizations (question 29 to Arabs and question 23 to Jews);
6. Disagree with the statement “I avoid as much as possible personal contacts with Jews/Arabs” (question 30 to Arabs and question 24 to Jews).<sup>7</sup>

The distribution on the old scale was found heavily tilted toward the upper part (Table 8.1). The ratio between 5–6 to 0–1 points in 2019 is 62.8% to 16.3% among the Arabs and 50.2% to 10.8% among the Jews. This asymmetric distribution points to appreciable support of coexistence by both sides. The Arabs' mean on the scale is 4.19 and the Jews' mean is 4.11, and both show strong commitment of both sides to a shared society.

**Table 8.1 Old Coexistence Scale, Arabs and Jews, 2009–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs									Jews								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019		
0	4.5	6.3	2.0	5.6	1.5	4.3	5.3	10.7	1.8	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.1	3.7	3.4		
1	7.2	9.0	4.2	6.4	3.6	6.0	10.9	5.6	4.3	3.7	6.0	4.7	6.9	4.1	6.1	7.4		
2	5.7	6.8	7.9	8.1	7.0	5.8	9.2	6.0	5.2	9.1	7.8	6.1	7.8	8.4	5.5	7.6		
3	11.7	9.6	10.5	13.4	16.9	14.6	6.1	8.2	10.6	9.4	10.4	11.1	11.2	12.0	13.8	11.3		
4	15.6	16.5	13.3	12.7	12.5	14.3	11.6	6.3	14.7	17.0	16.4	15.4	15.6	13.8	16.6	20.1		
5	19.1	21.7	20.3	20.9	20.8	18.4	20.9	27.2	30.0	24.1	25.5	24.3	26.7	26.5	25.5	27.0		
6	35.7	29.1	41.7	32.8	37.0	36.3	35.1	35.6	33.3	34.0	31.2	35.9	28.9	33.2	28.7	23.2		
No answer	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		

<sup>7</sup> Factor analysis in the Arab sample in 2019 showed that the six items constituted one factor that explains 58.9% of the variance on the coexistence scale (71.5% for two factors). The reliability of the six items of the Arabs' coexistence scale ranged from 0.619 to 0.851. The results of the Jews' coexistence scale were similar. Factor analysis in the Jewish sample in 2019 showed that the six items yielded one factor that explains 55.8% of the variance on the coexistence scale (72.7% for two factors). The reliability of the six items of the Jews' coexistence scale ranged from 0.635 to 0.823.

	Arabs									Jews								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019		
Mean	4.28	4.04	4.57	4.16	4.47	4.30	4.13	100.0	4.55	4.43	4.33	4.49	4.26	4.43	4.25	100.0		
S.D.	1.81	1.90	1.63	1.85	1.58	1.78	1.97	4.19	1.53	1.62	1.67	1.62	1.69	1.60	1.69	4.11		

\* Question 25 in 2017 was replaced by question 50 in 2019 (this question is identical to question 48 in 2017); the distribution of questions 25 and 48 in 2017 was very similar

The new coexistence scale is identical to the old scale: The correlation between them is 0.97 among the Arabs and 0.94 among the Jews. They differ only in the first, not uniform item (“Israel has a right to exist” for Arabs, “in favor of two states to two peoples” for Jews) that was replaced by the uniform item “I am reconciled with Israel as a state where a Jewish majority and an Arab minority live together” (question 25 to Arabs and question 19 to Jews) that better measures basic coexistence.<sup>8</sup> The Arab mean on the new scale is 4.08 compared to 4.51 of the Jewish mean and the recipients with the two highest scores 5–6 count 55.7% and 63.2% respectively (Table 8.2). This is a strong evidence of the acceptance of coexistence by Arabs and Jews.

**Table 8.2 New Coexistence Scale, Arabs and Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs	Jews
	2019	2019
0	11.0	3.1
1	6.0	5.6
2	6.9	5.4
3	7.6	8.1
4	12.4	14.5
5	20.0	27.7
6	35.7	35.5
No answer	0.4	0.0
Mean	100.0	100.0
Standard deviation	4.08	4.51
No answer	2.07	1.66

8 The factor analysis of the new coexistence scale in 2019 is similar to the previous coexistence scale. The six items in the Arab sample were grouped into one factor, which explains 58.3% of the differences in the coexistence scale (72.0% for two factors). The reliability of the six scale items of the Arabs ranged from 0.690 to 0.832. The results on the Jewish scale were similar: The factor analysis revealed that the six items were grouped into a single factor that explains 53.5% of the differences in the coexistence scale (67.8% for two factors). The reliability of the six scale items ranged from 0.608 to 0.796.

The militancy scale for Arabs is built on 13 identical questions in the 2012–2019 surveys of the Arabs. The questions in the militancy scale are not only important but also belong to a single world contents as shown by a statistical factor analysis test. Each "militant" answer to a question receives one point, constructing an 0–13 scale. Following are the attitudes that win one point on the militancy scale in 2019:

1. Agree that "as an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel" (question 23 to Arabs);
2. Disagree that "Israel as a state has a right to exist" (question 147 to Arabs);
3. Agree that "it is impossible to trust most Jews in Israel" (question 31 to Arabs);
4. Disagree that "despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is democracy for the Arab citizens as well" (question 45 to Arabs);
5. Disagree that "Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as an independent state in which Arabs and Jews live together" (question 50 to Arabs);
6. Disagree that "Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together" (question 51 to Arabs);
7. Disagree that "I reconcile myself with Israel today as a state with a Jewish majority" (question 55 to Arabs);
8. Agree that "A Palestinian state should arise in all of Palestine instead of Israel" (question 82 to Arabs);
9. Disagree that "Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of any kind of service to the state" (question 86 to Arabs);
10. Disagree that "two states to two peoples" (question 105 to Arabs);
11. Disagree that "I'll support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even if it will not include a solution to the problem of

the lands expropriated from Israeli Arab citizens and to the problem of the internal refugees” (question 110 to Arabs);

12. Agree that “The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, will be doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians” (question 116 to Arabs);
13. Agree that “it is justified that Arab citizens in Israel will open an Intifada of their own if their situation will not improve appreciably” (question 118 to Arabs).

The distribution on the militancy scale for Arabs in 2019 was found asymmetrical, leaning toward moderation, as can be seen in the ratio between 0–2 to 11–13 points – 27.2% to 10.9% (Table 8.3). The mean of 5.41% was also close to the midpoint of the scale.

The correlation between the militancy scale and the coexistence scale is  $-0.81$ . This high correlation indicates that the two scales measure the same world contents and validates the idea that coexistence is a consistent orientation.

**Table 8.3 Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2012–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
0	5.5	9.4	11.0	10.3	10.2
1	4.8	7.9	4.8	6.8	5.3
2	7.2	6.2	5.4	8.1	11.7
3	7.1	4.0	7.9	5.0	9.7
4	6.1	5.3	7.2	6.2	7.7
5	7.4	10.8	9.5	6.4	7.1
6	8.6	5.2	8.1	11.5	7.4
7	9.2	12.4	9.0	4.0	7.5
8	9.8	7.8	5.9	7.0	11.1
9	8.5	8.6	8.7	2.8	5.5
10	4.2	7.3	6.0	7.7	4.6
11	6.4	5.4	6.2	3.6	2.4
12	6.8	3.6	4.1	10.0	8.5
13	7.3	4.7	5.0	9.3	0.0
No answer	1.1	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.2

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Mean	6.70	6.11	6.02	6.39	5.41
Standard deviation	3.813	3.818	3.856	4.294	3.662
Number of cases	710	692	690	695	10.2

Like the militancy scale for Arabs, the "rejection scale" for Jews is built on 13 identical questions in Jews' surveys in 2015, 2017 and 2019. The questions in the scale are not only important but also belong to one world contents as the statistical factor analysis test shows. Each rejection attitude in each question is given one point, creating a scale from 0 to 13. Following are the attitudes that won one point on the rejection scale:

1. Do not "accept today the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel" (question 96 to Jews);
2. Completely reject "the right to exist in Israel of an Arab national minority with full civil rights" (question 95 to Jews);
3. Oppose granting Arabs "a right to vote to the Knesset" (question 16 to Jews);
4. Disagree that "Arab political parties will join coalition governments" (question 3 to Jews);
5. Disagree that "the country between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews" (question 8 to Jews);
6. Disagree that "I accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society" (question 10 to Jews);
7. Disagree that "I'm ready to have an Arab as superior in my job" (question 13 to Jews);
8. Agree that the "state should grant to Jews some preference over Arabs" (question 18 to Jews);
9. Agree that "it is impossible to trust most Arab citizens" (question 26 to Jews);
10. Agree that "I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel" (question 34 to Jews);

11. Agree that "Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character" (question 35 to Jews);
12. Disagree that "Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land" (question 43 to Jews);
13. Agree that "in case of a contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, I would prefer the Jewish character" (question 56 to Jews).

The distribution on the rejection scale for the Jews was found a bit skewed toward the lower part as can be seen in the ratio between 0–2 to 11–13 in 2019 that was 20.7% to 14.1% (Table 8.4). The mean of 5.99 was also tilted toward the lower part of the scale. This asymmetric distribution shows a greater proportion of Jews who accept Arab citizens than Jews who reject them.

The correlation between the rejection and coexistence scales was -0.74, indicating that there is a general and consistent outlook of Jews toward the Arab minority.

**Table 8.4 Rejection Scale, Jews, 2015–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews		
	2015	2017	2019
0	7.0	8.5	5.9
1	8.4	9.0	6.8
2	8.3	7.5	8.0
3	10.5	8.9	7.1
4	12.7	5.4	7.2
5	9.5	8.1	11.2
6	8.2	9.4	11.0
7	8.6	7.7	9.3
8	6.2	9.0	7.9
9	4.3	4.0	6.6
10	5.0	7.3	4.9
11	6.0	5.2	5.7
12	3.8	6.8	5.0
13	1.5	3.1	3.4
No response	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mean	5.34	5.85	5.99
Standard deviation	3.494	3.852	3.584

## Internal Differences among Arabs

The internal differences among the Arabs are clearly evident in the coexistence and militancy scales. The population groups that score higher than the mean of 4.19 in 2019 on the old coexistence scale are Druze (mean of 5.42), Christians (4.73), not from a family of internal refugees (4.74), not from a family that suffered from land expropriations (4.90), have not suffered from discrimination by Jews or the state (4.62), have not suffered from threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (4.59), have Jewish friends (4.91), have received help from Jews (5.05), have spent time with Jews (4.95), live in a mixed town (4.76), their identity is non-Palestinian Israeli Arab (4.38), and vote for Jewish political parties (5.59) (Table 8.5). As expected, there were no significant differences according to gender, age and education.

**Table 8.5 Internal Differences in the Old Coexistence Scale, Arabs, 2017–2019 (Means)**

	Arabs	
	2017	2019
Total	4.13	4.19
Community (A com):		
Druze	5.43	5.42
Galilee Bedouin	5.55	4.10
Negev Bedouin	4.10	3.36
Non-Bedouin Muslim	4.05	4.19
Christian	4.02	4.73
Deprivation:		
Not from internal refugee family (A 189)	4.34	4.74
From internal refugee family (A 189)	3.43	2.99
Not from family that had suffered from land expropriations (A 188)	4.48	4.90
From family that had suffered from land expropriations (A 188)	3.74	3.38
Have never suffered from discrimination by Jews or state institution (A 174)	4.53	4.62
Have suffered from discrimination by Jews or state institution (A 174)	3.89	3.66
Have never encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews (A 173)	4.48	4.59
Have encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews (A 173)	3.59	3.26
Contacts with Jews:		
Have Jewish friends (A 166)	4.62	4.91
Do not have Jewish friends (A 166)	3.78	3.41
Have received help from Jews (A 171)	4.62	5.05
Have never received any help from Jews (A 171)	3.33	3.50
Have spent time with Jews (A 172)	4.38	4.95
Have never spent any time with Jews (A 172)	3.63	3.14

	Arabs	
	2017	2019
Residence (A mixedtown):		
Live in Jewish towns	4.79	4.76
Live in Arab villages and towns	4.14	4.12
Identity (A identity):		
Israeli, Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel	5.21	4.38
Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian-Arab in Israel, Israeli Palestinian	3.77	4.48
Palestinian-Arab, Palestinian	3.52	2.81
Voting in Knesset election for (A vote19):		
Jewish political parties	5.44	5.59
Arab political parties	3.95	4.53
Islamic Movement (A 185):		
Opponents, neutral (neither opponents nor sympathizers)	4.44	4.65
Sympathizers, members or active members	3.64	3.53
Gender (A gender):		
Men	4.20	4.14
Women	4.18	4.23
Age (A age):		
18–24	4.09	3.88
36–40	4.55	4.67
51–55	3.98	4.88
Education (A edu):		
With university degree	4.20	4.02
Without university degree	4.19	4.09
Family expenditure (A 196):		
Above average, same as average	4.29	4.26
Below average	4.04	3.89
Religious observance (A religiosity):		
Not religious, religious to some extent	4.32	4.44
Religious or very religious	3.97	3.57

The militancy scale also distinguishes well between Arab population groups. Arabs whose mean score is higher than the overall mean of 5.41 in 2019 on the militancy scale are non-Bedouin Muslims (5.80), from a family of internal refugees (7.03), from a family who suffered from land expropriations (6.87), Arabs who have suffered from discrimination from Jews or state institutions (6.43), have endured threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (7.53), do not have Jewish friends (6.45), have not received help from Jews (6.79), have not spent time with Jews (7.15), identify as a Palestinian in Israel (5.76) or as (non-Israeli) Palestinian (7.63), did not vote in the last elections (6.64), and define themselves

as religious or very religious (6.60) (Table 8.6). There were no significant differences according to gender, age and education.

**Table 8.6 Internal Differences in the Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2012–2019 (Means)**

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Total	6.70	5.93	6.02	6.39	5.41
Community (A com):					
Druze	2.34	2.00	1.44	1.96	1.82
Galilee Bedouin	7.21	3.87	4.39	4.65	6.39
Negev Bedouin	7.62	6.97	7.90	6.26	5.59
Non-Bedouin Muslim	6.00	6.79	5.71	7.31	5.80
Christian	5.84	5.00	5.68	7.39	4.77
Deprivation:					
Not from internal refugee family (A 189)	5.24	5.77	4.98	6.32	5.03
From internal refugee family (A 189)	7.45	7.25	7.15	8.16	7.03
Not from family that had suffered from land expropriations (A 188)	4.77	5.35	4.57	5.58	4.16
From family that had suffered from land expropriations (A 188)	6.50	7.22	6.85	8.29	6.84
Have never suffered from discrimination by Jews or state institution (A 174)	4.68	5.28	4.40	5.41	4.56
Have suffered from discrimination by Jews or state institution (A 174)	6.52	6.78	6.66	7.70	6.43
Have never encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews (A 173)	5.19	5.34	4.90	5.79	4.48
Have encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews (A 173)	6.73	7.72	6.74	8.36	7.53
Contacts with Jews:					
Have Jewish friends (A 166)	4.88	5.33	4.80	5.39	4.52
Do not have Jewish friends (A 166)	6.74	7.41	6.48	7.79	6.45
Have received help from Jews (A 171)	4.86	5.42	4.76	5.83	3.67
Have never received any help from Jews (A 171)	6.55	6.99	6.85	8.23	6.79
Have spent time with Jews (A 172)	5.37	5.70	5.05	6.24	4.13
Have never spent any time with Jews (A 172)	6.35	7.43	6.75	7.71	7.15
Residence (A mixedtown):					
Live in Jewish towns	3.71	3.16	5.24	6.18	3.90
Live in Arab villages and towns	5.81	6.31	5.48	6.65	5.59
Identity (A identity):					
Israeli, Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel					
Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian-Arab in Israel, Israeli	3.00	4.21	3.53	3.01	3.98
Palestinian	6.56	7.10	6.23	8.09	5.76
Palestinian-Arab, Palestinian	7.54	8.42	7.53	9.12	7.63
Voting in Knesset election for (A vote19):					
Jewish political parties	2.17	2.37	1.60	2.02	1.61
Arab political parties	6.55	6.89	6.19	7.51	5.14
Did not vote	7.90	6.46	7.98	7.89	6.64

	Arabs				
	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019
Islamic Movement (A 185):					
Opponents	4.94	4.73	3.65	6.54	3.13
Neutral (neither opponents nor sympathizers)	5.01	6.07	4.67	5.77	4.76
Sympathizers	7.02	6.75	7.09	8.05	6.57
Members or active members	7.12	7.26	6.20	7.32	7.45
Gender (A gender):					
Men	5.56	5.98	5.05	6.58	5.48
Women	5.68	6.14	5.90	6.65	5.33
Age (A age):					
18–24	5.59	7.13	6.12	6.57	6.24
36–40	5.55	5.64	5.13	5.96	4.88
51–55	5.56	4.38	5.36	7.11	4.47
Education (A edu):					
Incomplete high school education	6.21	6.12	5.39	6.32	5.21
Have complete university/college education	5.95	5.70	5.48	6.68	5.74
Family expenditure (A 196):					
Above average	5.31	5.77	6.05	7.23	4.99
As the average	5.32	5.68	4.82	6.11	5.69
Below average	5.92	6.41	5.32	6.45	5.49
Religious observance (A religiosity) :					
Not religious	4.08	4.29	4.77	6.23	4.48
Religious or very religious	6.65	6.79	6.70	7.30	6.60

## Internal Differences among Jews

Jews whose mean scores are significantly higher than the overall mean of 4.11 in 2019 on the old coexistence scale are of mixed ethnicity (4.53), have not endured threats, humiliations or beatings from Arab citizens (4.36), have Arab friends (4.71), have received help from Arabs (4.92), have spent time with Arabs (4.60), their most important affiliation is Israeli citizenship (4.86), voted in 2019 for a political party in the center-left bloc (5.10), classify themselves as belonging to the left (5.23) or to the center (4.87), it is important to them that the center-left bloc rules (5.27), aged 65 or older (4.78), have an academic degree (4.47), and is secular (4.65) (Table 8.7).

**Table 8.7 Internal Differences in the Old Coexistence Scale, Jews, 2017–2019 (Means)**

	Jews	
	2017	2019
Total	4.25	4.51
Ethnic descent (J ethnicity4):		
Ashkenazi	4.69	4.35
Mixed	4.48	4.53
Russian	4.23	4.01
Mizrahi	3.69	3.86
Deprivation:		
Have never encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Arabs (J 107)	4.55	4.36
Have encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Arabs (J 107)	3.49	3.68
Contacts with Arabs:		
Have Arab friends (J 106)	4.94	4.71
Do not have Arab friends (J 106)	3.83	3.78
Have received help from Arabs (J 104)	5.19	4.92
Have never received any help from Arabs (J 104)	4.08	4.00
Have spent time with Arabs (J 105)	4.85	4.60
Have never spent any time with Arabs (J 105)	4.01	3.98
Residence (J mixedtown):		
Live in a mixed town	4.34	4.19
Live in a Jewish town	4.23	4.09
Most important affiliation (J 101):		
Israeli citizenship	4.93	4.86
Jewish people	3.99	3.62
Judaism	3.35	3.82
Voting in 2019 Knesset election for (J blocvoted):		
Left-center political parties	5.18	5.10
Right political parties	3.64	3.53
Self-definition on political stream (J stream):		
Left	5.51	5.23
Center	4.75	4.87
Right	3.71	3.68
Preference of political bloc to rule the government (J blocprefer):		
Left-Center	5.38	5.27
Right	3.58	3.59
Gender (J gender):		
Men	4.31	4.14
Women	4.21	4.09
Age (J age):		
65+	4.97	4.78
35–44	4.05	4.01
18–24	3.27	3.26
Education (J edu):		
With a university degree	4.62	4.47
Without university degree	3.82	3.81

	Jews	
	2017	2019
Family expenditure (J 124):		
Above average, same as average	4.55	4.23
Below average	3.86	3.97
Religious observance (J religiosity):		
Hiloni (secular)	4.75	4.65
Masorti (traditional)	4.19	3.92
Dati (religious)	3.39	3.30
Haredi (ultra-orthodox)	2.57	2.74

The rejection scale reveals the Jewish population groups that reject Arab citizens. These are groups whose mean score is significantly higher than the overall mean of 5.99 in 2019 on the rejection scale. They are Mizrahim (7.97), Jews who have suffered from threats, humiliations, or beatings from Arab citizens (7.09), do not have Arab friends (6.75), their most important affiliation is the Jewish people (7.50) or Judaism (7.06), voted in April 2019 for a rightwing political party (7.44), define themselves as rightwingers (7.45), prefer a rightwing rule (7.60), 18–24 years old (7.01), do not have academic degree (6.80), their family expenditure level is below average (6.41), define themselves as Masorti (traditional) (6.61), religious (7.66), or ultra-orthodox (7.84) (Table 8.8).

**Table 8.8 Internal Differences in the Rejection Scale, Jews, 2015–2019 (Means)**

	Jews		
	2015	2017	2019
Total	5.34	5.85	5.99
Ethnic descent (J ethnicity4):			
Ashkenazi	4.51	4.08	5.07
Mixed	5.33	5.65	5.54
Russian	6.24	5.61	6.12
Mizrahi	5.88	7.80	6.97
Deprivation:			
Have never encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Arabs (J 107)	4.81	5.13	5.54
Have encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Arabs (J 107)	7.13	7.62	7.09
Contacts with Arabs:			
Have Arab friends (J 106)	3.78	4.33	5.01
Do not have Arab friends (J 106)	6.04	6.92	6.75
Have received help from Arabs (J 104)	5.00	2.92	3.57
Have never received any help from Arabs (J 104)	5.34	5.97	6.54
Have spent time with Arabs (J 105)	4.80	5.07	5.00
Have never spent any time with Arabs (J 105)	5.38	5.98	6.45

	Jews		
	2015	2017	2019
Residence (J mixedtown):			
Live in a mixed town	5.18	5.83	5.56
Live in a Jewish town	5.38	6.17	6.10
Most important affiliation (J 101):			
Israeli citizenship	3.88	4.01	3.93
Jewish people	6.29	6.91	7.50
Judaism	6.75	8.32	7.06
Voting in 2019 Knesset election for (J blocvoted):			
Center-left political parties	3.16	2.83	3.62
Right political parties	7.25	7.86	7.44
Self-definition on political stream (J stream):			
Left	1.82	1.80	2.11
Center	4.10	4.41	3.99
Right	7.17	7.82	7.45
Preference of political bloc to rule the government (J blocprefer):			
Center-left	*	2.55	2.80
Right		7.89	7.60
Gender (J gender):			
Men	5.18	5.83	6.08
Women	5.71	6.18	5.91
Age (J 119):			
18–24	6.66	7.51	7.01
35–44	5.67	6.07	6.48
65+	4.72	4.51	4.55
Education (J edu):			
Have complete university/college education	4.70	4.89	5.12
Incomplete high school education	5.96	7.09	6.80
Family expenditure (J 121):			
Above average	4.19	5.25	5.74
As average	5.32	5.68	5.75
Below average	6.27	6.65	6.41
Religious observance (J religiosity):			
Hiloni (secular)	4.06	4.64	4.81
Masorti (traditional)	5.79	6.70	6.61
Dati (religious)	6.78	7.63	7.66
Haredi (ultra-orthodox)	8.46	9.20	7.84

## Predictors of Coexistence among the Arabs

The internal differences that were found among Arabs and Jews point to the possible predictors of the score on the scales that measure attitudes toward the other side and toward the state. Since there is a correlation between the predictors themselves (for instance, the Druze refrain from

a Palestinian identity), a question arises what is the best predictor while holding all the other predictors constant.

We classified the predictors into five categories as follows:

1. Socio-demographic variables: Gender, age, education, religiosity, ethnicity, standard of living (family expenditure or income);
2. Positive experiences: Friendship ties, help and spending time with the other side, residence in a mixed town;
3. Negative experiences: Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from the other side, personal suffering from discrimination, from a family that suffered from land expropriations or displacement;
4. Identity variables: The most important affiliation (citizenship, nation, religion), specific identity (choice between Israeli to Palestinian/Jewish);
5. Political orientation: The political party or movement one feels closest to, political party for which one voted or intending to vote, the political bloc one prefers to rule.

Since there is a high correlation between the scales, the examination of predictors was made among the Arabs on the three scales – the old coexistence scale, the new coexistence scale and the militancy scale – by the standard method of regression analysis. Table 8.9, Table 8.10 and Table 8.11 present the final findings of the regression analysis of the best predictors of the score on the old coexistence scale in 2019. Of the large battery of predictors inserted into the regression analysis, 5–7 predictors were found statistically significant. The predictive power of the old coexistence scale amounted to a multiple correlation of 0.617, which explains 38.1% of the differences in scores on the scale among the Arab respondents; the prediction of the new coexistence scale amounted to a multiple correlation of 0.595 with an explanation rate of 35.4%; and the prediction of the militancy scale amounted to a multiple correlation of 0.664 with an explanation rate of 44.2%. This is good predictive power. Four good predictors were found that are common

to all the three scales, and these are (in ascending order of their effect according to the standardized beta coefficient): Personal encounter with threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews, Jewish friends and visits to their homes, spending time with Jews and the party/ movement which one feels most close to. In addition to these four predictors, three other predictors were found which were good for only one or two scales: Voting in the last Knesset elections, suffering from land expropriation, and receiving help from Jews. All of these good predictors belong to three different batteries: Negative experiences, positive experiences, and political orientation. Those with high scores on the two coexistence scales and those with low scores on the militancy scale are Arabs who have never encountered threats, humiliations or beatings from Jews, who have Jewish friends, who have spent free time with Jews and who feel closest to Jewish political parties. It is very important to note that there is no effect to any socio-demographic factor such as age, gender and level of education. Religiosity and identity also have no direct impact, only indirect impact through other factors. To illustrate, belonging to the Druze community indirectly increases support for coexistence and moderates attitudes through other variables such as not being harmed by threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews and by spending time with Jews.

From this it can be concluded that cultivating coexistence among the Arabs requires, among other things, the establishment of friendly relations that will lead to spending time with Jews and preventing harm from threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews. These efforts should be aimed at the general population and not necessarily at men, young people and the educated. However, the best way to bring about change in Arab attitudes is the "Rabin Way" of striving for peace and equality, that is, to change foreign and security policy in order to achieve a permanent settlement with the Palestinians and to change domestic policy to increase equality between Arabs and Jews. The negative way that distances Arabs from the Jews and the state is the enactment of the Nation-State Law, which harms Arabs' equality of citizenship and sense of belonging to the state.

**Table 8.9 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors  
of the Old Coexistence Scale, Arabs, 2019**

	Arabs			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.617 (38.1%)			
Feeling closest to a political party/movement (Jewish political parties, Arab political parties, Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and Sons of Village Movement) (A pol_ori_3cat)		-.423	-.180	-.656 (.144)
Suffering from land expropriations (a lot of lands, some lands, do not own land) (A 188)		.409	.240	.466 (.071)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 173)		-.310	-.224	-.685 (.106)
Spending time with Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 172)		.404	.144	.269 (.078)
Jewish friends (none, have friends but no home visits, have friends and home visits) (A 166)		.397	.199	.568 (.113)

**Table 8.10 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors  
of the New Coexistence Scale, Arabs, 2019**

	Arabs			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.595 (35.4%)			
Voting to the Knesset in April 2019 (Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am-Balad, other Arab political parties, Jewish political parties, did not vote, minor) (vote19)		-.232	-.194	-.242 (.044)

	Arabs			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
Feeling closest to a political party/movement (Jewish political parties, Arab political parties, Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and Sons of Village Movement) (A pol_ori_3cat)		-.411	-.207	-.773 (.150)
Spending time with Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 172)		.386	.144	.271 (.081)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 173)		-.340	-.254	-.787 (.112)
Jewish friends (none, have friends but no home visits, have friends and home visits) (A 166)		.360	.229	.656 (.117)

**Table 8.11 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors of the Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2019**

	Arabs			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.664 (44.2%)			
Voting to the Knesset in April 2019 (Hadaash-Ta'al, Ra'am-Balad, other Arab political parties, Jewish political parties, did not vote, minor) (vote19)		.200	.129	.302 (.080)
Feeling closest to a political party/movement (Jewish political parties, Arab political parties, Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and Sons of Village Movement) (A pol_ori_3cat)		-.496	-.230	1.603 (.277)

	Arabs			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
Suffering from land expropriations (a lot of lands, some lands, do not own land) (A 188)		.364	-.150	-.550 (.135)
Receiving help from Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 171)		-.425	-.160	-.732 (.212)
Spending time with Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 172)		-.463	-.116	-.410 (.176)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (A 173)		.359	.237	1.382 (.200)
Jewish friends (none, have friends but no home visits, have friends and home visits) (A 166)		-.355	-.112	-.595 (.211)

## Predictors of Coexistence among the Jews

A parallel regression analysis of the predictors of the three scales gave even better results for the Jews in 2019 than for the Arabs. Table 8.12, Table 8.13 and Table 8.14 list all the predictors that were found to be statistically significant. The prediction of the old coexistence scale was made by 7 predictors whose aggregate prediction capacity reaches a multiple correlation of 0.634 which explains 40.2% of the variance on the scale; the prediction of the new coexistence scale is made by 8 predictors whose aggregate prediction capacity reaches a multiple correlation of 0.590 which explains 34.8% of the variance on the scale; and the prediction of the rejection scale was made by 8 predictors whose aggregate prediction capacity reaches a multiple correlation of 0.740 which explains 54.8% of the variance on the scale. The four best predictors that appear in the prediction of all three scales (in ascending

order of their degree of influence according to the standardized beta coefficient) are: Religiosity, receiving help from Arabs, age, and personally encountering threats, humiliations, or beatings by Arabs. Five other predictors appear in the prediction of two of the three scales: The preferred political bloc in power, a political stream (right, moderate right, center, moderate left, left), spending time with Arabs, friends and visits to Arab homes, and the level of family expenses. Primary identity (Israeli versus Jewish) is a statistically significant predictor of only one scale. The Jews who are high on the coexistence scales and low on the militancy scale are secular, not young, have received help from Arabs, have spent time with Arabs, have Arab friends and visit their homes, are not harmed by threats, humiliations, or beatings by Arabs, prefer center-left rule and are center-left politically.

The lesson from these findings is that fostering Arab-Jewish coexistence among Jews should be aimed at the young, the people on the political right, the religious and the ultra-orthodox, persons lacking any ties with Arabs, and Jews who have been personally harmed by Arabs. The best way to change Jewish attitudes includes education for tolerance and peace, statements and activities of Jewish public figures in this spirit, a war against manifestations of racism of all kinds, and actions to establish close relations (friendship, leisure) with Arabs.

**Table 8.12 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors of the Old Coexistence Scale, Jews, 2019**

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.634 (40.2%)			
Age (12 categories) (J age)		.293	.149	.073 (0.018)
Rule by right or center-left (right, center-left) (J blocprefer)		.464	-.233	-.834 (0.135)
Family expenditure (much above average, a bit above average, same as average, a bit below average, much below average) (J 124)		-0.150	-0.098	-0.128 (0.043)

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
Receiving help from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 104)		-0.333	-0.189	-0.424 (.082)
Arab friends (none, have friends but no home visits, have friends and home visits) (J 106)		0.233	0.114	0.254 (0.078)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 107)		-0.221	-0.067	-0.127 (0.066)
Religiosity (ultra-orthodox, orthodox, traditional-religious, traditional-not religious, secular) (J religiosity5)		0.464	0.283	0.361 (0.047)

**Table 8.13 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors of the New Coexistence Scale, Jews, 2019**

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.590 (34.8%)			
Political stream (right, moderate right, center, moderate left, left) (J 114)		0.403	0.195	0.289 (0.056)
Age (12 categories) (J age)		.301	.197	.094 (0.017)
Family expenditure (much above average, a bit above average, same as average, a bit below average, much below average) (J 124)		-0.141	-0.092	-0.114 (0.042)
Receiving help from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 104)		-0.308	-0.126	-0.272 (.087)

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
Spending time with Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 105)		-.248	-.107	-.185 (.074)
Arab friends (none, have friends but no home visits, have friends and home visits) (J 106)		0.239	0.101	0.213 (0.083)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 107)		-0.228	-0.097	-0.181 (0.066)
Religiosity (ultra-orthodox, orthodox, traditional-religious, traditional-not religious, secular) (J religiosity5)		0.399	0.215	0.265 (0.046)

**Table 8.14 Regression Analysis of the Best Predictors of the Rejection Scale, Jews, 2019**

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
	R=0.740 (54.8%)			
Political stream (right, moderate right, center, moderate left, left) (J 114)		-.648	-.294	-.972 (0.154)
Rule by right or left-center (right, left-center) (J blocprefer)		.625	.234	1.846 (0.362)
Identity (only Jewish and at all not Israeli, mainly Jewish and also Israeli to some extent, mainly Israeli and also Jewish to some extent, only Israel and not at all Jewish) (J 102)		-.381	-.095	-.531 (0.179)
Age (12 categories) (J age)		-.282	-.075	-.081 (0.034)
Receiving help from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 104)		.392	.150	.745 (.168)

	Jews			
	2019			
	Multiple Correlation (% of Explained Variance)	Zero-Order Correlation	Standardized Beta	Unstandardized Beta (Standard Error)
Spending time with Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 105)		.258	.114	.457 (.132)
Endurance of threats, humiliations, or beatings from Arabs (never, once or twice, three to five, six or more) (J 107)		.235	.100	.426 (0.129)
Religiosity (ultra-orthodox, orthodox, traditional-religious, traditional-not religious, secular) (J religiosity5)		-.429	-.097	-.262 (0.090)

## Chapter 9

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# Trends of Change

The main question that this Arab-Jewish relations project deals with is the trend of change in the attitudes of Arabs and Jews towards each other and towards the state. In Chapter 1, two alternative theses were formulated: Radicalization and rapprochement. The radicalization thesis holds that the attitudes of both sides have become increasingly radical and alienated over time and may lead to the collapse of relations and violence. On the other hand, the rapprochement approach posits that the attitudes of the two sides have not radicalized. The Palestinization and Islamization of the Arabs and the exacerbation of their attitudes and struggles, the drift of the Jews to the political right and to religion, and the state's entrenchment in its exclusive Jewish-Zionist character, do not really threaten coexistence.

The analysis of trends of change of the attitudes of the Arabs and the Jews is based on many comparable items over the years. The data that were produced from surveys conducted from 1976 to 2012 include a small number of questions for comparison while the data that were produced since 2003, the beginning year of the Index project, include plenty of recurring questions for comparison. The trends in attitudes in the following time periods will be examined: 1976–2019 (throughout the entire period), 1976–1995 (the period ending in Rabin's assassination), 2012–2013, 2013–2015, 2015–2017 and 2017–2019 (4 comparisons in the last decade). Three trends of change were discerned: A trend that supports coexistence from the other side's viewpoint (marked with a plus), a trend that is detrimental to coexistence also from the other side's viewpoint (marked with a minus), and a trend of lack of change, stability or inconsistent ups and downs (marked with zero). A change is an increase or decrease of at least 5%. In addition to using the coexistence scales to examine the trends of change, in 2012–2019 the scale of militancy for Arabs and the scale of rejection for Jews were

also used to find out the population groups in which there was a trend of change.

## **Trends of Change among Arabs**

### ***Trends of Change over the Entire Period 1976–2019***

Surveys conducted between 1976 and 2019, over a period of 43 years, presented several identical questions that allow for a long-term examination of the trend in Arab attitudes. These recurring questions can be classified into two categories: Questions that examine militant attitudes that do not threaten coexistence and questions that examine rejectionist attitudes that undermine coexistence. Table 9.1 presents militant attitudes of the Arabs in the years 1976–2019. In some of these attitudes there are ups and downs, but overall there is stability in them. The attitudes in the mid-1970s, which were marked by exacerbation in the aftermath of the first Land Day, are similar to the attitudes thereafter. Thus, for example, support for general strikes is in the range of 46%–71%, the common rate is 60%, without a consistent trend of change over the years. The rejection of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state also varies in the range of 35% to 62%, the most common rate is 55%, without a consistent change. In two other questions there is an exacerbation of attitudes: The proportion of Arabs who say that their most important affiliation is belonging to the Palestinian people (from 18.8% in 2003 to 43.0% in 2019) instead of belonging to their religion or to Israeli citizenship, and also the proportion of Arabs who antagonistically define themselves as anti-Zionist (from 19.6% in 2003 to 41.5% in 2019) instead of non-Zionist.

Table 9.2 shows the rejectionist attitudes of the Arabs in the years 1976–2019 and shows that half of them have been stable and half of them have escalated. The questions that indicate stability include the critical question of Israel's right to exist as a state. The rate of those who deny the right to exist fluctuated between 7% and 27%, with an average of about 14% until 2002, and stood at about 20% in both 1976

and 2019. The percentage of Arabs who support a single Palestinian state instead of Israel and define themselves as Palestinians (without an Israeli component in their identity) has also undergone inconsistent changes. However, there is also an escalation in the number of rejectionist attitudes. Although until 2003 there was no consistent trend in the proportion of Arabs who are not ready to have a Jewish friend, since then the refusal has steadily increased – from 15.7% in 2003 to 32.3% in 2019. Support for the use of illegal demonstrations also rose consistently from 6.9% in 1980 to 25.4% in 2019.

**Table 9.1 Trend of Change of Selected Militant Attitudes, Arabs, 1976–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs											Trend**					
	1976	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	1976–1995	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	1976–2019
Deny Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state (A 148)	*	56.1	61.1	34.6	59.6	62.0	54.0	54.2	53.9	53.8	41.6	+	0	0	0	+	0
Define themselves as anti-Zionist (A 165)	*	*	*	24.3	19.6	35.4	43.6	42.5	36.0	51.7	41.5	0	+	-	+	-	-
The most affiliation is to the Palestinian people (A 162)	*	*	*	22.6	18.8	29.2	41.3	33.9	39.5	45.7	43.0	+	0	-	0	-	-
Support protest abroad (A 149)	63.3	51.6	54.4	45.8	46.7	64.4	56.5	38.5	55.4	48.4	53.5	+	-	+	-	0	0
Support general strikes (A 150)	62.4	54.0	60.3	56.1	58.2	71.2	65.2	50.6	63.7	45.9	54.3	0	+	-	+	-	0
Define themselves as Palestinian in Israel (A 163)	*	28.6	38.4	36.0	40.1	43.3	45.0	39.0	37.1	35.8	47.1	0	+	0	0	-	0
Feel closer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to Jews (A 21)	*	*	*	49.2	53.1	49.9	55.7	41.8	43.7	45.9	53.8	+	0	0	-	0	0
Support the formation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel (A 105)	73.4	62.2	66.3	*	88.8	68.6	68.7	63.7	71.3	63.6	70.5	-	+	-	+	0	0
Not satisfied with Israeli citizenship (A 160)	48.2	54.7	57.2	26.1	34.8	49.0	56.5	47.8	55.7	48.4	50.8	+	+	-	+	0	0

\* Question not asked

\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – a trend hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is an increase or a decrease of at least 5%

**Table 9.2 Trend of Change of Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Arabs, 1976–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs													Trend*			
	1976	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	1976–1995	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	1976–2019
Deny Israel's right to exist as a state (A 147)	20.0	10.8	17.2	6.7	11.0	21.9	22.8	13.5	26.9	24.8	19.4	-	+	+	0	+	0
Support a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel or in the 1947 borders (A 82)	53.8	34.4	31.1	16.2	18.9	49.8	48.5	41.7	45.7	41.9	30.7	+	+	-	0	+	0
Support illegal demonstrations (A 151)	17.1	6.9	10.6	6.0	4.9	12.6	15.4	11.3	22.6	18.4	25.4	+	+	0	0	+	0
Support use of violence (A 143)	17.8	7.5	8.0	2.6	3.0	13.1	10.5	7.2	15.6	9.7	21.1	+	0	-	0	-	-
Define themselves as Palestinian (without an Israeli component) (A 163)	32.9	25.5	29.0	10.2	5.6	16.5	21.5	17.6	25.8	21.9	14.8	+	0	-	+	-	-
Not willing to have Jewish friends (A 15)	21.1	13.4	15.4	10.2	15.7	26.3	27.8	20.7	24.3	28.9	32.3	+	0	-	0	+	0

\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – a trend hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is an increase or a decrease of at least 5%

Throughout the period 2003–2019, the proportion of Arabs who participated in protests and memorial events steadily increased, an activity that Jews dislike but can attest to the process of empowerment and turning citizenship increasingly active. The proportion of Arabs who report participation in the Land Day memorial event rose from 8.2% in 2003 to 23.4% in 2017 and in the Nakba memorial event from 5.2% to 20.0%, respectively (Table 9.3). There was also an increase in participation three times or more in demonstrations and legal processions from 14.4% in 2003 to 25.8% in 2017 and in participation three or more times in illegal demonstrations and processions from 2.2% in 2003 to 9.2% in 2019.

**Table 9.3 Trend of Change of Participation in Protest Actions and Commemoration Events, Arabs, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs											Trend**				
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	2003–2019		
Participated in protest actions such as demonstrations and processions 3+ times (A 167)	14.4	16.6	19.7	20.8	21.7	29.1	27.1	25.8	11.5	-	0	0	+	-		
Participated in protest actions such as illegal demonstrations and violent processions 3+ times (A 168)	2.2	2.3	4.9	4.9	7.0	11.0	15.2	7.7	9.2	0	0	+	0	-		
Participated in Land Day event 3+ times	8.2	11.7	18.3	16.7	20.6	28.3	31.2	23.4	*	-	0	+		-		
Participated in Nakba commemoration event 3+ times	5.2	10.0	14.7	17.0	22.2	28.7	26.5	20.0	*	-	0	+		-		
Participated in Land Day event (A 169)								28.7	30.0				0			
Participated in Nakba commemoration event (A 170)								24.8	25.6				0			

\* Question not asked      \*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – a trend hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is an increase or a decrease of at least 5%

Table 9.4 sums up the changes. In 10 of the 15 identical questions examined there was stability and there was a change in 5. The change in the 5 questions was divided into 2 where there was exacerbation, radicalization in 3, and moderation in none. Radicalization that may undermine coexistence was found in an increase in support of violence. Yet, the increase in support for illegal demonstrations is not so severe because the police contain such incidents and even an increase in refusal to associate with Jews will not necessarily lead to a rift. So there is overall stability with exacerbation, not radicalization that could shatter coexistence. These findings seem to confirm the thesis of rapprochement more than the radicalization thesis.

**Table 9.4 Summary of Trends of Change in Selected Items, 1976–1995, 2012–2013, 2013–2015, 2015–2017, 2017–2019, 1976–2019, Arabs**

	Arabs																	
	1976–1995			2012–2013			2013–2015			2015–2017			2017–2019			1976–2019		
Trend*	-	0	+	-	0	+	-	0	+	-	0	+	-	0	+	-	0	+
Table 9.1	0	2	3	1	2	6	3	4	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	2	7	0

	Arabs																	
	1976–1995			2012–2013			2013–2015			2015–2017		2017–2019			1976–2019			
Table 9.2	0	0	6	0	3	3	4	2	0	0	5	1	2	1	3	3	3	0
Table 9.3				3	1	0	0	4	0	0	1	3	0	3	1			
Table 9.4				0	4	3	1	6	0	1	6	0	2	4	1			
Table 9.5				1	7	11	5	13	1	4	12	3	5	7	7			
Total	0	2	9	5	17	23	13	29	3	8	27	10	13	17	15	5	10	0

\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – a trend hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is an increase or a decrease of at least 5%

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 1976–1995***

The survey that was conducted in the summer of 1995, several months before Rabin's assassination, is exceptional in the moderation of the Arab attitudes compared to surveys conducted before and after it. The second Rabin government (1992–1995) is considered the golden age of Arab-Jewish relations because it made a turning point in its domestic policy toward the Arab minority and in its foreign and security policy toward the Palestinians. In order to gain a majority in the Knesset, the Rabin government had to rely on the outside support of the Arab political parties. In accordance to a written agreement it signed with them, it benefited the Arabs by abolishing the discrimination in child allowances, investing in Arab education and local authorities and respecting the Arab public and its leaders. The Oslo Accords were the highlight of the historical change. They recognized the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and the PLO as its leadership, and aroused hope for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel and for an end to the conflict with the Palestinians.

In the 1995 survey, the attitudes of the Arabs were found to be exceptionally moderate: Only 6.7% of the Arabs in 1995 compared to 20.0% in 1976 denied Israel's right to exist as a state (Table 9.2), and only 34.6% in 1995 compared to 56.1% in 1980 rejected Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state (Table 9.1). 9 of the 11 identical questions in the 1976–1995 surveys indicate a moderation in the attitudes of the Arab public, there was no change in 2, and no question showed exacerbation or radicalization (Table 9.4).

The attitude change of the Arabs that corresponds with the policy change towards them shows generally that a policy towards a minority has a great influence on the shaping of its views. Reduction of discrimination and genuine striving for a settlement with the Palestinians soften the opposition of Arab citizens to the Jewish character of the state and increase their willingness to come to terms with it.

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2012–2013***

Rabin's assassination is a turning point in Arab-Jewish relations. The first Netanyahu government (1996–1999) was not kind to the Arabs in either domestic or foreign policy, and the Barak government (1999–2001) fostered a great illusion that was shattered during the second Palestinian Intifada (2000–2004) and the October 2000 unrest of the Arab public. In all the years since 2000, the attitudes of the Arabs have exacerbated until they moderated in 2013. Almost all the questions point to moderation, or at least to non-exacerbation, in the transition from 2012 to 2013. The comparison between the 45 questions presented to the Arabs in these two years showed that in 23 questions there was a moderation, in 17 there was no change and only in 5 there was exacerbation (Table 9.4). For example, support for protest abroad dropped from 56.5% in 2012 to 38.5% in 2013, dissatisfaction with Israeli citizenship decreased from 56.5% to 47.8%, and feeling closer to Palestinians than to Jews went down from 55.7% to 41.8% (Table 9.1). There was also a decline in the unwillingness to accept a Jew as a neighbor from 37.6% in 2012 to 29.7% in 2013, in support of the boycott of Knesset elections from 41.3% to 29.7% and in fear of annexation of the Triangle to Palestine from 66.2% to 53.3% (Table 9.6). During these years, the proportion of Arabs who have Jewish friends increased (from 18.8% in 2012 to 27.2% in 2013), who have received help from Jews (from 17.8% to 30.2%) and who have spent time with Jews (from 43.1% to 52.9%) (Table 9.5).

To find out the source of the changes in the trend, we conducted a detailed comparison of the attitudes of different Arab population groups since 2012. To do this, we used group's means on the militancy scale that consists of 13 central attitudes. Several options can be distinguished. One option is that most Arab population groups have moderated their attitudes and each one contributed its share to the overall change. The second option is that some groups exacerbated their attitudes and some moderated them. And the third option is that the attitudes of the majority of the public have not changed, but some groups have exacerbated their attitudes.

A comparison of the means on the militancy scale between 2012 and 2013 shows that most of the Arab public did not change its attitudes, except for a few groups that continued the trend of exacerbation. The vast majority of Arabs that the trend of exacerbation of their attitudes stopped in 2013 include Christians, Druze, Bedouin in the Negev, those from a displaced family, those affected by discrimination by Jews or state institutions, very religious and religious, do not have Jewish friends, have not received help from Jews, have not spent free time with Jews, regular members and activists in the Islamic Movement, young people aged 18–28, voters for Arab political parties, residents in Jewish towns and those whose standard of living below the average (Table 9.7). On the other hand, there was exacerbation of the attitudes of Arabs with higher education, who had suffered from land expropriation, and who had faced threats, humiliations or beatings from Jews.

The hold on the escalation of Arab attitudes in 2013 can be explained by the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians, the release of Palestinian prisoners and the refusal of the Palestinian Authority to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. The disappointment with the Arab Spring and the continued campaign for the annexation of the Triangle to Palestine forced the Arabs to think about their lives in Israel and to tighten their adherence to it. These moderating forces acted more intensely on the Arabs. The non-exacerbation of the attitudes of the Bedouin in the Negev probably stems from putting on hold the Bedouin Settlement Law in the Negev

and from the attempts by the authorities to reconcile with them at the time of the survey. The Bedouin in the Galilee apparently moderated thanks to their identification with their Bedouin brothers in the Negev.

**Table 9.5 Trend of Change of Experiences with Jews, Arabs, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs										Trend**			
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	2003–2019
Have Jewish friends and home visits (A 166)	37.4	38.9	22.9	26.6	18.8	27.2	24.3	16.0	17.8	+	0	-	0	-
Received help from Jews 3+ times (A 171)			19.9	21.4	17.8	30.2	25.8	27.4	14.4	+	0	0	-	0
Spent time with Jews 3+ times (A 172)			48.0	46.7	43.1	52.9	44.3	43.8	33.0	+	-	0	-	0
Endured threats, insults and blows from Jews 3+ times (A 173)	6.8	10.2	13.3	6.6	6.7	10.0	10.3	12.7	8.1	0	0	0	0	0
Endured discrimination from Jews or state institutions 3+ times (A 174)	20.6	25.3	26.5	26.6	25.3	23.9	22.5	21.7	15.7	0	0	0	+	0
Harassed by the authorities because of participation in protest actions (A 176)	3.7	2.7	5.1	8.4	8.5	10.3	12.0	13.3	12.5	0	0	0	0	-
One's livelihood was hurt because of participation in protest actions	3.5	2.4	3.7	5.8	6.1	9.1	11.5	13.8	*	0	0	0	0	-
For the past twelve months, they have been arrested and questioned by the security forces for participating in protests (A 175)								15.3	18.4				0	

\* Question not asked

\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

**Table 9.6 Trend of Change of Selected Attitudes, Arabs, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Arabs										Trend*			
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	2003–2019
Not willing to have a Jewish neighbor (A 16)	27.2	31.6	43.0	38.8	37.6	29.7	39.2	31.8	41.1	-	-	+	-	0
Do not trust the courts (A 62)	27.5	36.6	39.7	41.6	*	38.7	37.9	40.6	39.6	0	0	0	0	0
Do not believe in the occurrence of the Shoah (A 57)	*	28.0	29.6	23.8	31.0	34.5	31.0	29.7	29.1	0	0	0	0	0

	Arabs										Trend*			
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012-2013	2013-2015	2015-2017	2017-2019	2003-2019
Fear the annexation of the Triangle to the state of Palestine (A 41)	50.6	62.1	61.0	67.0	66.2	53.6	53.3	62.6	59.7	+	0	-	0	0
Arabs should not publicly identify with the Arab side when Israel is attacked (A 93)	*	*	32.0	33.2	23.2	28.7	35.6	26.0	35.9	+	+	-	+	0
Jews are not foreign settlers who usurped land from the Arabs (A 97)	*	*	34.2	28.3	29.0	39.1	43.4	33.4	34.7	+	0	-	0	0
Arab leaders should avoid making strong pronouncements against the state (A 94)	*	*	44.4	42.0	33.6	45.0	44.3	37.6	38.0	+	0	-	0	0
Israel as an independent state has a right to exist in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 50)	81.1	75.4	59.4	66.5	58.0	55.6	56.4	58.4	65.4	0	0	0	+	-
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state has a right to exist in which Arabs and Jews live together (A 51)	65.6	67.5	51.6	55.7	47.4	52.8	53.6	49.1	69.8	+	0	0	+	-
Support in a referendum a constitution instituting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and insuring full equality of civil rights to the Arabs (A 52)	*	70.9	56.5	57.4	48.2	53.2	51.7	47.2	56.0	+	0	0	+	-
Support the right of return to the state of Palestine only (A 108)	72.2	55.6	50.5	51.8	46.8	47.5	46.7	45.2	39.1	0	0	0	-	-
Personal identity is Israeli Arab (not Palestinian) (A 163)	53.0	40.9	39.6	38.6	32.5	42.5	36.2	37.1	36.0	+	-	0	0	0
Ready to move to the state of Palestine (A 22)	13.8	11.9	24.0	22.1	24.1	20.9	27.5	21.9	20.1	0	-	+	0	-
Arab citizens have a right to support Palestinians' armed struggle against Israel within the Green Line	17.8	30.7	41.3	39.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-
Despite its shortcomings, Israel is a democracy for Arabs as well (A 45)	63.1	58.2	50.5	55.8	54.2	54.0	56.2	61.9	56.3	0	0	+	-	0
In favor of protest abroad (A 76)	49.9	62.9	67.2	64.4	70.9	49.0	58.9	62.7	57.0	+	-	0	+	0
In favor of boycott of Knesset election (A 78)	32.8	34.6	40.6	40.3	41.3	29.7	32.5	37.4	46.4	+	0	0	-	0
In favor of use of all means, including violence (A 79)	5.4	9.5	13.9	13.7	16.6	14.0	18.5	18.5	34.7	0	0	0	-	-
Agree to the rise of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel (A 82)	18.9	36.2	41.9	41.4	48.5	41.7	45.7	41.9	30.7	+	0	0	+	-
Expect worsening of the state of Arab-Jewish relations in the coming five years (A 158)	43.0	49.9	49.6	61.4	66.2	52.3	61.8	63.8	57.7	+	-	0	+	-

\* Question not asked

\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

**Table 9.7 Statistical Significance of Differences in Population Group Means of Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2012–2013 (Means)**

Population Group	2012			2013			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Entire sample	6.70	3.813	710	5.93	3.577	694	-3.9034	1399.6429	<0.0001	Highly significant
Druze	2.34	2.664	47	2.00	2.703	50	-0.6238	94.7816	0.5343	Not significant
Galilee Bedouin	7.21	4.627	14	3.87	3.642	15	-2.1499	24.7094	0.0415	Significant
Negev Bedouin	7.62	3.755	29	6.97	4.658	31	-0.5968	56.7932	0.553	Not significant
Non-Bedouin Muslims	6.00	3.233	273	6.79	3.121	304	2.9789	563.4899	0.003	Highly significant
Christians	5.84	3.338	37	5.00	3.288	33	-1.0594	67.3122	0.2932	Not significant
Internal refugees	6.67	3.255	65	7.28	3.354	83	1.1164	139.4372	0.2662	Not significant
Confiscated lands	6.57	3.388	193	7.23	3.055	164	1.8346	353.7331	0.0538	Significant
Discrimination	6.56	3.281	201	6.80	3.283	225	0.7535	418.6994	0.4516	Not significant
Threats	6.83	3.094	109	7.69	2.663	129	2.2758	214.5817	0.0238	Significant
No friends	6.75	3.438	158	7.35	3.393	155	1.5540	310.9886	0.1212	Not significant
No help	6.64	3.186	183	6.91	3.414	176	0.7740	352.8827	0.4395	Not significant
No leisure time	6.47	3.284	102	7.36	3.348	89	1.849	184.4872	0.0661	Not significant
Mixed town	3.72	2.894	36	3.15	3.560	34	-0.7326	63.6646	0.4665	Not significant
No mixed town	5.91	3.516	364	6.26	3.505	399	1.3754	754.1805	0.1694	Not significant
Self-identity:										
Israeli Arab	3.17	3.219	128	4.15	3.590	192	2.5467	291.616	0.0114	Significant
Palestinian-Israeli	6.68	2.903	202	7.11	2.640	167	1.4885	363.6502	0.1375	Not significant
Palestinian-non-Israeli	7.57	3.119	70	8.36	3.121	74	1.5187	141.5666	0.1311	Not significant
Voted for:										
Jewish parties	2.13	2.153	82	2.37	2.714	84	0.632	157.4555	0.5283	Not significant
Arab parties	6.64	3.198	318	6.89	3.224	349	1.0045	660.2183	0.3155	Not significant
Islamic Movement:										
Oppose	4.94	3.619	49	4.66	3.696	89	-0.4317	100.8209	0.6669	Not significant
Neutral	5.08	3.516	228	5.99	3.552	211	2.6950	433.6525	0.0073	Highly significant
Sympathetic	7.13	2.841	95	6.77	3.525	91	-0.7649	172.7924	0.4454	Not significant
Member, active	7.43	3.605	28	7.36	2.929	42	-0.0856	49.6601	0.9321	Not significant
18–24 years old	5.95	3.198	122	5.72	3.536	123	-0.534	240.9615	0.5938	Not significant
Academic degree	5.59	3.378	61	7.13	3.009	82	2.8235	120.6087	0.0056	Highly significant
Low expenditure	5.67	3.923	73	6.41	3.645	152	1.3551	133.1654	0.1777	Not significant
Religious	6.65	3.166	127	6.79	3.316	143	0.3547	266.5845	0.7231	Not significant

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2013–2015***

The Arab survey in 2015 is supposed to answer the question whether the stopping of the trend of exacerbation in 2013 was a passing or a

real turning point. Given the variety of events from 2013 to 2015, we would expect a renewal of escalation of the attitudes of the Arab public. The political stalemate following the failure of the negotiations with the Palestinians, and following the Operation Protective Edge in which Israel severely beat the Palestinians in Gaza, intensified the alienation of the Arabs. To these must be added the continuation of the divisive campaign "Al-Aqsa in Danger" of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and the Arab consensus on the need to protect "Al-Haram a-Sharif" (Temple Mount) which serves as a national-religious symbol for all Arabs in Israel. The continued destruction of the makeshift buildings without a permit and the clash between the police and the Bedouin in Rahat continued to ignite the anger of the Arabs. The events surrounding the Knesset elections on March 17, 2015 also caused resentment and anger among the Arab public. They included the raising of the threshold percentage for entering the Knesset from 2.0% to 3.25% with the intention to decrease the Arab representation in the Knesset, the anti-Arab campaign of Yisrael Beiteinu Party with the slogan "without loyalty there is no citizenship," incitement by Prime Minister Netanyahu on election day "the Arabs are moving in huge numbers to the polls" and the lack of a changeover of government that the Arabs had so longed for.

Approval for the expected exacerbation of Arab attitudes we get from the comparison of the 45 identical questions for 2013 and 2015 which shows stability in 29 questions, exacerbation in 13 and moderation in 3, leading to the conclusion that the trend is stability with some exacerbation (Table 9.4). The exacerbation is evident in rejectionist attitudes. In 4 of the 6 rejectionist attitudes in Table 9.2 there was a deterioration and in 2 stability. The rate of Arabs denying Israel's right to exist was doubled from 13.9% in 2013 to 26.9% in 2015, the rate of Arabs defining themselves just Palestinians (without an Israeli component in their identity) rose from 17.6% to 25.2%, the rate of Arabs supporting the use of illegal demonstrations doubled from 11.3% to 22.6% and the rate of supporters of the use of violence also doubled from 7.2% to 15.6% (Table 9.2).

However, a comparison of population group scores on the militancy scale shows that the stop of the trend of exacerbation in 2013 continues. The mean score on the militancy scale was 5.93 in 2013 and 6.02 in 2015, the difference being negligible and not statistically significant (Table 9.8). Among half of the population groups surveyed, there was no change in attitudes and in half there was a moderation. We find moderation among non-Bedouin Muslims, those who have experienced discrimination by Jews or state institutions, those who have faced threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews, residents of Jewish cities and residents of Arab localities, who have an Israeli identity or a Palestinian identity with an Israeli component, voters in Knesset election (in contrast to non-voters), those who oppose or are neutral about the Islamic Movement, have a full higher education and have below-average incomes. This is a variety of groups that are different in their orientation to Jews and to the state. Apparently the militancy scale, which includes only 13 items and does not indicate any exacerbation in 2015, does not truly represent the 45 questions common to the 2013 and 2015 surveys that reveal certain exacerbation.

**Table 9.8 Statistical Significance of Differences in Population Group Means of Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2013–2015 (Means)**

Population Group	2013			2015			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	Significance Level
Entire sample	5.93	3.577	694	6.02	3.856	690	0.4501	1373.0507	0.6527	Not significant
Druze	2.00	2.703	50	1.44	1.896	62	-1.2395	84.8671	0.2186	Not significant
Galilee Bedouin	3.87	3.642	15	4.39	3.984	33	0.4450	29.5473	0.6595	Not significant
Negev Bedouin	6.97	4.658	31	7.90	3.318	49	0.9672	49.1844	0.3382	Not significant
Non-Bedouin Muslims	6.79	3.121	304	5.71	3.045	301	-4.3081	602.8694	<0.0001	Highly significant
Christians	5.00	3.288	33	5.68	3.024	53	0.9615	63.7083	0.3399	Not significant
Internal refugees	7.28	3.354	83	7.12	3.032	106	-0.3394	167.0881	0.7347	Not significant
Confiscated lands	7.23	3.055	164	6.77	3.276	189	-1.3642	349.1644	0.1734	Not significant
Discrimination	6.80	3.283	225	6.63	3.021	225	-0.5716	444.9364	0.5679	Not significant
Threats	7.69	2.663	129	6.72	2.585	148	-3.0655	267.4862	0.0024	Highly significant
No friends	7.35	3.393	155	6.33	3.550	206	-2.7715	339.2630	0.0059	Highly significant
No help	6.91	3.414	176	6.70	3.390	166	-0.5706	339.0963	0.5687	Not significant

No leisure time	7.36	3.348	89	6.58	3.516	120	-1.6301	194.5714	0.1047	Not significant
Mixed town	3.15	3.560	34	5.18	3.229	38	2.5235	67.0569	0.0140	Significant
No mixed town	6.26	3.505	399	5.32	3.452	460	-3.9478	836.1955	<0.0001	Highly significant
Self-identity:										
Israeli Arab	4.15	3.590	192	3.33	3.017	203	-2.4506	373.7205	0.0147	Significant
Palestinian-Israeli	7.11	2.640	167	6.18	3.069	190	-3.0777	354.8420	0.0022	Highly significant
Palestinian-non-Israeli	8.36	3.121	74	7.54	2.728	105	-1.8222	143.5622	0.0705	Not significant
Voted for:										
Jewish parties	2.37	2.714	84	1.60	2.054	96	-2.1223	153.3830	0.0354	Significant
Arab parties	6.89	3.224	349	6.19	3.089	402	-3.0258	724.4197	0.0026	Highly significant
Islamic Movement:										
Oppose	4.66	3.696	89	3.34	3.573	53	-2.1020	112.4126	0.0378	Significant
Neutral	5.99	3.552	211	4.50	3.221	248	-4.6739	428.3666	<0.0001	Highly significant
Sympathetic	6.77	3.525	91	7.10	3.198	145	0.7252	177.4077	0.4693	Not significant
Member, active	7.36	2.929	42	6.13	2.393	52	-1.8853	91.5658	0.0626	Not significant
18–24 years old	5.72	3.536	123	5.98	3.313	121	0.5928	241.4293	0.5539	Not significant
Academic degree	7.13	3.009	82	5.23	3.694	148	-4.2221	196.9705	<0.0001	Highly significant
Low expenditure	6.41	3.645	152	5.18	3.541	272	-3.3663	305.0021	0.0009	Highly significant
Religious	6.79	3.316	143	6.65	3.072	175	-0.3871	293.2910	0.6990	Not significant

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2015–2017***

We expected exacerbation of the attitudes of the Arab public due to quite a few events harmful to Arab-Jewish relations between the years 2015–2017. The political stalemate continues. Terrorism of young Palestinians against Jews has continued unabated. The continued demolition of houses without a permit in the Negev, which culminated in Umm al-Hiran and Qalansawa, led in January 2017 to a general strike and protests by the Arab population. Umm al-Hiran became an affair in which an Arab citizen was shot dead, a policeman was trampled to death and law enforcement authorities were charged with perjury. Members of the far-right Jewish Tag Mehir Movement conducted vandalism operations in June-July 2017 in the Triangle, Galilee and East Jerusalem. Harsh statements by the Prime Minister and government Ministers were made against the Arab public such as accusations of arson and terrorism and a call for a boycott of Arab businesses. The government decided in November 2015 to outlaw the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement. It also continued to act in legislation, bills and policies that are considered anti-Arab: The Dismissal Law (of a Knesset Member), the Muezzin bill, the Nation-State bill, the Kaminitz Law (which imposes

heavy fines on builders and users of buildings without permit) and the dilution of the contents of the civics textbook to high schools. To these must be added the activities of Arab Knesset Members: A mourning visit to a family of terrorists, non-expression of grief and non-participation in President Shimon Peres' funeral, MK Ghattas' prosecution for handing over cellular phones to national security prisoners, and an unequivocal refusal of Arab MKs to condemn Palestinian terrorist acts.

A comparison of the attitudes of population groups in 2015 to 2017 confirms the exacerbation. In contrast to the trend of change between 2013 and 2015 in Table 9.7, which showed a moderation of population groups, the comparison between 2015 and 2017 in Table 9.10 shows a consistent exacerbation. 20 of the 28 groups in comparison indicate a statistically significant exacerbation. The exacerbation encompasses almost all the Arab population groups. The findings on exacerbation in Table 9.10 are more unequivocal than the findings in Table 9.4, which show a mixed trend.

**Table 9.9 Summary of Trends of Change in All Items, 2015–2017, 2017–2019, Arabs**

#	Issue	Table	Arabs										
			2015–2017				2017–2019						
			-	0	+	Total	-	0	+	Total			
	<b>Trend*</b>												
1	Separation	2.5–2.1, 2.7, 2.13–2.12	4	7	4	15	3	10	1	14			
2	Image of the other	2.14	0	2	0	2	1	1	0	2			
3	Alienation	2.21–2.16	0	8	1	9	2	7	1	10			
4	Distrust	2.24–2.22	0	5	2	7	1	5	0	6			
5	Deprivation	3.7–3.1	2	6	2	10	4	5	2	11			
6	Threats	3.10–3.8	1	6	0	7	0	8	0	8			
7	Collective memory	3.12, 3.14, 3.16	2	4	0	6	0	1	3	4			
8	Legitimacy of coexistence	4.7–4.1	13	13	0	26	2	5	14	21			
9	Regional disputes	5.1, 5.9–5.4	7	6	0	13	4	3	4	11			
10	Regional integration	5.11	0	1	2	3	2	1	0	3			
11	Identity	5.13–5.12, 5.17–5.15	4	5	1	10	1	4	2	7			
12	Minority leadership	6.2–6.1	4	4	1	9	0	0	5	5			
13	Autonomy	6.8	3	1	0	4	1	1	3	5			
14	Means of struggle	6.15–6.14, 6.20–6.17	0	6	8	14	1	7	3	11			
15	Options of change	7.1, 7.3	12	5	0	17	1	12	4	17			

#	Issue	Table	Arabs							
			2015–2017				2017–2019			
			Trend*		-	0	+	Total	-	0
16	Evaluation of state of relations	7.5	0	3	0	3	0	0	2	2
Total			52	82	21	155	23	70	44	137

\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

**Table 9.10 Statistical Significance of Differences in Population Group Means of Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2015–2017 (Means)**

Population Group	2015			2017			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	Significance Level
Entire sample	6.02	3.856	690	6.39	4.294	695	-1.6874	1309.3095	0.0917	Not significant
Druze	1.44	1.896	62	2.08	3.475	76	-1.3743	120.0664	0.1719	Not significant
Galilee Bedouin	4.39	3.984	33	5.00	4.000	33	-0.6207	63.9990	0.5370	Not significant
Negev Bedouin	7.90	3.318	49	6.20	4.576	90	2.5138	126.0088	0.0132	Significant
Non-Bedouin Muslims	5.71	3.045	301	7.32	4.158	431	-6.0457	728.3518	<0.0001	Highly significant
Christians	5.68	3.024	53	7.10	3.820	73	-6.0457	728.3518	0.0216	Significant
Internal refugees	7.12	3.032	106	8.17	3.490	122	-2.4309	225.9999	0.0158	Significant
Confiscated lands	6.77	3.276	189	8.30	3.288	250	-4.8376	405.7186	<0.0001	Highly significant
Discrimination	6.63	3.021	225	7.71	3.913	362	-3.7519	558.1460	0.0002	Highly significant
Threats	6.72	2.585	148	8.36	3.995	220	-4.7804	365.5060	<0.0001	Highly significant
No friends	6.33	3.550	206	7.82	4.090	330	-4.4548	480.0885	<0.0001	Highly significant
No help	6.70	3.390	166	8.24	4.240	250	-4.0992	399.8946	<0.0001	Highly significant
No leisure time	6.58	3.516	120	7.74	4.163	176	-2.5842	280.7749	0.0103	Significant
Mixed town	5.18	3.229	38	6.18	2.284	64	-1.6763	59.1812	0.0990	Not significant
No mixed town	5.32	3.452	460	6.61	4.469	640	-5.3980	1092.3236	<0.0001	Highly significant
Self-identity:										
Israeli Arab	3.33	3.017	203	2.99	3.334	269	1.1583	454.7606	0.2473	Not significant
Palestinian-Israeli	6.18	3.069	190	8.12	3.715	278	-6.1590	449.5054	<0.0001	Highly significant
Palestinian-non-Israeli	7.54	2.728	105	9.20	3.292	141	-4.3188	241.1754	<0.0001	Highly significant
Voted for:										
Jewish parties	1.60	2.054	96	1.96	2.825	81	-0.9538	143.2784	0.3418	Not significant
Arab parties	6.19	3.089	402	7.55	4.003	382	-5.3065	716.2682	<0.0001	Highly significant
Islamic Movement:										
Oppose	3.34	3.573	53	6.31	4.790	140	-4.6683	125.1570	<0.0001	Highly significant
Neutral	4.50	3.221	248	5.80	4.292	321	-4.1271	566.5482	<0.0001	Highly significant
Sympathetic	7.10	3.198	145	8.11	3.644	192	-2.7023	327.4716	0.0072	Significant
Member, active	6.13	2.393	52	7.21	4.995	43	-1.2998	57.7426	0.1988	Not significant

Population Group	2015			2017			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
18–24 years old	5.98	3.313	121	6.57	4.549	144	-1.2186	258.0044	0.2241	Not significant
Academic degree	5.23	3.694	148	6.99	4.150	227	-4.2931	339.1098	<0.0001	Highly significant
Low expenditure	5.18	3.541	272	6.32	4.485	307	-3.4122	569.6528	0.0007	Highly significant
Religious	6.65	3.072	175	7.32	4.092	265	-1.9578	430.8122	0.0509	Significant

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2017–2019***

Our expectation is that the trend of exacerbation of Arab attitudes since 2015 will continue in 2019. The mischiefs of the rightwing government continued after the 2017 survey. The process of de-democratization was strengthened to compensate for the decline in support for the rightwing government due to the indictment of Prime Minister Netanyahu of fraud, breach of trust and bribery. The crystallization of the Center-Left bloc threatened the continuation of the rightwing rule, a threat that could be realized by forming a narrow government that would rely on the Arab political parties. To prevent this possibility, Netanyahu and the leaders of the political right adopted a strategy of de-legitimization of the Arab political parties and, indirectly, their Arab voters. The Arabs also did not agree to the Israeli bombing of Syria in order to remove Iran from there and to the Israeli attacks on the residents of Gaza in response to the attacks on the Jewish residents around Gaza Strip. These are some of the events that served as a basis for expecting the exacerbation to continue.

Contrary to expectations of further exacerbation, a detailed comparison of Arab attitudes in 2017 and 2019 indicates a general trend of moderation. The 137 common questions for these years were divided into 70 indicating no change, 44 moderation and 23 exacerbation (Table 9.9). A clear moderation of Arab attitudes is evident also in a statistically significant increase in the old coexistence scale from a mean of 3.54 in 2017 to a mean of 4.19 in 2019 and in a statistically significant decrease in the militancy scale from 6.39 to 5.71 (Table 9.11). The moderation of

Arab attitudes is found in 18 of the 28 Arab population groups examined (Table 9.12).

Examination of the attitudes in which there was a large concentration of moderation and a large concentration of exacerbation reveals a paradoxical trend. Contrary to the expectation that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Arabs will be weakened due to the Nation-State Law and the campaign against the political legitimacy of the Arab citizens, it actually strengthened considerably. The most notable moderation is expressed in the increase in the legitimacy of Israel's right to exist as a state and of its Jewish character, as evidenced by the distribution of 21 questions related to this issue, 14 of which showed moderation and only 2 exacerbation (Table 9.9). The proportion of Arabs who recognize Israel's right to exist as a state steadily decreased from 81.1% in 2003 to 58.4% in 2017 but increased to 65.4% in 2019 and Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state decreased from 65.6% to 49.1% and jumped back to 69.8%, respectively, and the rate of those agreeing to establish a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel doubled from 18.9% to 41.9%, but dropped to 30.7%, respectively (Table 9.6). On the other hand, there was exacerbation in support for means of struggle. In 3 questions about means of struggle there was an exacerbation compared to only 1 in which there was a moderation, while in the other 7 questions there was no change apparently because exacerbation already took place in 2017 (Table 9.9). The proportion of Arabs who said that Israel is democracy also for the Arabs was 63.1% in 2003 and 61.9% in 2017 but went down to 56.3% in 2019 (Table 6.14). Support for boycott of Knesset elections rose from 32.5% in 2003 to 37.4% in 2017 and to 46.4% in 2019 (Table 9.6), and support for the use of all means including violence rose dramatically from 5.4%, to 18.5% and to 34.7%, respectively (Table 9.6).

Are these findings in contradiction? The political right's denial of Arab legitimacy leads Arab citizens to strengthen their adherence to Israeli citizenship by increasing their acceptance of the state, reconciliation with its character and loyalty to it. The coming to terms with a minority status drives Arabs precisely to intensify their struggle

to achieve equality, even if the struggle requires the use of illegitimate means such as a boycott of Knesset elections and violence. Although there is an element of radicalism in these attitudes, there is no “breaking of the rules” here. The Arab minority continues to link its fate to the State of Israel and is struggling to improve its position in it. It does not detach itself from the state and from the Jewish majority, does not prefer a Palestinian life over an Israeli life and is not swept away by massive violations of law and order.

**Table 9.11 Statistical Significance of Differences in Means of the Old Coexistence Scale and Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2017–2019 (Means)**

	Arabs									
	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance
	Mean	SD	No. of Cases	Mean	SD	No. of Cases	T-Value	D.F.	P	
Coexistence scale	3.53	1.62	698	4.19	2.05	713	6.735	1409	<0.001	Highly significant
Militancy scale	6.39	4.294	695	5.71	3.908	704	-3.105	1397	0.002	Highly significant

**Table 9.12 Statistical Significance of Differences between 2017 and 2019 in Population Group Means of Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2017–2019 (Means)**

Population Group	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Entire sample	6.39	4.294	695	5.71	3.908	704	-3.105	1397	0.002	Highly significant
Druze (com)	2.08	3.475	76	1.02	1.872	37	-1.735	111	0.086	Not significant
Gallilee Bedouin (A com)	5.00	4.000	33	6.97	3.416	23	1.922	54	0.060	Not significant
Negev Bedouin (A com)	6.20	4.576	90	6.40	3.985	81	0.303	169	0.0762	Not significant
Non-Bedouin Muslims (A com)	7.32	4.158	431	5.99	3.643	352	-4.700	781	<0.001	Highly significant
Christians (A com)	7.10	3.820	73	5.36	3.480	54	-2.636	125	0.009	Highly significant
Internal refugees (189)	8.17	3.490	122	6.90	3.911	97	-2.535	217	0.012	Significant
Confiscated lands (A 188)	8.30	3.288	250	7.09	3.750	257	-3.854	505	<0.001	Highly significant
Discrimination (A 174)	7.71	3.913	362	6.82	3.562	250	-2.871	610	0.004	Highly significant
Threats (A 173)	8.36	3.995	220	7.83	3.801	172	-1.332	390	0.184	Highly significant
No friends (A 166)	7.82	4.090	330	6.84	4.052	238	-2.832	566	0.005	Highly significant

Population Group	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
No help (A 171)	8.24	4.240	250	7.04	3.671	305	-3.571	553	<0.001	Highly significant
No leisure time (A 164)	7.74	4.163	176	7.54	3.789	227	-0.504	401	0.615	Not significant
Mixed town (A mixedtown)	6.18	2.284	64	3.49	2.420	44	5.873	106	<0.001	Highly significant
No mixed town (A mixedtown)	6.61	4.469	640	5.89	3.836	504	-2.880	1142	0.004	Highly significant
Self-identity (A identity):										
Israeli Arab	2.99	3.334	269	4.40	4.349	191	3.939	458	<0.001	Highly significant
Palestinian-Israeli	8.12	3.715	278	6.06	3.001	275	-7.178	551	<0.001	Highly significant
Palestinian-non-Israeli	9.20	3.292	141	7.52	3.843	81	-3.443	220	<0.001	Highly significant
Voted for (vote19):										
Jewish parties	1.96	2.825	81	1.24	1.744	70	-1.851	149	0.066	Not significant
Arab parties	7.55	4.003	382	5.36	3.373	201	-6.616	581	<0.001	Highly significant
Islamic Movement (A 185):										
Oppose	6.31	4.790	140	3.08	3.328	58	-4.688	196	<0.001	Highly significant
Neutral	5.80	4.292	321	5.05	3.686	256	-2.219	575	<0.027	Highly significant
Sympathetic	8.11	3.644	192	6.81	3.386	172	-3.514	362	<0.001	Highly significant
Member, active	7.21	4.995	43	6.75	3.760	62	-0.538	103	0.592	Not significant
18–24 years old (A age)	6.57	4.549	144	6.59	3.945	121	0.038	263	0.970	Not significant
Academic degree (A edu)	6.99	4.150	227	5.04	4.159	198	-4.827	423	<0.001	Highly significant
Low expenditure (A 196)	6.32	4.485	307	4.96	3.555	275	-4.024	580	<0.001	Highly significant
Religious (A 184)	7.32	4.092	265	6.85	3.576	230	-7.098	493	<0.001	Highly significant

## Trends of Change among Jews

### *Trends of Change over the Entire Period 1980–2019*

The common view is that there was radicalization of the attitudes of the Jewish public toward Arabs in Israel because of its drift to the right and radical right and religionization. The state and the governing political right also acted to strengthen Israel's Jewish character and to weaken its democracy, steps that reduce the tolerance of Jews toward Arab citizens. The exacerbation of Jewish attitudes is also expected as a response to the exacerbation of Arab attitudes in this period.

The drift of the Jews to the right is well expressed in the vote for the Knesset. An examination of the changes in the political map in the years 1999–2019 shows that although the support for the radical rightwing

political parties doubled from 6.7% of the votes in the 1999 Knesset elections to 12.5% of the votes in 2013, it dropped back to 6.7% in 2015 and to 5.8% in the April 2019 elections (Table 9.13). Just as the radical right is small, the left and the moderate left have shrunk: Support for its political parties fell in those years from 31.6% in 1999 to 17.5% in 2013, but rose again to 24.2% in 2015 and fell to an abyss of 8.3% in April 2019. In order to understand the meaning of the vote to the Knesset regarding Jewish attitudes, the vote for Arab political parties must be deducted from it. After deducting the vote for Arab political parties, the rightwing bloc (including the religious political parties, the radical right and the center-right) has a permanent and clear advantage over the center-left bloc. The rightwing bloc won 69 seats in the Knesset in 2003 against 43 for the center-left bloc (excluding the Arab political parties), 50 against 60 in 2006, 65 against 44 in 2009, 61 against 48 in 2013, 57 against 40 in 2015 and 58 against to 45 in April 2019. This distribution of seats that is based on the Jews' vote only shows the great advantage of the rightwing bloc (including the radical right and the religious political parties): The political right in the April 2019 elections won 54.1% of the votes compared to only 37.5% received by the center-left political parties (excluding the Arab political parties).

**Table 9.13 Trend of Change of the Results of Knesset Elections by Political Stream, 1999–2019 (Percentages and Mandates)**

	1999	2003	2006	2009	2013	2015	April 2019
Radical right	6.7 (8)	5.8 (7)	16.7 (20)	15.8 (19)	12.5 (15)*	6.7 (8)**	5.8 (7)
Right	43.3 (52)	51.7 (62)	25.0 (30)	38.3 (46)	38.3 (46)	40.8 (49)	45.0 (54)
Right-center						8.3*** (10)	3.3 (4)
Center	10.0 (12)	12.5 (15)	30.0 (36)	23.3 (28)	23.0 (27)	9.2 (11) ****	29.2 (35)
Moderate left	23.3 (28)	18.3 (22)	15.8 (19)	10.8 (13)	12.5 (15)	20.0 (24)	5.0 (6)
Left	8.3 (10)	5.0 (6)	4.2 (5)	2.5 (3)	5.0 (6)	4.2 (5)	3.3 (4)
Arab	8.3 (10)	6.7 (8)	8.3 (10)	9.2 (11)	9.2 (11)	10.8 (13)	8.3 (10)
Total	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (120)

\* This proportion includes the part of Yisrael Betenu in Likud-Betenu (11 mandates) and the part of Halhud Leumi-Tekuma in Habayit Hayehudi (4 mandates)

\*\* This proportion includes Yisrael Betenu (6) and Tekuma (2 mandates) in Habayit Hayehudi

\*\*\* Kolanu

\*\*\*\* Yesh Aatid

The advantage of the rightwing bloc is also evident in the self-definition of Jews on the right-center-left continuum. Indeed, the political division of Jews in 2003–2015 remained stable: Between 45% to 50% defined themselves as rightwing and moderate rightwing, about 40% in the center-left and about 10% did not identify politically (Table 9.14). But after 2015, the balance of power changed in favor of the political right: 56.0% compared to 38.2% in 2017 and 62.5% compared to 31.5% in 2019. Even if we add the Arabs to the center-left bloc, the political right still enjoys a significant advantage. The rightwing advantage is most clearly expressed in the preference of 56.3% of the Jews in 2017 and 58.9% in 2019 for government to be in the hands of the political right, compared with only 29.5% and 27.6% to be in the hands of the center-left (Table 9.15). Moreover, there is enormous loyalty to the rightwing camp. Rightwing voters were asked in 2019 to which list they will give their vote if Netanyahu does not head the Likud, only 2.5% of them said they would vote for a party from the opposing camp (Table 9.16).

The increase in the self-affiliation of Jews to the rightwing bloc from 45% in 1999 to 60% in 2019 occurred under the Netanyahu government, the most rightwing of all Israeli governments. The government acted to de-democratize the regime by weakening the gatekeepers, inciting against the center-left, labeling Arab political parties as supporters of terrorism and accusing Arab citizens of potential disloyalty and disqualifying them for power sharing. The Likud has become a non-liberal party led by an authoritarian leader, accused of crimes, who does his utmost to evade justice.

**Table 9.14 Trend of Change of Self-Definition on Political Stream, Jews, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews														
	2003	2004	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019		
Self-definition on a political stream (J 110):															
Right	20.3	23.0	24.7	20.8	20.6	24.3	24.6	23.9	25.5	25.2	25.9	23.3	30.6		
Moderate right	29.0	22.7	22.3	23.1	24.7	23.1	22.2	25.0	27.8	21.6	24.8	32.7	31.9		
Center	21.5	23.1	25.1	22.9	25.8	26.2	22.3	24.6	19.1	27.6	26.3	21.2	18.7		
Moderate left	13.7	14.4	12.0	12.7	11.2	9.2	11.1	10.8	13.5	9.6	10.2	13.0	9.2		
Left	7.1	8.9	8.1	8.8	8.1	5.7	9.0	9.3	7.0	5.7	5.9	4.0	3.6		
No answer	8.4	7.8	7.8	11.8	9.5	11.5	10.7	6.3	7.2	10.4	6.9	5.7	6.0		

**Table 9.15 Preference of Government Rule by the Political Right or Left-Center, Jews, 2017–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews	
	2017	2019
What is important to you: That the government will be ruled by the right or the left-center? (J 109)		
It is very important to me that the government will be rule by right	34.2	34.4
It is important to me that the government will be rule by right	22.1	24.5
It is important to me that the government will be rule by left-center	14.0	17.2
It is very important to me that the government will be rule by left-center	15.4	10.6
No answer	14.3	13.3

**Table 9.16 Voting If Netanyahu Will Not Head the Likud, Jews, 2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews
	2019
(Question to a respondent who supports the political right) If Netanyahu will not head the Likud and someone else will replace him, for which list will you vote then?	
Will vote for one of the rightwing lists	52.6
Will vote for an ultra-orthodox list (Yahadut Hatorah or Shas)	16.5
Will vote for Kahol Lavan	2.5
Will vote for Labor	0.0
Will vote for Meretz	0.0
Will vote for another list	5.6
Will not vote	3.2
No answer	19.6

The data available to us for examining the attitudes of the Jewish public from the first representative national survey in 1980 to 2002 are few and irregular, but have become numerous and steady since the launching of the Arab-Jewish Relations Index in 2003. Some of the identical questions are presented in Table 9.17. These are questions about rejectionist (i.e., extreme in rejecting coexistence) attitudes of the Jewish public in the years 1980–2019. The findings show fluctuations but the general trend points to stability. During this period, about a seventh of the Jews did not accept the right to exist in Israel of an Arab minority, about a third denied the right of Arabs to vote to the Knesset and between a third to a half thought that the state should encourage Arabs to leave the country. These numbers are not heartening, but they have not changed consistently since 1980. These findings do not confirm the thesis that Jewish attitudes have been

radicalized over the years. They give more validity to the opposite thesis of rapprochement, which claims that forces that keep Jews away from the Arabs are counterbalanced by forces that bring them closer. The Jews have learned to distinguish well between Arab citizens and other Palestinians and that the former will continue to be citizens of the state even if a Palestinian state is established. They understand that the Arab minority will continue to live among them, so a way must be found to get along with it, to reduce discrimination and exclusion against it and to integrate it into all areas of public life.

**Table 9.17 Trend of Change of Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Jews, 1980–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews											Trend***			
	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	1980–2019
Deny Arabs' right to live in Israel as a minority** (J 96)	*	15.7	9.7	17.2	13.7	15.2	15.3	14.8	15.4	15.3	0	0	0	0	0
Reject the existence of an Arab minority with full civil rights in Israel (J 95)	*	21.3	16.4	19.8	18.9	21.8	21.9	15.4	18.8	15.3	0	+	0	0	0
Deny the Arabs the right to vote to the Knesset (J 16)	*	23.4	30.6	33.7	28.5	27.9	30.5	21.1	4.0	26.3	0	+	0	0	0
Think that Israel should encourage Arab citizens to leave the country**	48.5	38.7	36.4	38.9	34.1	*	*	*	*	*			+		+
Not willing to have an Arab friend (J 11)	38.1	37.0	32.0	31.3	*	*	37.1	*	35.4	31.5			0	0	0

\* Question not asked      \*\* Wording not identical over the years      \*\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%.

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2003–2015***

The moderation trend that was observed throughout the period from 1980 to 2019 was also clearly found in the years 2003–2015 in which the

Index project was conducted. Table 9.18 presents selected attitudes of the Jews for these years. For most attitudes there is no change and only in some there is a balance between moderation and exacerbation. For example, the proportion of Jews who fear that Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character dropped from 71.8% in 2003 to 64.9% in 2012, 59.4% in 2013 and 61.2% in 2015; and the percentage of Jews who believe that decisions about the nature of the state and its borders should be taken with a Jewish majority dropped from 81.9% to 69.2%, 65.3%, 69.4%, and 68.3%, respectively. Compared to the moderation in these questions, there was an exacerbation in other questions, such as a decrease from 46.1% in 2003 to 29.3% in 2012, 30.5% in 2013 and 34.0% in 2015 in the proportion of Jews who agree that the Arabs use general strikes to advance their interests. But in most questions there was stability as in the percentage of Jews who agree that the Jews would rule and the Israeli Arabs would not receive democratic rights – 21.4% in 2003, 17.4% in 2012, 20.2% in 2013 and 17.8% in 2015; there was also no change in the proportion of Jews who agree that the state should give Arab citizens the powers to manage their own religious, educational and cultural institutions – 61.7% in 2003, 58.3% in 2012, 52.6% in 2013 and 59.0% in 2015; nor has there been a change in the rate of Jews who believe that the state must ensure that an Arab citizen can live in any locality one wishes – 42.0% in 2009, 42.8% in 2012, 43.0% in 2013, and 47.2% in 2015. There was also no change in the experiences of the Jews with the Arab citizens in the years 2003–2015. The proportion of Jews who have Arab friends and have visited their homes in the last two years was 16.3% in 2003, 15.4% in 2012, 14.5% in 2013, and 14.0% in 2015 (Table 9.19). A similar pattern also prevails when it comes to spending free time with Arabs and encountering threats, humiliations, or beatings by Arab citizens.

**Table 9.18 Trend of Change in Selected Attitudes,  
Jews, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews														
											Trend****				
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012–2013	2013–2015	2015–2017	2017–2019	2003–2019	
Do not believe in the occurrence of Nakba in 1948 (J 59)	*	*	57.7***	52.6	52.6	54.5	54.3	57.1	61.1	-	*	*	57.7***	52.6	
Fear of Arabs endangering the state by high birthrate	70.1	64.4	58.4	63.4	51.5	*	*	*	*	+	70.1	64.4	58.4	63.4	
Fear of Arabs endangering the state by their struggle to change its Jewish character (J 35)	71.8	71.3	70.6	71.1	64.9	59.4	61.2	60.1	54.7	+	71.8	71.3	70.6	71.1	
Agree that Israel keeps its Jewish majority	*	95.3	92.9	92.6	*	*	*	*	*	0	*	95.3	92.9	92.6	
Agree that Jews have control of the state	*	92.8	83.9	87.8	*	*	*	*	*	0	*	92.8	83.9	87.8	
Agree that the Arabs have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights (J 38)	72.6	76.9	78.8	62.2	75.0	73.7	79.7	73.8	71.3	0	72.6	76.9	78.8	62.2	
Support Arabs' right to vote to the Knesset (J 16)	65.2	67.0	66.9	63.6	70.5	66.6	77.4	74.2	72.0	0	65.2	67.0	66.9	63.6	
Agree that there should be a Jewish majority in decisions on state's character and borders (J 44)	81.9	80.1	77.0	77.9	69.2	65.3	69.4	68.3	68.4	+	81.9	80.1	77.0	77.9	
Believe that an Arab who identify as a Palestinian-Arab in Israel cannot be loyal to the state and its laws (J 40)	75.6	75.4	72.9	72.0	69.4	68.1	66.5	69.5	69.4	0	75.6	75.4	72.9	72.0	
Will choose the Jewish character of the state when it is in contradiction with democracy (J 56)	69.7	72.3	67.1	67.4	64.5	61.7	65.3	63.2	61.7	+	69.7	72.3	67.1	67.4	
Support the annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state	45.3	42.2	41.4	39.4	*	*	*	*	*	0	45.3	42.2	41.4	39.4	

	Jews													
											Trend****			
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2012-2013	2013-2015	2015-2017	2017-2019	2003-2019
In the area of culture, Israel should integrate into Europe-America rather than to the Middle East (J 82)	66.4	59.0	57.5	64.1	65.0	59.3	58.9	55.1	50.6	0	66.4	59.0	57.5	64.1
The most important identity is Israeli citizenship (J 101)	29.6	35.6	38.9	36.7	42.2	41.0	35.1	34.9	30.2	+	29.6	35.6	38.9	36.7
Think that Arab citizens will be more loyal to a Palestinian state than to Israel	68.6	72.6	66.3**	68.2	64.6	59.1	*	*	*	+	68.6	72.6	66.3**	68.2
Israel should grant Arabs powers of self-rule of religious, educational and cultural institutions (J 89)	61.7	59.8	62.7	54.6	58.3	52.6	59.0	49.3	39.1	0	61.7	59.8	62.7	54.6
Agree to the use of general strikes by Arabs for advancing their interests (J 92)	46.1	35.1	37.0	28.7	29.3	30.5	34.0	32.3	22.2	-	46.1	35.1	37.0	28.7
Arabs should leave the country and receive proper compensation (J 54)	38.9	41.0	33.4	36.6	31.0	29.7	32.2	29.9	33.8	0	38.9	41.0	33.4	36.6
Jews should rule and Israeli Arabs will not receive democratic rights	21.4	20.6	16.5	21.1	17.4	20.2	17.8	19.2	*	0	21.4	20.6	16.5	21.1
There will be no differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks in border crossings (J 64)	*	*	33.2	27.2	26.9	27.7	26.4	25.0	25.9	0	*	*	33.2	27.2
The state must insure Arab citizens to live in every locality they choose	*	*	42.0	37.2	42.8	43.0	47.2	43.8	*	0	*	*	42.0	37.2
The state treats Arabs as second-rate citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality (J 99)	37.9	37.7	36.3	30.0	31.0	30.4	28.7	30.8	31.6	-	37.9	37.7	36.3	30.0

\* Question not asked      \*\* In 2008      \*\*\* In 2010      \*\*\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

**Table 9.19 Trend of Change in Experiences with Arabs, Jews, 2003–2019 (Percentages)**

	Jews										Trend**
	2003	2006	2009	2011	2012	2013	2015	2017	2019	2003–2019	
Have Arab friends and home visits (J 106)	16.3	17.9	11.1	13.5	15.4	14.5	14.0	14.0	12.0		0
Received help from Arabs daily or very often (J 104)	*	*	20.4	17.8	20.1	12.3	18.8	17.0	15.7		0
Spent time with Arabs daily or very often (J 105)	*	*	27.6	28.4	29.7	26.6	26.8	30.5	28.4		0
Endured threats, insults and blows from Arabs 3+ times (J 107)	6.9	7.4	8.0	8.4	8.6	8.0	9.4	11.5	11.5		0

\* Question not asked

\*\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2015–2017***

There are strong indications that for the first time from 2015 to 2017 there was an exacerbation of attitudes among the Jews. Table 9.20 gives a complete picture of the trend of change in all items common to the 2015 and 2017 surveys. Exacerbation of Jewish attitudes first occurred in 2017. Exacerbation took place in a number of important issues: Separation, alienation, legitimacy of coexistence, regional disputes (the Palestinian question), minority leadership, autonomy and options for change. It was expressed in a decrease from 60.4% in 2015 to 50.0% in 2017 in the proportion of Jews who agree that Arabs will study in Jewish high schools and in an increase from 20.5% to 28.0% in the rate of Jews reporting threats, humiliations, or beatings by Arab citizens. There was a decrease from 45.3% in 2015 to 34.5% in 2017 in the percentage of Jews who believe that the land between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews, a decrease from 79.7% to 73.8%, respectively, in the proportion of Jews who believe that Arab citizens have the right to live in the country as a minority with full civil rights, a decrease from 60.0% to 53.4% in the rate of supporters of a two-state solution, a decrease from 37.8% to 31.7% in the rate of believers that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent settlement in the coming years, a decrease from

39.0% to 23.9% in the rate of those who consider the Joint List as true representative of the Arabs in Israel, an increase from 29.5% to 41.3% in the rate of supporters of its outlawing, and a decrease in Jewish willingness to make various concessions to the Arabs to make them feel that Israel is their state and they are equal citizens in it – a decrease from 56.2% to 43.9% in the rate of Jews who agree to recognize the unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev and a decrease from 55.1% to 50.1% in the rate of those agreeing to ensure adequate representation for Arabs in all state institutions and public bodies.

**Table 9.20 Summary of Trends of Change in All Items, Jews, 2015–2017, 2017–2019**

#	Issue	Table	Jews							
			2015–2017*			Total	2017–2019*			Total
	Trend*		-	0	+		-	0	+	
1	Separation	2.3–2.1, 2.12	5	4	1	10	2	6	1	9
2	Image of the other	2.15	0	3	0	3	2	1	0	3
3	Alienation	2.16, 2.21	3	1	0	4	2	4	0	6
4	Distrust	2.22, 2.24	0	4	1	5	2	3	0	5
5	Deprivation	3.3–3.2, 3.5, 3.7	1	3	1	5	0	5	1	6
6	Threats	3.11	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2
7	Collective memory	3.15–3.13	1	3	0	4	0	3	0	3
8	Legitimacy of coexistence	4.1, 4.8, 4.11–4.10, 4.15–4.13	8	12	0	20	2	16	1	19
9	Regional disputes	5.1, 5.4, 5.7	2	5	0	7	5	2	0	7
10	Regional integration	5.11	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	2
11	Identity	5.18, 5.20	0	3	0	3	0	2	0	2
12	Minority leadership	6.3–6.2	5	0	0	5	0	1	0	1
13	Autonomy	6.9	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
14	Means of struggle	6.11–6.10	0	3	0	3	1	2	0	3
15	Options of change	7.2, 7.4	9	10	0	19	4	10	0	14
16	Evaluation of state of relations	7.5	1	2	0	3	0	1	1	2
Total			36	56	4	96	21	58	6	85

\* Plus indicates trend supporting coexistence, minus – trends hurting coexistence, and zero – lack of trend, lack of change, stability; change is up or down of at least 5%

An examination of the change that took place among Jewish population groups shows that the attitudes of many of them exacerbated

from 2015 to 2017. Of the 28 Jewish population groups surveyed, 17 exacerbated their attitudes toward the Arab minority. For example, the mean of Mizrahim on the rejection scale rose from 5.88 in 2015 to 8.16 in 2017 (Table 9.21). Various groups have exacerbated their attitudes, even groups that are known to be liberal or tolerant as supporters of the political center and those with an academic education. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 9.20 above.

**Table 9.21 Statistical Significance of Differences in Population Group Means of Rejection Scale, Jews, 2015–2017 (Means)**

Population Group	2015			2017			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Entire sample	5.34	3.494	728	5.85	3.852	788	-2.7030	1513.4950	0.0069	Significant
Ethnic descent:										
Mizrahim	5.88	3.437	234	8.16	3.630	280	7.3002-	504.0687	0.0001>	Highly significant
Mixed	5.24	3.575	104	5.53	3.508	119	0.6096-	215.8601	0.5428	Not significant
Ashkenazim	4.95	3.564	363	4.81	3.581	365	0.5287	725.9996	0.5972	Not significant
Religiosity:										
Haredim	8.39	3.173	87	9.49	2.787	69	2.2813	152.3589	0.0239	Significant
Datiyim	6.99	3.322	94	8.35	3.340	95	2.3065-	186.9949	0.0055	Highly significant
Masotiyim	5.74	3.267	178	6.75	3.487	188	2.8608-	363.9610	0.0045	Significant
Hilonim	3.91	3.056	364	4.90	3.812	409	4.0023-	762.8823	0.0001>	Highly significant
Higher education:										
Without BA	5.92	3.596	359	7.25	3.752	355	4.8348-	709.9564	0.0001>	Highly significant
With BA	4.71	3.384	361	5.26	3.802	425	2.1452-	782.2763	0.0322	Significant
Family expenditure:										
Below average	6.32	3.570	263	7.08	3.791	242	2.3142-	492.8929	0.0211	Significant
Above average	4.17	3.045	219	5.54	3.764	250	4.3540	464.1359	0.0001>	Highly significant
Age:										
18–24	6.77	3.841	67	7.59	3.851	252	1.5523-	104.0384	0.1236	Not significant
65 and over	4.15	3.094	196	4.51	3.531	162	1.0150-	322.8367	0.3109	Not significant
Residence in:										
Jewish town	5.38	3.508	530	5.77	3.816	654	1.8287-	1163.3657	0.0677	Not significant
In mixed town	5.12	3.636	198	6.92	4.0680	133	4.1165-	261.2686	0.0001>	Not significant
Self-identity:										
Jewish	7.21	3.495	151	8.75	3.357	142	3.8469-	290.8671	0.0001	Highly significant
Israeli	2.87	3.081	116	4.20	3.793	157	3.1933-	268.5314	0.0016	Highly significant
Political stream:										
Right	7.15	3.258	369	7.52	3.391	441	1.5800-	792.7420	0.1145	Not significant
Center	3.94	2.383	192	5.03	3.366	167	3.4922-	293.7613	0.0006	Highly significant
Left	1.88	2.090	117	1.84	2.449	134	0.1396	248.8772	0.8891	Not significant
Arab friends:										
No	6.06	3.566	494	7.16	3.758	471	4.6598-	953.4567	0.0001>	Highly significant
Yes	3.73	2.916	220	4.24	3.384	303	1.8446-	505.9074	0.0657	Not significant
Endured threats from Arabs:										
Yes	7.41	3.345	150	7.77	3.500	221	10.5735-	957.8225	0.0001>	Highly significant
No	4.79	3.395	569	5.15	3.772	550	0.9984-	329.4932	0.3188	Not significant

Population Group	2015			2017			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Receipt of help from Arabs:										
No	5.58	3.604	578	6.44	3.848	636	3.6965-	1133.1237	0.0002	Highly significant
Yes	4.22	3.048	136	3.61	3.133	134	1.6213	267.5199	0.1061	Not significant
Spending time with Arabs:										
No	5.63	2.583	519	6.61	3.785	533	4.3136-	1049.1667	0.0001>	Highly significant
Yes	4.48	3.296	195	4.56	3.723	240	0.2375-	429.792	0.8124	Not significant

### ***Trends of Change in the Years 2017–2019***

The de-democratization project of the rightwing government was in full swing between 2017 and 2019. It was intended not only to weaken the democratic regime but also to exacerbate the attitudes of the Jewish public and to strengthen the support of rightwingers to rightwing rule. Therefore, it is expected that the exacerbation of Jewish attitudes will not abate and perhaps will continue.

A comprehensive examination of the 85 questions presented in 2017 and 2019 reveals that 21 of them showed an exacerbation of attitudes compared to only 6 which showed a moderation, and there was no change in the other 58 questions (Table 9.20). There was no going back from the exacerbation in 2017. The 21 items where exacerbation intensified include almost all the issues. For example, there was an increase from 31.3% in 2017 to 37.0% in 2019 in the percentage of Jews who feel uncomfortable in a shopping mall where Arabs are also present (Table 2.21 above), in particular, there is a continuing decline in the willingness for changes that Jews are willing to make to improve the status of Arabs in Israel (Table 7.4 above), and an increase in the disqualification of Arab leadership and a decrease in support for a two-state solution (Table 5.1 above). The means of the rejection scale of 28 Jewish population groups also showed no change among 23 of them, exacerbation among 3 and moderation among 2 (Table 9.22).

The trend of exacerbation from 2017 to 2019 in the attitudes of the Jews does not contradict the stability in the means on the coexistence scales and on the rejection scale in these years (Table 9.23). This stability

shows that there was no return in 2019 from the general exacerbation in 2017. The exacerbation was preserved and in quite a few questions and in most Jewish groups it was even strengthened.

**Table 9.22 Statistical Significance of Differences in Population Group Means of Rejection Scale, Jews, 2017–2019 (Means)**

Population Group	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Entire sample	5.85	3.852	788	5.99	3.584	751	0.737	1537	0.461	Not significant
Ethnic descent (J 118):										
Mizrahim	8.16	3.630	280	7.01	3.572	230	3.583	508	<0.001	Highly significant
Mixed	5.53	3.508	119	5.77	3.534	64	0.440	181	0.660	Not significant
Ashkenazim	4.81	3.581	365	5.48	3.574	264	2.318	627	0.021	Significant
Religiosity (J religiosity):										
Haredim	9.49	2.787	69	9.14	2.336	52	0.732	119	0.465	Not significant
Datiyim	8.35	3.340	95	8.14	3.059	49	0.402	142	0.688	Not significant
Masotiyim	6.75	3.487	188	6.79	3.314	168	0.110	354	0.912	Significant
Hilonim	4.90	3.812	409	4.90	3.548	290	0.000	697	1.000	Highly significant
Higher education (J 121):										
Without BA	7.25	3.752	355	7.06	3.564	300	0.660	653	0.510	Not significant
With BA	5.26	3.802	425	5.08	3.434	258	0.623	681	0.534	Not significant
Family expenditure (J 124):										
Below average	7.08	3.791	242	6.54	3.715	267	1.622	507	0.106	Not significant
Above average	5.54	3.764	250	5.78	3.348	146	0.637	394	0.525	Not significant
Age (J 119):										
18–24	7.59	3.851	252	7.01	3.719	112	1.339	362	0.181	Not significant
65 and over	4.51	3.531	162	4.55	3.008	143	0.106	303	0.916	Not significant
Residence in (J mixedtown):										
Jewish town	5.77	3.816	654	5.80	4.125	439	0.123	1091	0.902	Not significant
Mixed town	6.92	4.068	133	6.24	3.493	119	1.417	250	0.158	Not significant
Self-identity (J 102):										
Only or mainly Jewish	8.75	3.357	142							
Only or mainly Israeli	4.20	3.793	157							
Political stream (J 114):										
Right	7.52	3.391	441	7.45	3.083	470	0.326	909	0.745	Not significant
Center	5.03	3.366	167	3.99	2.636	141	2.980	306	0.003	Significant
Left	1.84	2.449	134	1.56	2.685	96	0.821	228	0.412	Not significant
Arab friends (J 106):										
No	7.16	3.758	471	6.85	3.639	320	1.152	789	0.249	Not significant
Yes	4.24	3.384	303	5.14	3.432	229	3.020	530	0.003	Highly significant
Endured threats from Arabs (J 107):										
Yes	7.77	3.500	221	7.12	3.482	178	1.847	397	0.066	Not significant
No	5.15	3.772	550	5.67	3.616	381	2.105	929	0.036	Significant

Population Group	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance Level
	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	Mean	Standard Deviation	No. of Cases	T-Value	Degree of Freedom	Probability	
Receipt of help from Arabs (J 104):										
No	6.44	3.848	636	6.50	3.503	593	0.286	1227	0.775	Not significant
Yes	3.61	3.133	134	3.57	2.871	119	0.106	251	0.916	Not significant
Spending time with Arabs (J 105):										
No	6.61	3.785	533	6.20	3.674	510	1.775	1041	0.076	Not significant
Yes	4.56	3.723	240	5.58	3.203	49	1.786	287	0.075	Not significant

**Table 9.23 Statistical Significance of Differences in Means of the Old Coexistence Scale and Rejection Scale, Jews, 2017–2019 (Means)**

	Jews									
	2017			2019			T-Test (2-Tailed Test)			Significance
	Mean	SD	No. of Cases	Mean	SD	No. of Cases	T-Value	D.F.	P	
Old coexistence scale	4.25	1.69	788	4.11	1.68	752	1.628	1538	0.104	Not significant
Rejection scale	5.85	3.852	788	5.99	3.584	751	0.737	1537	.4610	Not significant

## Chapter 10

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# Main Findings and Conclusions

The 2019 Index was carried out at the peak of the implementation of the de-democratization project of the most rightwing government that Israel has ever had. This government, formed in 2015, has taken severe steps to reduce democracy, to deepen the gap between population groups, to strengthen the Jewish identity of Jews at the expense of Israeli identity, to mark Arab citizens as enemies, and to label Arab Knesset Members as supporters of terrorism whose support is forbidden to use for forming a government coalition. The 2019 Index can examine the extent to which this government has deepened the rift between Arabs and Jews and exacerbated and radicalized their attitudes.

The Index surveys are intended not only to provide an up-to-date picture of the attitudes of both sides, but also to create a database that makes it possible to monitor the trend of change in their attitudes over time. The Index database is deposited in the database of public opinion surveys of Israel Democracy Institute called Data Israel (<https://dataisrael.idi.org.il>). It also includes opinion surveys of Arabs and Jews from 1976, many years before the start of the Index in 2003. The Index is based on annual surveys from 2003 to 2013 and biannual surveys since 2015. It is the only scientific tool in Israel that examines in detail and systematically the attitudes of Arabs and Jews toward each other and toward the state since 1976 and that is based on face-to-face interviews for the Arab surveys.

Surveys of the attitudes of Arabs and Jews can shed light on the relative validity of two opposing theses on the trend of change in relations between them. The common thesis of scholars, the Jewish public, the media and policymakers is that the relations between Arabs and Jews are in a process of deterioration, separation, and violent conflict. This is because the Arabs are undergoing processes of Palestinization and Islamization and the Jews are undergoing processes of drift to the political right and to religion, trends of change that distance them from

each other and intensify the conflicts between them. These processes have been accelerated by the rightwing governments led by Netanyahu since 2009 and even more so since 2015 when a rightwing government was formed without balancing forces, and even more in 2017–2019 when Netanyahu, with the support of the Likud and other rightwing political parties, launched a fierce offensive against the rule of law and law gatekeepers in order to evade trial for breaching of trust, fraud and bribery. Against this thesis of radicalization and alienation stands the thesis of adaptation and rapprochement, which holds that Arabs and Jews have learned over the years to live together and to accept each other and that a violent confrontation between them is avoidable. Arab citizens are experiencing Israelization that softens their Palestinization and are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits of their life in Israel. Jews are learning to distinguish Arab citizens from Palestinians across the Green Line and to understand that they have no choice but accepting them as a minority with equal rights in Israeli society. The Index data over time can show which of these two opposing theses is more in line with reality.

In this study a distinction is made between exacerbation and radicalization. Exacerbation is an increase in awareness of and struggle for equality on the part of the minority and an increase in opposition on the part of the state and the majority without violating the rules of the democratic game. Radicalization, on the other hand, is the adoption of attitudes and perpetration of actions that undermine coexistence and democracy. Exacerbation can in certain circumstances lead to radicalization, that is, to not playing by the rules and to turning to violence.

## **Main Findings**

The 2019 Index is part of the 2003–2019 series of indices on the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens towards each other and towards the state. The Arab survey included 718 respondents who constitute a representative national sample of the Arab adult population (including Druze and Bedouin) who were interviewed in April–June 2019,

immediately after the Knesset elections held on April 9, in face-to-face interviews in Arabic. The Jewish survey included 752 respondents who constitute a representative national sample of the Jewish adult population (including members of kibbutzim and Moshavim, immigrants and settlers) who were interviewed in June 2019 in Hebrew and Russian (179 by telephone and 573 filled out online questionnaires). All data are weighted according to the vote in the Knesset elections in April 2019. The sampling error is 3.7%. The Arab survey included about 200 questions and the Jewish survey about 125 questions. The surveys posed questions on 16 key issues in Arab-Jewish relations.

The fear that the Arabs will be afraid to express their true views is especially heightened when they are under attack by the rightwing government which suspects them of disloyalty and accuses their leaders of support of terrorism. Yet, the percentage of Arabs who expressed concern about violations of their basic rights, state violence against them and population transfer did not increase from 2017 to 2019. It is also difficult to accept the doubt that the Arabs did not express themselves freely when 57.1% in 2017 and 57.6% in 2019 justified the opening of Intifada by the Arab minority if its situation does not improve significantly. Even according to the interviewers' estimate, only 4.3% in 2019 (6.3% in 2017) of the Arab respondents provided information not sufficient in quality.

The 2019 index data are compared to the 2017 Index data in order to locate the trend of change in the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in all the questions common to the surveys in these years. A change of 5% or more is considered statistically significant. Change is positive if it strengthens coexistence from the other side's point of view, negative if it weakens coexistence, and absent (no change, stability) if the change is less than 5%.

### ***Arab Attitudes in the Years 2017–2019***

In the transition from the 2015 Index to 2017, there was a great deal of exacerbation and some radicalization in Arab attitudes. It is expected that the exacerbation and radicalization will continue to intensify

in 2019 because the process of de-democratization in general and the de-legitimizing of the Arab minority in particular were in full force in 2017–2019. But contrary to this expectation, the Arabs in 2019 experienced a cessation of exacerbation of attitudes and even a certain moderation, which are not out of fear but rather a result of rethinking their status in the state and in Israeli society. The attack on their citizenship and their accusation of disloyalty pushed the Arabs to recognize the importance of their connection to Israel and the benefits that the state bestows on them. The unrest and underdevelopment in the Arab world also revealed the benefits of existence as a minority in a Jewish, democratic and developed state, despite the inequality, discrimination and exclusion inherent in it. The attacks against Arab citizens convince them that Israel is the least evil and perhaps even the best under the current conditions.

The unexpected moderation and discontinuation of exacerbation of the attitudes of Arab citizens from 2017 to 2019 is well reflected in the comparison of their attitudes in these years. The 137 questions common to the two surveys were divided into 70 that indicated no change, 44 moderation and 23 exacerbation. There was also no decrease from 2017 to 2019 in the acceptance of coexistence, measured in six questions, between Arabs and Jews in Israel within the Green Line. Coexistence is defined as the reconciliation of the minority and the majority with life in a common society, in which there are equal rights, a duty of loyalty to the state, making changes in relations by democratic ways only, voluntary relations such as personal friendship and activity in joint organizations, and non-avoidance of intergroup contacts. This definition does not oblige minority members to identify with the state and to accept its national character and boundaries and does not require members of the dominant majority to grant national collective rights to the minority. For example, according to two questions from the coexistence scale, 63.6% of the Arabs in 2017 and 72.0% in 2019 agreed that “it is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel” and 64.2% and 76.4% said that they do not avoid personal contacts with Jews.

The high rate of acceptance of coexistence between Arabs and Jews creates a willingness to integrate in various areas of life. 56.5% of the Arabs in 2017 and 51.7% in 2019 agreed that Arabs would live in Jewish neighborhoods, 71.4% and 71.9% agreed that there would be joint organizations of Arabs and Jews and 62.4% and 65.6% agreed that Arab political parties would participate in government coalitions. These are high and stable rates of the Arabs' willingness to integrate as a minority with the Jewish majority in the deeply divided Israeli society, despite the clearcut boundaries that separate them in religion, language, culture, nationality, identity, residence, schools, local and central government, political parties, religious and cultural institutions, media, civil society, the security forces, and of course also in family and in the view of the nature of the state and its borders.

In addition, in the militancy scale, which consists of 13 items, there was a statistically significant decrease from 6.39 to 5.71. The moderation in 5% or more was found on the militancy scale in 18 of the 28 population groups that included Druze, non-Bedouin Muslims, Christians, those who do not have Jewish friends, those who have not received help from Jews, those who have harmed by state's discrimination, displacement, or land expropriations, those who identify as Palestinian or Israeli in self-identity, those who oppose the Islamic Movement, those with a full academic education, those whose standard of living is low, the religious and very religious, and more. The main findings presented below show that the Arab attitudes in 2019 remained as they were in 2017 or even moderated, and only some of them exacerbated.

The most unexpected and important moderation was actually recorded in the increase in the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish nation-state. This was reflected in the increase from 2017 to 2019 in the Arabs' recognition of the Israel's right to exist from 58.4% to 65.4%, in Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state from 49.1% to 69.8%, in reconciliation with Israel as a state with a Jewish majority from 44.6% to 57.8%, in agreement with Israel as a state in which the dominant language is the Hebrew language from 49.7% to 60.3%, in reconciliation with Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state from 43.4% to 57.4%, and in

reconciliation with Israel that keeps a Jewish majority (i.e., as a Zionist state) from 36.2% to 43.7%. Most Arabs continued to believe that Jews are a people who have a right to a state (58.8% in 2017 and 61.7% in 2019) and that the country is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews (49.8% and 53.2%). At the same time, the Arabs continued to deny Israel as a Zionist state (59.2% in 2017 and 64.7% in 2019) and strongly oppose the National-State Law which solidifies their subordination to Jews (65.2% in 2019 supported its abolition and another 25.2% thought that the principle of equality should be added to it). In these numbers, the Arabs signaled to the state and to the Jews that they are loyal citizens who accept Israel as a Jewish nation-state, but reject Zionism and all the Zionist legislation that establish their status as second-class citizens.

Along with the increase in the legitimacy of the state, the Arabs continued to maintain or even increased their support for hard means of struggle to improve their situation. The percentages of support of steps of struggle were in 2017 and 2019 as follows: 62.8% and 66.6% endorsed general strikes, 62.7% and 57.0% protests abroad, 37.4% and 46.4% boycott of Knesset elections, 27.5% and 28.9% illegal demonstrations, and 18.5 % and 34.7% all means including violence. Besides, 57.1% and 57.6% supported opening of an Israeli Arab Intifada if the situation of the Arabs does not improve significantly. The Arabs also support a united national struggle as evidenced in their unequivocal support for the Joint List. 75.9% of the Arabs in 2019 expressed disappointment with the dissolution of the Joint List and with running in two lists in the April 2019 elections and 70.8% said that the Arabs should run on a Joint List in the next elections (as indeed happened in the September 2019 and March 2020 elections). In answering new questions posed in the 2019 survey, 57.9% of the Arabs supported the international community's boycott of Israel, 75.9% thought that Arabs in Israel should pressure the United Nations institutions and the European Union to act to change Israeli government policy towards them, and 54.0% thought they should be part of the Palestinian resistance. In addition, as part of the fight against the Nation-State Law, 44.3% of the Arabs in 2019 supported the boycott of Knesset elections and 57.2% supported a

prolonged general strike, measures that are considered as crossing red lines by the state and the Jews. The Arabs think that their struggle is necessary because 56.5% of them in 2017 and 48.4% in 2019 evaluated that the state of their relations with Jews was not good and 63.8% and 57.5% expected it to deteriorate over the next five years, and also because 65.7% and 67.2% believed that the government treats Arabs as second-class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality.

The large and growing support for the severe means of struggle does not necessarily contradict the increase in the legitimacy of the state because in Arab eyes reconciliation with the status of an Arab minority in a Jewish state is conditioned on equality, fair government policy and abolition of discrimination and exclusion, and to achieve this goal the national struggle should be escalated. The Arabs in Israel are aware of the fact that they have no other state and therefore must accept Israel as legitimate but on the condition that it treats them with equality, respect and trust. A majority of 61.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 57.2% in 2019 felt that "Israel is a good place to live" and 60.0% and 55.6% preferred to live in the State of Israel than in any other country in the world. 55.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 58.7% in 2019 also felt that it is good that they are living in Israel in the face of the unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. The proportion of Arabs who felt closer to Jews following the government's decision 922 at the end of 2015 to implement a major plan for the development of the Arab sector also rose from 37.3% in 2017 to 54.0% in 2019, an evidence that improvement of government policy toward the Arabs moderates their attitudes.

The Arabs perceive themselves as part of the Palestinian people but as a separate entity with interests of their own for being also part of Israel. Their connection to the Palestinians is expressed, among other things, in the preservation of their Arabic language, in the Palestinization of their identity and in their adoption of the Palestinian solution to the conflict with Israel. Although the Israeli state is run in Hebrew, the mother tongue and everyday language of the Arabs is still Arabic. 71.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 65.9% in 2019 thought that the

identity “‘Palestinian Arabs in Israel’ suits most Arabs in Israel” and 60.3% and 61.9% included a Palestinian component in their personal identity. Unlike the Palestinians, the Arabs in Israel recognize the national rights of the Jews. For example, 58.8% in 2017 and 61.7% in 2019 believed that “Jews are a people who have the right to a state,” 49.8% and 53.2% agreed that “the land between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews,” and 63.6% and 70.5% supported the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. At the same time, they support the Palestinian plans for a two-state solution to which most Jews object – a withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, dismantling of all Jewish settlements, a right of return for Arab refugees and a sovereign Palestinian state without restrictions whose capital is East Jerusalem. They also oppose, along with the Palestinians and Arab peoples, to certain developments in the Middle East. 89.3% of the Arabs in 2019 objected to Israel’s military operations in Syria, 59.0% to the continued Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria, 79.7% to development of nuclear weapons by Iran and 55.9% to the recent rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Morocco that sets aside the Palestinian question.

However, the affiliation of Arab citizens to the Palestinians is not a detachment from Israel, where they lead their lives. Only 21.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 20.1% in 2019 stated their willingness to move to a Palestinian state when established, but by this statement most of them expressed presumably protest and no intention to emigrate. The Jews are the comparison and reference group of the Arabs in Israel. 62.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 60.3% in 2019 estimated that “the way of life and behavior of Arab citizens are more similar to Jews in Israel than to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” 59.5% in 2017 said that “when Arab citizens evaluate their achievements, most compare themselves mainly to the Jews,” 61.2% in 2017 and 69.5% in 2019 agreed that “Arab and Jewish citizens should together create common values and customs in addition to their values and customs,” and 69.8% and 62.3% want, like the Jews, that “in the field culture, Israel must integrate more in Europe-America than in the Middle East.” We learn about the preference of the Arabs’ local over the national interest

from the support of 69.1% of them in 2017 and 80.4% in 2019 for the idea that “Arabs will fight for civic and socioeconomic equality and less for peace and change of the character of the state” and from the opposition of 53.9% and 71.0% to Arab leaders in Israel for not serving the “Arab population by finding practical solutions to its problems.” Their uniqueness as Palestinian citizens of Israel is also evident in 59.5% of them in 2019 who believed that “the Palestinian Authority should not represent the Arabs in Israel in the framework of peace negotiations.”

The 2019 survey asked questions about the self-images of Arabs in Israel. It is not surprising to find that they perceive themselves as an integration-seeking and powerful minority. 71.2% said that “most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society.” The following rates of consent indicate images of a powerful minority: 62.5% felt they were a strong minority, 71.8% said the Israeli economy cannot exist without them, 76.6% believed they have the power to disrupt life in the country, 57.7% thought the country would pay a heavy price if it expropriates a lot of land from Arabs, and 48.8% even estimated that they had enough influence to determine which of the two political blocs would be in power despite the fact that the Arab political parties are disqualified from participating in government coalitions. Moreover, most Arabs were of the opinion that they deserve special rights – 77.6% for being an indigenous minority and 77.1% for being part of a regional majority. The special rights of an indigenous minority include institutional autonomy. Indeed, 82.9% of the Arabs in 2017 and 72.5% in 2019 said that “the state should give Arab citizens powers to manage their own religious, educational and cultural institutions” and 79.5% and 70.2% agreed that “the state should recognize the High Follow-Up Committee as a body that represents Arab citizens.” These collective self-images are positive and largely reflect reality. They also instill in the hearts of the Arabs hope that their struggle will yield improvements, as 68.0% of the Arabs in 2017 and 64.9% in 2019 said that “Arab citizens can improve their situation through persuasion, political pressure and voting.”

The Arabs have another central self-image that can be deduced from their attitudes regarding options for change of their status. They

perceive themselves as victims and are therefore free from taking steps that may motivate the state and the Jews to improve the treatment of them. Most of them rejected all the 16 transformational measures that are offered to them in the 2009–2019 surveys and hardened their objection in 2017 and 2019. Their rate of agreement with these steps ranges from 17.3%–42.2% in 2017 and 20.3%–45.6% in 2019. For example, in order for the state and the Jews to treat Arabs with equality, respect and trust, only 22.7% in 2017 and 21.8% in 2019 agreed that “Arab citizens will see Israel as their state and support it in case of conflict with the Palestinian state,” only 38.3% and 36.0% agreed that “Arab citizens should fulfill some duty of service to the state,” only 37.6% and 38.0% agreed that “Arab leaders should refrain from harsh statements against the state,” only 24.8% and 20.9% agreed that “Arab citizens give up the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel,” and only 29.4% and 29.7% agreed that “Arab citizens refrain from a struggle to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state.” The Arabs place the responsibility for their situation on the state and the Jews and expect them to initiate and make changes when they themselves wage a vigorous struggle without making any concession.

The images of the Arabs about the Jews are also an obstacle to improving relations. 41.8% of the Arabs in 2017 and 47.4% in 2019 said that “it is impossible to trust most Jews in Israel,” 38.8% and 41.8% said that most Jews are prone to violent behavior and 50.6% and 60.2% said that most Jews in Israel are racists. In the 2019 survey, the Arabs were asked for the first time how they imagine what the Jews think of them. 56.7% of the Arabs in 2019 thought that “most Jews in Israel hate Arab citizens,” 52.9% thought that most Jews do not accept the existence in Israel of an Arab minority, 65.0% thought that most Jews do not believe that Arabs are loyal to the state and 39.0% thought that most Jews believe the Arabs identify with Palestinian terrorism. Also, 73.0% of the Arabs in 2019 thought that “the Jewish media spreads hate against the Arabs in Israel” and 76.6% thought that “government ministers incite against Arab citizens.” These images make it difficult to improve and cultivate Arab-Jewish coexistence.

Arabs suffer from various hardships such as poverty, housing shortages and poor municipal services. Regarding personal suffering from distress, 45.9% of the Arabs in 2017 reported suffering from land expropriation, 19.5% in 2017 and 20.0% in 2019 presented themselves as hailing from a family of internal refugees, 54.7% and 44.8% who personally encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions, 28.0% and 30.0% who were personally harmed by threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews, 15.3% and 18.4% who were arrested and interrogated during the last twelve months by the security forces due to their participation in protests, and 80.4% and 76.6% who “felt personal insecurity because of the violence in Arab localities.” 49.4% of the Arabs in 2017 and 44.8% in 2019 also observed that “there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel” and 56.5% in 2019 thought that there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs who try to move to a Jewish city. There was also a sharp decline in the positive personal experiences of the Arabs with the Jews. The high rate of Arabs receiving help from Jews dropped from 60.0% in 2017 to 44.2% in 2019 and the rate of Arabs spending free time with Jews dropped from 73.0% to 57.6%. On the other hand, there is an increase in the assessment of the “chance of a young Arab to fulfill his professional aspirations in the country today” from 44.2% in 1980 to 45.9% in 2001 and to 56.5% in 2019.

In addition to personal hardships, the Arabs are suffering from collective threats that have remained severe and unchanged in 2017 and 2019. 73.4% of the Arabs in 2017 and 71.9% in 2019 feared a serious violation of their civil rights, 77.7% and 75.7% of massive lands expropriation, 62.6% and 60.6% of population transfers, 63.3% and 59.7% of the annexation of the Triangle to the future state of Palestine, 74.9% and 71.5% of state violence, and 73.8% and 70.0% of persecution of Arabs who speak out against the state on social networks. Although the likelihood of these threats is slim, 66.2% of the Arabs in 2019 feared “that one of the [above] collective threats to Arab citizens could happen to them personally.”

The findings have so far been presented without detailing the internal differences among the Arab public. However, in almost all the

questions presented in the Arab survey in 2017 and 2019, significant and consistent differences were found between Arab population groups. Arabs with critical and radical views from the point of view of the Jewish public and the state include non-Druze, the religious or very religious, those who feel closest to the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and the Sons of Village Movement, non-voters to the Knesset, those who have a Palestinian identity without an Israeli component, those who lack positive personal experiences with Jews (friends, home visits, receipt of help, leisure), and those with negative personal experiences with Jews or with state institutions (encounters of threats, humiliations, beatings, discrimination, harassment by the authorities, land expropriation, or displacement from their locality in 1948). Statistical analyses have shown that the best predictors of Arabs' attitudes toward coexistence and attitudes of militancy are: Personal encounters with threats, humiliations or beatings by Jews, friends and visits to Jewish homes, spending free time with Jews and feeling closeness to Jewish political parties. No effect of gender, age and level of education was found on Arab attitudes. Religiosity and identity also have no direct influence, only indirect impact through other factors. For example, belonging to the Druze community indirectly increases support for coexistence and moderation through other variables such as spending time with Jews and not being harmed by threats, humiliations, or beatings by Jews.

Among the Arab public throughout the period 1976–2019, there is a trend of exacerbation of attitudes and certain radicalization beyond ups and downs in various years. An example of radicalization of attitudes is the proportion of Arabs who deny Israel's right to exist as a state, which averaged about 10% in the years 1980–2003 and jumped to more than 20% in the years 2008–2019. Another example is the proportion of Arabs who are not willing to have a Jewish friend that amounted to 15% on average in the years 1980–2003 and increased to 25% or more in the years 2008–2019.

The Arab minority has undergone politicization, which led to an exacerbation of attitudes and to struggle for socioeconomic equality,

establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and a change in the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. In addition, some Arabs have in recent years also endured radicalization as reflected in the denial of Israel's right to exist, in Palestinian identities without an Israeli component and in support of all means of struggle including violence.

### ***Jewish Attitudes in the Years 2017–2019***

In the transition from the 2015 index to 2017, there was an exacerbation as well as a certain radicalization of Jewish attitudes. Since in 2017 the attitudes were already exacerbated and even radical to some degree, the question is whether there was retraction from them in 2019, remain more or less as they are, or even continued to exacerbate and to radicalize. The expectation was that the exacerbation would increase because the rightwing government reinforced the implementation of the de-democratization project and the attacks on the Arab public. Examination of the findings of the 2019 Jewish survey showed a certain preservation and continuation of the exacerbation of attitudes.

Lack of moderation and certain exacerbation of Jewish attitudes was expressed in the division of the 85 questions presented in 2017 and 2019 into 58 in which there was no change, 21 in which there was exacerbation and only 6 in which there was moderation. There is no return from the exacerbation in 2017. The 21 items where exacerbation has been in evidence include almost all issues. An examination of the change in attitudes on the rejection scale also showed that there was no change in the means (5.85 in 2017 and 5.99 in 2019) and the score on the rejection scale of 23 of the 28 Jewish population groups remained stable, the score of 3 groups showed exacerbation and the score of 2 groups point to moderation, that is, the exacerbation in 2017 was maintained in 2019.

The strong support of the Jews for Arab-Jewish coexistence was maintained in the transition from 2017 to 2019. 52.4% of the Jews in 2017 (down from 58.9% in 2015) and 54.8% in 2019 said that "it is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel," 78.4% in 2017 (down from 84.7% in 2015) and 75.4% in 2019 thought that "Arab

and Jewish citizens in Israel should have both equal rights and equality in the duty of loyalty to the state” and 88.4% in 2017 (like 88.9% in 2015) and 85.0% in 2019 believed that “Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act to change their relations by legal and democratic ways only.” Jews’ willingness to integrate in specific areas is, as expected, less than their support for the coexistence ethos. 50.0% of the Jews in 2017 and 51.7% in 2019 agreed that Arab high school students would attend Jewish schools, 49.0% and 39.6% were personally prepared to have Arabs live in their neighborhoods and 31.3% and 37.0% said they did not feel comfortable in a shopping mall where Arabs are also present. Most Jews have no close relationship with Arabs: 59.8% of the Jews in 2017 and 56.2% in 2019 did not have Arab friends, 80.8% and 78.9% have not received help from Arabs and 67.7% and 68.7% have not spent time with Arabs. 28.0% of the Jews in 2017 and 30.0% in 2019 reported to have personally encountered threats, humiliations or beatings by Arab citizens. These numbers indicate continuity from 2017 to 2019, meaning that the exacerbation of Jewish attitudes in 2017 was carried over to 2019.

Most Jews respect the Arabs’ right to live in Israel as a minority with full civil rights. From 2015 to 2017 there was a deterioration in the percentage of Jews who saw the Arab minority as legitimate and in 2019 this deterioration was maintained. 76.0% of the Jews in 2017 (down from 82.4% in 2015) and 75.7% in 2019 agreed that “there is a right to exist within Israel for an Arab national minority with full civil rights” and 61.1% (down from 69.5% in 2015) and 61.6% said they accept Arab citizens “as full members of Israeli society.” The Jews also support the status quo according to which cultural collective rights are granted to the Arab minority such as preservation of the Arabic language and separate and state-funded Arab education and religious services. But only a minority of the Jews are willing to give national rights to the Arabs. Only 34.4% of the Jews in 2017 and 34.5% in 2019 said that “Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights over the land,” 50.3% and 58.1% thought that “the state should give some preference to Jews over Arab citizens” and 60.5% and 63.5% expressed opposition to “allowing Arab citizens to buy land wherever they want.” The right of

the Arabs to live in the country as an equal minority is conditioned on their acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state and on the non-adoption of a Palestinian identity. This position is expressed in the disagreement of 69.8% of the Jews in 2017 and 59.9% in 2019 that “Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or not accept Israel’s right to be a Jewish state” and in the agreement of 69.5% and 69.4% that “an Arab who defines himself as a ‘Palestinian Arab in Israel’ will not be able to be loyal to the state and its laws.” The supremacy of the Jewish identity of the state is reflected in the agreement of 63.2% of the Jews in 2017 and 61.7% in 2019 with the statement that “in case of conflict between its Jewish character and the democratic character of the state, I will choose its Jewish character.”

Most Jews do not support a vigorous Arab struggle for change because they think the Arabs are getting already what they deserve. Contrary to Arab evaluations, only 49.4% of the Jews in 2017 and 44.8% in 2019 thought there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel and only 30.8% and 31.6% estimated that the government treats Arabs as second-class citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality. 71.9% of the Jews in 2019 thought that “Israel treats Arab citizens fairly.” The Jews’ belief in the prospect of young Arabs for social mobility is evidenced by the agreement of 72.6% in 1995 and 78.4% in 2019 that there is a good chance that a young Arab can fulfill his professional aspirations in Israel. 78.8% of the Jews in 2017 and 79.0% in 2019 believed that “despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is a democracy for the Arabs as well.” Therefore, only 32.3% of the Jews in 2017 and 22.2% in 2019 agreed to Arabs’ use of general strikes in the struggle to improve their situation and 19.5% and 20.5% agreed to use of protest abroad. Needless to say that the Jews oppose Arab use of harsh measures such as illegal and violent demonstrations. 70.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 64.7% in 2019 estimated that state of relations between Arabs and Jews is not good probably because the Jews think that the Arabs and their leaders are not behaving properly. Also, only 28.1% of the Jews in 2019 agreed that there is a lot of discrimination against Arabs who try to move to a Jewish city. There is no doubt that many of the Jews think that this behavior of the Arabs is trespassing

because Jews have a right to maintain the homogeneity of their communities.

Most Jews perceive Arabs as a threat, even though 60.9% of the Jews in 2019 thought that “most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society.” The images Jews have about the Arabs are quite negative: 41.8% of the Jews in 2017 and 47.4% in 2019 thought that most Arab citizens could not be trusted. In 2019, 50.4% of the Jews said that “most Arab citizens hate Jews,” 57.2% said that “most Arab citizens do not accept the existence of the state,” 59.5% said that “most Arab citizens want a Palestinian state instead of the State of Israel,” and 68.9% said that “Arab citizens can disrupt life in the country if they wish.” 60.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 54.7% in 2019 feared that “Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character” and 62.8% and 55.3% feared that “Arab citizens endanger the state because they might start a popular uprising.” 63.7% of the Jews in 2017 and 60.7% in 2019 reported that they “refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel” probably because of fear or hatred.

From the point of view of the Jews, the affiliation of Arab citizens to the Palestinians is a serious obstacle to Arab integration in Israel. 69.4% of the Jews in 2017 and 65.3% in 2019 blamed the Palestinians for the conflict with Israel. To distance themselves from blame for the Nakba, 57.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 61.1% in 2019 disagreed that “the Palestinian Arabs in 1948 had a disaster (Nakba) in losing the war with the Jews, becoming refugees, their settlements were destroyed and they did not establish a state of their own.” In addition, 62.5% of the Jews in 2017 and 69.1% in 2019 did not believe that “negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would lead to a permanent agreement in the coming years” and most probably blamed the Palestinians for the political stalemate.

At the same time, Jews show a considerable willingness to integrate Arabs into Israeli society as long as certain rules are observed, but this willingness diminished in the years 2017–2019. The Jews were presented with various steps that they and the state should take so that Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and they are equal citizens

in it. 40% or more of the Jews in 2013 and 2015 agreed with 12 of the 17 steps presented to them, in 2017 they agreed with 11 of 17 and in 2019 7 of 13. The consent rates of the Jews were higher than the corresponding consent rates of the Arabs and stood out especially in resource distribution. 51.4% of the Jews in 2017 and 45.7% in 2019 agreed that “the state will determine in law that Arab citizens receive their relative share of the state budget” and 50.1% and 51.0% agreed that “the state will determine in law that Arab citizens will receive appropriate representation in all state institutions and public bodies.” The lowest consensus rates were in affirmative action for Arabs, in measures that could harm national security and in changes of state symbols: Only 24.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 20.3% in 2019 agreed that “affirmative action will be given to Arab citizens for admission to state and college institutions,” only 25.0% and 25.9% agreed to “eliminate the differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks at border crossings” and only 25.0% and 22.4% agreed that “the state will give Arab citizens appropriate expression in its symbols, flag and anthem.”

Even in the most sensitive area of sharing power, most Jews show openness conditional on Arabs’ “good behavior.” A significant minority of the Jews would like to deprive Arabs of the right to vote to the Knesset or to get rid of them altogether: 24.1% of the Jews in 2017 and 26.3% in 2019 supported the denial of the right of Arabs to vote to the Knesset and 29.9% and 33.3% agreed that “Arab citizens should leave the country and receive appropriate compensation.” A significant proportion of Jews, 45.8% in 2017 and 39.0% in 2019, agreed that Arab political parties would participate in government coalitions. The Jews attribute their opposition to Arab political integration to the “bad behavior” of the Arab media and Arab leadership. 67.8% of the Jews in 2019 said that “the Arab media in Israel spreads hate against the state,” 88.7% said that they did not “trust the Arab leaders in Israel,” 80.5% said that “Arab Knesset Members incite against the state” and 63.8% said that “the Arab political parties do not truly represent Arab citizens.” When these obstacles are removed, it seems that the Jews will be reconciled with integration of representatives of the Arab public. In the 2019 survey, 56.7% of the Jews support entry into a government

coalition of “an Arab party that will act for integration into government coalitions on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and state policy of equality and fairness towards its Arab citizens.” The differences by political stream were relatively small: Supporting this option were 40.6% of the Jews on the right, 65.1% on the moderate right, 82.8% in the center, 89.2% on the moderate left and 100.0% on the left. We learn from this that most Jews are willing to share power with the Arabs and their political parties if they accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and that most Arabs would accept Israel if it treats them equally and fairly.

This option of political integration of the Arabs was supported by 57.1% of the Arabs in 2019, slightly less than the 65.6% of them who agreed with the general statement that “there will be participation of Arab parties in government coalitions.” It was supported by 39.8% of followers of the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement and Sons of the Village Movement, 47.5% of those who feel closest to Arab political parties and 88.5% of those who feel closest to Jewish political parties; it was also supported by 39.7% of the Arabs who did not vote to the Knesset in April 2019 for ideological reasons, compared with 61.7% of the Arabs who did not vote for non-ideological reasons. These figures show considerable Arab support of political integration. It is worth emphasizing that about half of voters for Arab political parties support such an integrationist political party in spite of their political parties’ rejection of Israel as a Jewish state and objection to join government coalitions.

Like the internal differences in the Arab population, there are significant differences in the Jewish population in attitudes toward Arabs. Jews with critical and negative attitudes toward Arab citizens include the ultra-Orthodox, the religious-national, the traditional-religious, the aged 18–24, those who lack full academic education, those whose family expenses are below average, those whose most important affiliation is Jewish religion or the Jewish people (not Israeli citizenship), those who belong to the moderate right and the right, those who prefer that the government be in the hands of the political

right, those who do not have positive personal experiences with Arabs (friends, home visits, receipt of help, leisure), and those who have negative personal experiences with Arabs (encounters of threats, humiliations, or beatings by citizens Arabs). The following factors were found to be the best predictors of the score on the old coexistence scale in 2019 (listed in ascending order): Personal encounter with threats, humiliations, or beatings by Arab citizens, level of family expenses, Arab friends and home visits, age, receipt of help from Arabs, preference of which political bloc will rule and religiosity. Jews with anti-Arab views tend to have been hurt by Arabs, those whose standard of living is low, those who lack Arab friends, young people, those who have not received any help from Arabs, those who prefer government rule by the political right, the ultra-Orthodox and the national-religious.

## **Conclusions**

The Index studies show that the Arab public has undergone exacerbation of attitudes since 1976 and some radicalization in the last decade, while the Jewish public has undergone exacerbation of attitudes and some radicalization only since 2015. However, these changes are not serious and do not cause collapse of Arab-Jewish relations and blatant violation of the democratic framework. During the period in which the opinion surveys were conducted, 1976–2019, a number of turning points stood out. In 1976–1992, there was an exacerbation of Arab attitudes in the aftermath of the first Land Day in March 1976, when the Arabs staged the first general strike against the government's decision to expropriate Arab lands. This exacerbation was replaced by moderation in 1992–1995 during the term of the second Rabin government. This period is considered the golden age of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. The second Rabin government signed the Oslo Accords based on the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the pursuit of a settlement as well as a policy of eliminating discrimination against Arab citizens, adding budgets to them and treating them with trust and respect. The Arab political parties have rewarded the government with

outside support for this beneficial foreign and domestic policy. The assassination of Rabin in November 1995, the collapse of the peace talks at Camp David in 2000, the opening of the second Intifada, the unrest of October 2000 and the non-prosecution of those responsible for the killing of the 13 Arabs who took part in the protest, renewed the exacerbation of the attitudes of the Arab public. This exacerbation was stopped again in 2013 when negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians resumed and hope was fostered in the mind of the Arabs in Israel. The Arabs also learned from the fall of the Arab Spring about the prerogative of living as a minority in Israel. The exacerbation resumed again in 2015 and was even accompanied by some radicalization due to the campaign against the Arab political parties launched in 2015. Under Netanyahu's leadership since 2015, the Likud, the other rightwing political parties and the government have carried out a project of de-liberalization and de-democratization that was further escalated in 2018–2020 to curb the investigations against Netanyahu and the indictment against him for fraud, breach of trust and bribery. Netanyahu, with the support of the political right, led a de-legitimization campaign against law enforcement agencies, the media and the center-left. All Arab political parties have been portrayed as supporters of terrorism and hence disqualified from joining government coalitions. Although not explicitly stated, the Arab public was suspected of disloyalty to the state due to its vote for the Arab political parties that was accused of supporting terrorism. Rightwing attacks on Arab citizens have become even more severe since September 2019 when the head of the Joint List declared his readiness to support under certain conditions a narrow government led by the center-left bloc and when this option was put as a real option on the national agenda.

The Jews maintained stability in their attitudes until the start of the de-democratization campaign of the rightwing governments in 2015. In the Index surveys in 1980–2013, there was no sign of exacerbation in the Jews' attitudes despite their drift towards the political right and religionization, which made most of them rightwing supporters. For the first time in the 2015 Index, there was a certain exacerbation

and radicalization of the Jews, which continued in the 2017 and 2019 Indices.

It is clear that the changes in the attitudes of Arabs and Jews are largely influenced by policy changes. The state is a major player in Arab-Jewish relations and its policy towards the Arab population and towards the Palestinians has great impact on the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens towards each other and towards the state. Twice in the history of Israeli politics, attempts have been made to use the parliamentary power of the Arab political parties to overcome the political stalemate between the rightwing bloc and the center-left bloc. For the first time, the second Rabin government held a coalition and won Knesset's confidence thanks to the outside support of Arab political parties. The political right under Netanyahu argued that the Rabin's government and the Oslo Accords are illegitimate because they do not rely on a Jewish majority. This incitement was the central cause for Rabin's assassination. For the second time, the center-left bloc led by Gantz, after three rounds of elections in 2019–2020, despite winning a majority in two of them, did not form a narrow government because several MKs from it vetoed this option for a lack of legitimacy of a government without a Jewish majority. The Joint List and all the four political parties that make it up do not accept Israel as a Jewish state. At the same time they do not explicitly reject Israel as a Jewish state in order to be able to register as political parties and to run to the Knesset. The political right accuses Knesset Members from the Arab political parties of supporting terrorism because they are unwilling to unequivocally condemn Palestinian terrorism.

Despite the failure of formation of a narrow government with the support of the Joint List, raising this option on the political agenda is a step that promotes the political legitimacy of the Arab population. In Israel's ethnic democracy, the conditions of Arab participation in government are unclear and public debate is necessary to clarify them. The center-left bloc was forced to move in the direction of legitimizing the Arab votes because of its dependence on their support, while the rightwing bloc felt free to delegitimize the Arabs politically because its

supporters are Jewish. This public debate also drives the Arab political parties to think creatively about the possibilities of integrating into a possible center-left government in order to increase their influence. In this regard, it is important to mention the finding that a majority of 57.1% of the Arabs in 2019 and a majority of 56.7% of the Jews thought positively of an Arab political party that accepts Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and act to enter a government coalition on the condition that the state treats Arabs equally and fairly.

The critical question that arises is why the Arabs, the Jews and the state continue to play by the rules and to maintain coexistence as it has been crystallized in the last two decades. Despite the exacerbation and even some radicalization in its attitudes, the Arab public does not break law and order and does not detach itself from the state. The comprehensive Israelization that Arab citizens have undergone moderates their Palestinization and Islamization and binds them strongly to the state. Although they do not admit it, Israeli citizenship is dear to them because it gives them cultural collective rights that are important to them, access to modernity, welfare services, the ability to wage a democratic struggle, exemption from a duty of military service and immunity from displacement, population transfer and Islamic takeover. They continue to live in their homeland and their continuous exposure to the gloomy sights in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, refugee camps in the Palestinian diaspora, Syria, Egypt and other Arab countries strengthens their connection to Israel. Needless to mention that maintenance of law and order also stems from the continued security surveillance of the Arabs and the potential threats to them if they disrupt life in Israel. The Palestinian Authority also does not mobilize Arab citizens for Palestinian resistance and expects them instead to act within the law as a political lobby for the Palestinian people in general and for a two-state solution in particular. The collapse of the Arab Spring also reduces their opposition to Israel despite its Jewish and Zionist character and manifestations of discrimination and exclusion.

Apart from the exacerbation and certain radicalization in their attitudes since 2013 in response to the rightwing bloc's policy against

the Arab minority, the Jews have maintained stability in their attitudes toward Arab citizens until then. Several factors have contributed to this stability. First, over the years, Jews have increasingly become aware of the fact that they are doomed to live with Arab citizens, and their resignation with this fact of life has grown. Second, during the five decades following the Six-Day War, Jews have learned to distinguish between Arab citizens of the state and Palestinians across the Green Line, a distinction that has been confirmed by the consistent policy of differentiation by all Israeli governments. The Jews understand that the two-state solution is intended for disengagement only from the Palestinians under occupation, and not from the Arabs in Israel. Third, there has been increase in Jews' awareness of the discrimination and exclusion of Arab citizens and in their willingness to reduce them. Fourth, the refrain of Arab citizens from joining the enemy in Israel's wars and their maintenance of law and order in times of calm have pushed the Jews to the recognition that the Arabs are loyal citizens who deserve fair treatment. And fifth, the Jewish public seems to have learned to separate the harsh criticism of Arab leaders against the state from the attitudes of the silent and pragmatic Arab public, who lives its daily life while coming to terms with a minority status.

Since the unrest of October 2000, the red lines of each side vis-a-vis the other side have sharpened. The *modus vivendi* between Arabs and Jews is preserved by respecting the mutual red lines. In accordance with the red lines set for them by the state and the Jews, the Arabs refrain from disrupting law and order, committing security offenses, perpetrating violence outside their communities, harming the Jewish and Zionist character of the state, and struggling to internationalize their grievances and demands. According to the red lines set by the Arabs, the state and the Jews refrain from using terrorism against Arab citizens, violating their basic rights, enacting explicit laws against them, expropriating large portions of their lands, openly discriminating against them in provision of services and resources, and imposing on them a duty of military or civic service. The political de-legitimization and the enactment of the Nation-State Law are measures that can be

interpreted as crossing a red line, which are opposed not only by the Arabs but also by most of the Jews who support the center-left bloc.

Despite the deep divide between Arabs and Jews and the trend of exacerbation and some radicalization of their attitudes, the infrastructure of a common society still functions and prevents violence, mass violation of law and order and repression and persecution by the authorities. Both sides believe in coexistence and accept Israel within the pre-1967 borders as a legitimate space in which they live together and embrace democracy as a set of mechanisms for managing their relations. Moreover, they feel that Israel is a good place to live and proudly share its achievements. About half of the Arab public also accepts Israel as a Jewish nation-state in which there is a Jewish majority that determines its symbols, its official calendar, the language of its administration and its dominant culture. Most Arabs are pragmatic and willing to come to terms with Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state if treated with equality and dignity. The Arab public should be differentiated from its political leadership and intellectual elites who deny the Jewish character of the state. However, this reconciliation of the Arab public with Israel has eroded in recent years and is likely to continue to be eroded by the de-democratization project and the Nation-State Law. Reconciliation is neither a preference nor a justification for the Jewish state. It is also definitely clear that the Arab reconciliation with the state is not acceptance of any of the highest goals of Zionism such as the Law of Return, the assurance of the Jewish majority for generations, the exclusivity of the Jewish character of the state, and the exclusive control of the Jews over it.

Maintenance of Arab-Jewish coexistence requires that the rightwing government immediately stop the de-democratization of the regime and the de-legitimization of Arab citizens. In order to improve the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens, there is a need to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel and to grant Arabs a status of a Palestinian national minority. It is required, among other things, to eliminate discrimination and exclusion against the Arabs, to make large investments for reducing the socioeconomic gaps between them and

the Jews, to accord them cultural autonomy, to share power with them, to insure them a proportional share of the state budget, and to respect and consult with their leaders in any matter vital to the Arab minority. In this way, Israel will give fair treatment to its national minority while keeping its character as a Jewish and democratic state.

## Survey of Arabs 2019

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I'm an interviewer from the University of Haifa. We are conducting a scientific survey, carried out by the university, on the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. Participation in the survey will enable you to express your opinion on the topic and to contribute to obtaining a true picture of the public opinion in the state. For the purpose of the study you were randomly chosen. Your answers will not be given to anyone and will be used for statistical objectives only. There are no correct or incorrect answers to the questions asked. We thank you in advance for your participation which is vital for the success of the study.

I'll read to you several statements about the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. With regard to each of these statements, please indicate if you agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or disagree.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
1	There will be joint organizations of Arabs and Jews	17.3	10.7	37.9	34.0	0.0
2	Arabs will spend time in Jewish leisure places	11.7	14.5	35.6	38.0	0.1
3	Arabs will attend Jewish high schools	24.7	24.4	27.4	23.0	0.4
4	Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods	22.9	25.1	31.3	20.4	0.3
5	Arab political parties will join coalition governments	18.1	15.8	30.8	34.8	0.6

And now I want to ask you personally:

		Definitely Want	Want	Do Not Want	Did Not Want at All	No Answer
6	Do you want or do not want to spend time in Jewish leisure places?	30.0	43.9	16.3	9.0	0.8
7	Do you want or do not want your children attend Jewish high schools?	17.4	27.3	31.8	22.7	0.7
8	Do you want or do not want to live in a Jewish neighborhood?	15.8	29.0	34.4	20.1	0.6

I want to ask you about your feeling when you happen to be with Jews:

		Definitely Feel at Ease	Feel at Ease	Do Not Feel at Ease	Definitely Do Not Feel at Ease	No Answer
9	When you happen to be in a shopping mall in which Jews are also present, how do you feel?	24.9	46.8	15.1	10.9	2.3
10	When you happen to talk Arabic in Jewish places (localities, institutions), how do you feel?	21.7	40.9	21.2	15.1	1.1

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
11	The country between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews	27.0	18.6	33.0	20.2	1.1
12	Israel is a good place to live	21.2	21.3	32.4	24.8	0.4
13	I prefer to live in the State of Israel than in any other country in the world	19.8	23.6	26.9	28.7	1.0
14	There is lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel	7.4	13.0	30.4	47.9	1.4
15	I'm ready to have a Jewish friend	14.4	17.9	35.2	31.7	0.8
16	I'm ready to have a Jewish neighbor	19.6	21.5	33.5	24.3	1.1
17	Jews have many good and important values and customs that Arabs should adopt	21.5	22.8	30.6	24.8	0.4
18	Arab citizens and Jews must create together new common values and practices in addition to their own values and practices	15.4	15.0	46.2	23.3	0.2
19	In their way of life and behavior, Arab citizens are more similar to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	16.6	23.0	42.0	18.3	0.1
20	The identity "Palestinian Arabs in Israel" is appropriate to most Arab citizens in Israel	13.2	20.6	41.8	24.1	0.4
21	I feel closer to the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza than to the Jews in Israel	19.5	26.4	24.8	29.0	0.3

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
22	I am ready to move to a Palestinian state	46.3	33.3	9.8	10.3	0.3
23	As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel	22.5	24.9	29.5	22.9	0.4
24	As an Israeli citizen, I feel alien and rejected by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	28.9	35.9	23.6	11.7	0.0

The following statements are about the attitudes of Arab citizens toward the state and the Jews. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each one of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
25	I'm reconciled with Israel as a state in which a Jewish majority and an Arab minority live together	24.0	20.0	36.8	18.1	1.1
26	It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens always live together in Israel	12.4	15.0	37.7	34.3	0.5
27	Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state	24.6	16.8	29.2	28.6	0.9
28	Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act for changing their relations by legal and democratic means only	14.2	14.8	39.9	30.5	0.6
29	Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendship and activity in joint organizations	12.3	11.7	36.4	38.3	1.3
30	I would avoid as much as possible any personal contact with Jews	42.5	33.9	9.1	13.9	0.6

Here are some more statements about Jews in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of these statements.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
31	It is impossible to trust most Jews in Israel	20.4	29.4	27.1	22.0	1.0
32	Most Jews in Israel are disposed to violent behavior	25.0	35.0	22.4	16.4	1.1
33	Most Jews in Israel are racist	18.6	29.8	26.0	24.6	1.0

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
34	Most Jews in Israel hate Arab citizens	15.3	26.6	33.3	23.4	1.5
35	Most Jews are reconciled with the existence of an Arab minority in Israel	17.5	28.5	33.1	19.8	1.2
36	Most Jews believe that most Arab citizens identify themselves with what in Jews' eyes is Palestinian terrorism	20.8	38.0	24.5	14.5	2.2
37	Most Jews do not believe that Arab citizens are loyal to the state	25.3	39.7	25.5	8.8	0.7

To what extent do you fear or do not fear each of the following events that may occur to the Arab citizens in Israel in coming years.

		Did Not Fear	Fear So So	Fear to Some Extent	Fear	No Answer
38	Fear of severe infringement of the rights of Arab citizens	9.0	18.6	45.1	26.8	0.5
39	Fear of numerous confiscations of Arab lands	8.2	15.6	32.8	42.9	0.5
40	Fear of state violence against Arabs	9.3	18.5	36.1	35.4	0.8
41	Fear of annexation of the Triangle to a Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents	15.8	23.5	30.8	28.9	1.0
42	Fear of population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens	21.6	16.8	30.1	30.5	1.0
43	Persecution of Arabs who speak against the state in the social networks	8.8	20.1	40.3	29.7	1.1
44	Do you fear or do not fear that one or more of these things may happen to you personally?	14.7	18.5	29.8	36.4	0.6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Jews and the character of the state?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
45	Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is democracy for Arab citizens as well	21.3	21.7	37.4	18.9	0.7

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
46	Arab citizens can improve their situation by using persuasion, political pressures and voting	13.1	21.2	38.1	26.8	0.8
47	Israel treats Arab citizens fairly	32.6	30.6	16.0	8.2	12.6
48	Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land	20.2	22.3	36.2	19.9	1.3
49	The Jews in Israel are a people who have a right to a state	18.2	18.4	38.9	22.8	1.7
50	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as an independent state in which Arabs and Jews live together	16.0	17.8	36.6	28.8	0.8
51	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	17.3	12.1	44.0	25.8	0.8
52	If there were a referendum regarding a constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and guarantees Arabs full civil rights, I would support it	19.5	24.0	32.7	23.3	0.5
53	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that keeps a Jewish majority	25.5	22.5	34.1	17.5	0.5
54	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state in Jewish control	26.2	29.7	28.0	15.7	0.5
55	I reconcile myself with Israel today as a state with a Jewish majority	22.7	18.9	39.3	18.5	0.5
56	I reconcile myself with Israel today as a state whose dominant language is Hebrew	22.2	16.5	34.5	25.8	1.0
57	I believe that there was Shoah in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis	12.0	17.1	41.7	27.8	1.3
58	Israel should have teachings of Hashoah also in Arab schools	31.1	26.4	25.3	14.5	2.7
59	It is justified that the state has Jewish symbols, but the state should also have Arab symbols with which Arabs could identify	14.6	10.3	40.1	33.6	1.5
60	Israel as a Zionist state, in which Arabs and Jews live together, is racist	13.6	20.7	29.8	34.9	1.1

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions in Israel?

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
61	Health institutions	2.7	11.4	46.0	39.5	0.3
62	The courts	12.2	27.4	34.2	25.9	0.3
63	The police	34.4	35.3	20.5	9.3	0.4
64	The Knesset	30.4	32.7	25.1	11.5	0.3
65	The government	37.9	31.0	19.9	11.0	0.3
66	Arab Knesset Members	19.3	42.6	22.9	14.9	0.3

Do you support or oppose the following steps?

		Definitely Support	Support	Oppose	Definitely oppose	No Answer
67	That Arabs will struggle for civil and socioeconomic equality and less for peace and change of the character of the state	24.1	56.3	8.2	11.1	0.2
68	That the international community will impose boycott on Israel	25.7	32.2	31.8	10.1	0.2

Do you agree or disagree with the following steps?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
69	Most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society	14.9	12.7	49.0	22.2	1.2
70	The Jewish media spreads hate against Arabs in Israel	8.4	18.3	38.2	34.8	0.3
71	The Arab media in Israel spreads hate against the state	29.4	42.6	16.2	10.5	1.3
72	It is possible in Israel to express different political opinions without fear	32.8	28.5	24.2	14.1	0.3
73	Arab Knesset Members incite against the state	35.5	39.0	18.2	7.0	0.4
74	Government Ministers incite against Arab citizens	6.9	15.9	39.0	37.6	0.7

Let's return to questions about Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the possibility that Arab citizens use each of the following means to improve their situation in Israel?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
75	General strikes	13.6	19.5	30.5	36.1	0.3
76	Protest abroad	18.6	24.1	29.3	27.7	0.3
77	Illegal demonstrations	35.8	34.9	11.0	17.9	0.4
78	Boycott of Knesset elections	26.0	27.3	19.1	27.3	0.3
79	All means, including violence	46.2	18.6	15.2	19.5	0.6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following arrangements for the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
80	Arab citizens will have a status of a national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and will come to terms with it	19.9	21.3	36.7	21.5	0.6
81	Arab citizens will enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of budgets and run their religious, educational and cultural institutions	20.0	19.5	37.5	22.3	0.8
82	A Palestinian state should arise in all of Palestine instead of Israel	29.9	36.8	15.0	15.7	2.7

83	Do you think that there is a reasonable chance for an Arab youth to fulfill his occupational aspirations in Israel today?				
1	No				19.3
2	Doubtful				23.4
3	Possible				34.4
4	Yes				22.4
5	No answer				0.5

<b>84</b>	Is there or is there no discrimination in Israel against Arabs trying to move to a Jewish city?	
1	No discrimination at all	8.1
2	Some discrimination	34.7
3	Appreciable discrimination	33.7
4	A lot of discrimination	22.8
5	No answer	0.6

<b>85</b>	Are you ready to have an Arab youth volunteer to a year of civil service and get the benefits given to a person who has done a military service?	
1	Certainly yes	14.9
2	Think so	21.2
3	Do not think so	31.0
4	Certainly not	30.9
5	No answer	2.1

I'll read to you now several things that will possibly be required in order to have the state and Jews treat Arab citizens with equality, respect and trust. With regard to each of them, please indicate if you agree or disagree that Arab citizens would do in order that the state and Jews treat them with equality, respect and trust.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
<b>86</b>	Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of any kind of service to the state	39.8	23.5	21.9	14.1	0.6
<b>87</b>	Arab citizens will accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state	25.1	27.9	27.8	17.8	1.3
<b>88</b>	Arab citizens will accept Israel as the state of all Jews in the world, and not just the state of the Jews in Israel	31.1	29.2	26.0	13.0	0.7
<b>89</b>	Arab citizens will avoid struggle to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state	32.1	37.7	19.8	9.9	0.5
<b>90</b>	Arab citizens will avoid protest abroad against the state	39.8	26.4	19.6	11.9	2.2
<b>91</b>	Arab citizens will not publicly observe the Nakba Day	43.2	32.1	17.1	5.7	1.8

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
92	Arab citizens will not demand that the displaced (internal refugees) will be allowed to reconstruct their villages that were ruined in 1948	37.0	29.8	22.6	9.2	1.4
93	Arab citizens will not identify publicly with the Arab side if Israel is attacked verbally or physically	34.3	28.9	20.2	15.7	1.0
94	Arab leaders will avoid severe pronouncements against the state	29.6	30.0	27.9	10.1	2.4
95	Arab leaders will condemn unequivocally violent actions by Arabs against Jews in Israel	33.3	32.7	23.0	10.4	0.6
96	Arab citizens will renounce the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel	43.0	34.5	15.2	5.7	1.5
97	Arab citizens will not see the Jews as alien settlers who usurped the lands of the country from the Arabs	34.8	30.0	19.8	14.9	0.5
98	As long as there are no peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab citizens will not define their identity as "Palestinian-Arabs in Israel"	31.8	32.5	26.1	9.1	0.6
99	Arab citizens will not demand to be recognized as a Palestinian national minority	44.8	34.2	11.6	8.7	0.6
100	Arabs will see Israel as their state and support it in case of dispute with the Palestinian state	46.1	31.1	16.1	5.7	1.0
101	Arab citizens will recognize the Jews' right to determine the language, culture, symbols and state policy while the state will recognize the needs of Arab citizens	33.2	25.5	26.9	13.7	0.7

102 What is your opinion of the Nation-State Law?		
1	It should be abolished	65.2
2	The principle of equality must be added in legislation to it	25.2
3	It should remain as is	0.8
4	The Jewish character of the state must be strengthened in it	0.0
5	No answer	8.7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with regard to each of the following steps that Arabs in Israel will take in protest against the Nation-State Law?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
103	Boycott of Knesset elections	28.9	26.1	19.9	24.4	0.6
104	Prolonged general strike	23.5	18.6	24.3	32.9	0.7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles for settling the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
105	Two states to two peoples	17.2	11.8	31.4	39.1	0.5
106	The pre-1967 borders will be the borders between the two states with an option of land swaps	20.1	14.6	35.2	29.7	0.5
107	Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	33.9	30.0	20.6	13.4	2.1
108	The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the state of Palestine only	34.0	25.2	25.1	14.0	1.8
109	After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over	27.4	21.4	29.1	20.5	1.6
110	I'll support a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians even if it does not include a solution to the lands expropriated from Israeli Arab citizens and to the internal refugee problem	36.0	29.1	20.4	13.9	0.6
111	I'll support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even if it will include recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state but guarantees full civil equality for the Arabs	22.8	20.3	31.4	24.9	0.6

<b>112</b>	As long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there should be a strong Arab or Muslim force that withstands Israel and hard hits it when needed	26.0	28.8	25.1	19.2	0.9
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Now I'll ask you some more questions about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the status of Israel in the region. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
<b>113</b>	I believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent agreement in the coming years	28.4	27.9	28.9	14.4	0.5
<b>114</b>	The Jews are the main guilty party for the protracted conflict between them and the Palestinians	13.8	23.5	30.2	32.0	0.5
<b>115</b>	In all schools in Israel, Arab and Jewish, the history of the conflict between Jews and Palestinians must be taught from the perspective of both sides.	14.7	13.0	35.7	27.6	8.9
<b>116</b>	The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, will be doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians	18.3	33.1	26.5	21.3	0.8
<b>117</b>	It is justified that the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza will open a third Intifada if the political stalemate continues	13.2	25.8	31.4	29.0	0.6
<b>118</b>	It is justified that Arab citizens in Israel will open an Intifada of their own if their situation will not improve appreciably	19.3	22.5	31.2	26.4	0.6
<b>119</b>	In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East	14.8	22.2	37.9	24.4	0.6

120	Israel should integrate into the Western world more than into the Arab and Muslim states in the region	14.8	25.0	31.6	27.0	1.5
121	Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries	24.5	31.5	27.7	14.3	2.1
122	When I see the unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, I feel it is good that I live in Israel	14.4	26.4	36.2	22.5	0.6

Please indicate if you support or oppose each of the following events:

		Definitely Support	Support	Oppose	Definitely Oppose	No Answer
123	Oppose the recent rapprochement between Israel and Arab and Muslim states	9.8	32.6	30.8	25.1	1.7
124	The continued rule of Bashar al-Asad in Syria	14.3	25.0	36.2	22.8	1.6
125	Israel's military operation in Syria	2.2	6.8	45.3	44.0	1.6
126	Iran's development of nuclear weapon	10.3	8.4	36.3	43.4	1.6

Here are several statements about Arabs in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
127	The Arab minority is a strong minority	20.7	16.1	41.7	20.8	0.7
128	Arab citizens have considerable influence on which of the two political blocs (the Left-Center or the Right) will be in power	25.4	24.9	31.8	17.0	0.9
129	The economy in Israel cannot survive without the labor of Arab citizens	4.6	13.5	40.5	31.3	10.0
130	Arab citizens can disrupt life in the state if they so wish	6.8	15.7	48.2	28.4	0.9

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
131	The state will pay a heavy price if it expropriates a lot of lands from the Arabs	11.7	29.7	29.6	28.1	0.9
132	As an indigenous minority that lives in the country for generations, Arabs in Israel are entitled to special rights	6.0	14.3	44.3	33.3	2.2
133	Since most inhabitants in the Middle East are Arabs, Arabs in Israel are entitled to special rights in the state	9.0	12.6	37.4	39.7	1.3

Please indicate if in the aftermath of each of the following events, do you feel closer to or afar from the state?

		I Feel Much Closer to the State	I Feel a bit Closer	I Feel a bit Afar	I Feel Much Afar from the State	[Do not Read, No Change]	No Answer
134	In the aftermath of the government resolution to implement a grand plan for the development of the Arab sector	13.6	23.7	13.5	18.9	29.6	0.8
135	In the aftermath of the destruction of unapproved buildings in Arab localities	1.7	2.6	23.7	53.2	17.8	1.0

To what extent do you agree or disagree that each of the following organizations truly represents Arab citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
136	The Higher Follow-Up Committee	21.8	32.8	32.5	12.4	0.5
137	The Committee of Arab Local Authorities	17.1	37.3	29.4	15.6	0.5
138	The Islamic Movement	20.0	26.7	32.8	20.0	0.4
139	The Arab political parties	24.7	34.9	26.7	13.2	0.5

Now I would like to ask you several questions about Arab leaders in Israel.

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
140	To what extent do you trust Arab leaders in Israel?	20.8	45.2	26.5	6.5	1.0
141	To what extent do Arab leaders in Israel serve the Arab population in advancing practical solutions to its problems?	21.1	49.9	18.2	9.8	1.1

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the Joint List of the Arab political parties.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
142	I'm disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List	8.9	14.3	35.5	40.4	0.8
143	Arabs should run in the Joint List in the next elections	16.6	12.0	30.7	40.1	0.7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
144	The state should recognize a top body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them	14.4	7.4	41.6	36.0	0.6
145	The state should recognize the Higher Fellow-Up Committee as a representative body of Arab citizens	16.0	13.3	34.5	35.7	0.6
146	The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions	15.5	11.5	31.1	41.4	0.6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Yes	Yes with Reservation	No	No Answer
<b>147</b>	Does Israel have a right to exist? (To the interviewer: Read all the answers)	32.1	40.5	24.8	2.5
<b>148</b>	Do you think that Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state? (To the interviewer: Read all the answers)	15.5	27.9	53.8	2.8

Are you in favor, reserved, or opposed to the use of the following means as part of the struggle of Arab citizens to advance their interests?

		In Favor	Reserved	Opposed	No Answer
<b>149</b>	Protest actions abroad	53.5	23.8	22.2	0.6
<b>150</b>	General strikes	54.3	25.0	20.1	0.7
<b>151</b>	Illegal demonstrations	25.4	27.0	47.1	0.6
<b>152</b>	Use of violence	21.1	24.1	54.2	0.6

<b>153</b>	Should or should not Arab citizens in Israel be part of the Palestinian resistance?	
1	No	41.9
2	Yes, but only part of the non-armed resistance	40.1
3	Yes, part of the resistance in all its forms	13.9
4	No answer	4.0

<b>154</b>	The Palestinian Authority should represent the Arabs in Israel in peace negotiations	
1	Sure it should represent them	16.0
2	Think it should represent them	23.8
3	Think it should not represent them	27.6
4	Sure it should not represent them	32.0
5	No answer	0.6

<b>155</b>	Arabs in Israel should mobilize the institutions of the United Nations and European Union for changing Israeli government policy toward them?	
1	Definitely should	33.3
2	Should	42.6
3	Should not	16.6
4	Definitely should not	5.9
5	No answer	1.6

<b>156</b>	Do you support or oppose an Arab political party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel?	
1	Definitely support	19.2
2	Support	37.9
3	Oppose	20.1
4	Definitely oppose	21.6
5	No answer	1.2

<b>157</b>	How do you evaluate the state of relations today between Arab citizens and Jews?	
1	Very good	12.9
2	Sufficiently good	37.6
3	Not sufficiently good	34.8
4	Not good at all	13.6
5	No answer	1.1

<b>158</b>	Do you expect improvement or worsening of the state of relations between Arab citizens and Jews during the coming five years?	
1	Much improvement	7.7
2	Some improvement	32.6
3	Some worsening	36.8
4	Much worsening	20.7
5	No answer	2.1

159 How does the government today treat Arab citizens?		
1	As equal citizens	7.8
2	As equal citizens that are discriminated against in certain areas	23.8
3	As second class citizens	42.0
4	As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	25.2
5	No answer	1.2

### We will end now with questions about you.

160 To what extent are you satisfied with your life as an Israeli citizen?		
1	Definitely satisfied	14.7
2	Sufficiently satisfied	33.8
3	Not sufficiently satisfied	36.2
4	Not satisfied at all	14.6
5	No answer	0.7

161 Are you proud or not proud to be Israeli?		
1	Not proud at all	22.6
2	Not proud	48.7
3	Proud	23.5
4	Definitely proud	4.0
5	No answer	1.2

162 Which of the following identities is the most important for you?		
1	Being an Israeli citizen	14.3
2	Being Muslim, Christian, or Druze	39.0
3	Being a member of the Palestinian people	43.0
4	No answer	3.6

163 How do you define your identity if you have to choose one from the following possibilities?		
1	Arab	10.0
2	Israeli Arab	14.9
3	Arab in Israel	8.0
4	Israeli	3.0
5	Palestinian Arab	12.8

6	Israeli Palestinian	9.0
7	Palestinian in Israel	11.0
8	Palestinian Arab in Israel	27.1
9	Palestinian	2.0
10	No answer	2.1

**164** As an Israeli citizen, to what extent do you consider yourself Palestinian-Arab or Israeli-Arab?

1	Only Palestinian-Arab and not Israeli-Arab at all	27.8
2	Mainly Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab to some extent	41.2
3	Mainly Israeli-Arab and Palestinian-Arab to some extent	18.3
4	Only Israeli-Arab and not Palestinian-Arab at all	11.5
5	No answer	1.2

**165** According to how you understand and define Zionism, are you:

1	Definitely Zionist	0.5
2	Zionist	0.5
3	Not Zionist	56.2
4	Anti-Zionist	41.5
5	No answer	1.3

**166** Do you have Jewish friends and did you visit them at their homes during the past two years?

1	Do not have Jewish friends	40.4
2	Have Jewish friends but have not visited them at their homes	34.2
3	Have Jewish friends and have visited them at their homes during the past two years	17.8
4	No answer	7.6

Have you participated or not participated in each of the following events?

		Never	Once or Twice	Three to Five Times	Six or More Times	No Answer
<b>167</b>	In protest actions like legal demonstrations and processions	63.1	24.7	6.3	5.2	0.7
<b>168</b>	In protest actions like illegal demonstrations and violent processions	76.0	14.0	8.1	1.1	0.8

<b>169</b>	Did you participate or not participate in March this year (2019) in Land Day events?	
1	Did not participate	67.0
2	Participated	30.0
3	No answer	3.0

<b>170</b>	Did you participate or not participate in April this year (2019) in the Nakba events?	
1	Did not participate	71.5
2	Participated	25.6
3	No answer	2.9

Indicate if you, as an Arab, have experienced or not experienced any of the following events?

		Never	Once or Twice	Three to Five Times	Six or More Times	No Answer
<b>171</b>	Have you received help from Jews?	55.3	29.8	8.1	6.3	0.5
<b>172</b>	Have you spent leisure time with Jews?	41.8	24.6	12.9	20.1	0.5
<b>173</b>	Have you personally, as an Arab, encountered threats, humiliations, or beatings from Jews against Arabs?	69.4	22.0	6.5	1.6	0.5
<b>174</b>	Have you personally, as a Arab, encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions in any area (shops, workplaces, leisure places, public transportation, police, government offices)?	54.6	29.1	13.0	2.7	0.6

In addition, indicate if you have experienced or if you fear any of the following events.

		Yes	No	No Answer
<b>175</b>	In the last twelve months were you arrested and interrogated by the security forces because of your participation in protest actions?	18.4	80.9	0.7
<b>176</b>	In the past three years have you been harassed by the authorities because of participation in protest activities?	12.5	86.8	0.7
<b>177</b>	Do you fear harassment by the authorities because of participation in protest activities?	36.1	63.1	0.8

178 To which TV channel from the following list do you feel closest? (To the interviewer: Please read the answers)		
1	Al-Jazeera	21.3
2	Al-Arabia	12.2
3	Al-Miadin	16.3
4	TV channels from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt	17.3
5	The Arabic TV channels of the BBC and Sky News	3.3
6	The Israeli TV channel in Arabic	13.9
7	One of the Israeli TV channels in Hebrew	14.9
8	No answer	0.9

179 To which political party or movement from the following list do you feel closest?		
1	Hadash headed by Ayman Odeh	19.3
2	Balad headed by Matanes Shehada	9.1
3	Ta'al headed by Ahmad Tibi	8.3
4	Ra'am headed by Mantzur Abas	6.4
5	The Southern Faction of the Islamic Movement headed by Hamad Abu Da'abes	3.1
6	The Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement headed by Raid Salah	14.7
7	The Sons of Village Movement	6.6
8	Other Arab political parties or movements	1.7
9	Labor headed by Gabay	1.2
10	Meretz headed by Tamar Zandberg	4.6
11	Yesh Aatid headed by Yair Lapid	1.3
12	Hosen LeYisrael headed by Benny Gantz	2.6
13	Telem headed by Bogy Ya'alon	0.4
14	Kulanu headed by Moshe Kahlon	1.5
15	Likud headed by Benyamin Netanyahu	1.3
16	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennett and Shaked	0.0
17	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	0.1
18	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal headed by Naftali Bennett	0.0
19	Halhud HaLeumi Tekuma headed by Smotrich	0.1
20	Utzma LeYisrael headed by Ben-Ari	0.0
21	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	0.0
22	Shas headed by Arye Der'i	0.4

23	Gesher headed by Orly Levi-Abuksis	0.0
24	Zehut Yehudit headed by Moshe Fieglin	0.0
25	Other Jewish political parties or movements	0.0
26	(To the interviewer: Do not read) none of the above	10.6
27	(To the interviewer: Do not read) don't know, refuse	6.6
27	No answer	0.0

<b>180</b>	<b>If the election to the Knesset was held today, for which political party would you vote from the following list?</b>	
1	Hadash-Ta'al headed by Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi	20.7
2	Ra'am-Balad headed by Mantzur Abas and Matanes Shehada	15.7
3	Other Arab political parties	1.9
4	Labor headed by Gabay	1.3
5	Meretz headed by Tamar Zandberg	3.8
6	Kahol-Lavan headed by Gantz (Hosen LeYisrael, Telem, Yesh Aatid)	4.0
7	Likud headed by Benjamin Netanyahu (including Kulanu)	1.1
8	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	0.2
9	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennet and Shaked	0.3
10	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin headed by Peretz (Habayit Hayehudi, Halhud HaLeumi Tekuma, Utzma LeYisrael)	0.1
11	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	0.0
12	Shas headed by Arye Der'i	0.4
13	Gesher headed by Orly Levi-Abuksis	0.1
14	Zehut Yehudit headed by Moshe Fieglin	0.0
15	Yahad headed by Elie Yishay	0.0
16	Other Jewish political parties	0.3
17	(To the interviewer: Do not read) none of the above	1.5
18	(To the interviewer: Do not read) have not decided	2.7
19	(To the interviewer: Do not read) empty ballot	0.4
20	(To the interviewer: Do not read) will not vote	37.9
21	(To the interviewer: Do not read) don't know, refuse	7.6
22	No answer	0.0

181	For which political party did you vote in the last election to the Knesset in April 2019?	
1	Hadash-Ta'al headed by Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi	20.1
2	Ra'am-Balad headed by Mantzur Abas and Matanes Shehada	15.6
3	Other Arab political parties	0.5
4	Labor headed by Gabay	1.4
5	Meretz headed by Tamar Zandberg	4.5
6	Kahol-Lavan headed by Gantz (Hosen LeYisrael, Telem, Yesh Aatid	4.3
7	Likud headed by Benjamin Netanyahu (including Kulanu)	1.0
8	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	0.3
9	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennett and Shaked	0.1
10	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin headed by Peretz (Habayit Hayehudi, Halhud HaLeumi Tekuma, Utzma LeYisrael)	0.0
11	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	0.1
12	Shas headed by Arye Der'i	0.4
13	Gesher headed by Orly Levi-Abuksis	0.0
14	Zehut headed by Moshe Fieglin	0.0
15	Yahad headed by Elie Yishay	0.1
16	Another Jewish political party or movement	0.7
17	(To the interviewer: Do not read) did not vote although I had the right to vote	43.0
18	(To the interviewer: Do not read) did not vote because I did not have the right to vote	0.6
19	(To the interviewer: Do not read) empty ballot	2.4
20	(To the interviewer: Do not read) refuse to answer (to the interviewer: The data are important to us only for checking if the sample represents the population) no answer	4.9

182	(To eligible Arabs who did not vote in the Knesset election in April 2019) Why did you not vote in the recent election?	
1	I am not interested in politics	9.6
2	My voting is ineffective	5.2
3	There is no party or list that represents me	5.2
4	I am in principle boycotting the Knesset election	13.7
5	I am disappointed with the Joint List in the previous Knesset	4.0

6	I am disappointed with the breakup of the Joint List	8.1
7	Another answer	0.6
8	No answer	53.7

<b>183</b>	What is your religion?	
1	Muslim	83.5
2	Christian	8.8
3	Druze	6.9
4	No answer	0.9

<b>184</b>	With regard to religious observance, do you think of yourself today as:	
1	Very religious	7.0
2	Religious	35.0
3	Religious to some extent	32.2
4	Not religious	22.7
5	No Answer	3.2

<b>185</b>	What is your attitude toward the Islamic Movement in Israel?	
1	Opposed	10.1
2	Neither opposed nor sympathetic	45.7
3	Sympathetic	31.1
4	A rank and file member	8.1
5	An active member	2.0
6	No answer	3.1

<b>186</b>	To what extent do you feel danger to your personal safety from Jews in Israel?	
1	Always	14.6
2	Often	25.3
3	Seldom	33.7
4	Never	24.7
5	No answer	1.8

<b>187</b>	Do you personally feel insecure because of the violence in Arab localities?	
1	Yes, definitely	24.7
2	Yes	51.9

3	No	25.7
4	No, definitely	27.2
5	No answer	1.3

**188** Since the proclamation of the state, have lands been expropriated from your family or parents?

1	Yes a lot	20.1
2	Yes some	25.8
3	Own lands but they were not expropriated	25.7
4	My family or parents do not own land	27.2
5	No answer	1.3

**189** Are you of a displaced family (internal refugees)?

1	Yes	20.0
2	No	78.7
3	No answer	1.3

**190** Are you of Bedouin descent?

1	Yes	25.9
2	No	70.8
3	No answer	3.3

**191** How old are you? Age in years.

**192** What is your family status?

1	Bachelor	24.4
2	Married	70.4
3	Divorced/separated	2.2
4	Widowed	2.1
5	No answer	0.9

**193** Level of education

1	I did not go to school	2.3
2	Attended Heder or elementary school but did not complete	3.6
3	Completed elementary school	7.2

4	Attended high school (academic, vocational or Yeshiva) but did not complete	6.7
5	Completed high school	37.0
6	Attended post-secondary school, college, or university but did not complete	8.0
7	Completed college or university and received a B.A. degree	24.8
8	Completed college or university and received a M.A. degree	8.1
9	Completed university and received a Ph.D. degree	0.8
10	No answer	1.6

<b>194</b>	Are you:	
1	A wage earner (including a civilian employed by the military, a professional soldier, a Kibbutz or Moshav member)	53.6
2	Self-employed	11.7
3	A soldier in a compulsory service	0.3
4	Not employed but seeking employment	5.7
5	Not employed and not seeking employment	3.6
6	Retired	4.2
7	A student (in high school, college, university), a youth before the draft, a volunteer	7.1
8	A housewife	12.6
9	No answer	1.3

<b>195</b>	How many subordinates do you have in your work? (To the interviewer: Record the number of the subordinates and if none write 0)	
0	84.1	
1	4.8	
2	4.9	
3	1.8	
4	0.8	
5	0.6	
6	1.1	
7	0.3	
8	0.5	
9	0.1	

11	0.1
12	0.1
13	0.1
16	0.1
20	0.5
30	0.1

<b>196</b>	The average expenditure per month in Israel of an Arab family is 14,550 NIS. In comparison, the expenditure of your family is:	
1	Much above the average	8.3
2	To some extent above the average	17.8
3	Same as the average	19.4
4	To some extent below the average	26.4
5	Much below the average	25.7
6	No answer	2.4

**We are done. Thank you.**

### ***Interviewer's Report***

<b>197</b>	In which sample list does the respondent appear?	
1	In the original sample list	71.2
2	In the substitute sample list	22.9
3	Not known	5.8

<b>198</b>	Gender.	
1	Man	51.8
2	Woman	47.5
3	Not known	0.8

<b>199</b>	Name of place of residence.	
1	Abu Snan	5.5
2	A'atzam	5.7
3	Ksefe	3.5
4	Um al-Faham	5.8
5	Iksal	4.1
6	Bo'ene-Nojidad	3.0

7	Julis	2.3
8	Jat (in the Triangle)	3.4
9	Daliat al-Carmel	3.3
10	Zimer-Marja	2.5
11	Haifa	4.7
12	Bir al-Maksur	1.8
13	Tira	4.1
14	Kfar Yasif	2.8
15	Kfar Manda	2.7
16	Ar'ara	4.0
17	Sha'ab	2.0
18	Ramle	3.4
19	Majdal al-Krum	4.2
20	Na'ora	1.3
21	Nahaf	3.1
22	Nazareth	7.3
23	Sakhnin	3.3
24	Akko	2.4
25	Rahat	4.8
26	Segev Shalom	2.6
27	Shefaram	3.9
28	Sheikh Danun	2.6
29	Not known	0.1

<b>200</b>	How do you evaluate the general reliability of the information that the respondent provided?	
1	Not satisfactory	4.3
2	Satisfactory	16.9
3	Good	39.4
4	Very good	19.3
5	No answer	20.2

<b>201</b>	The month in which the interview was held.	
1	April 2019	27.1
2	May 2019	41.6
3	June 2019	25.7

4	July 2019	0.2
5	Not known	5.4

**202** The day in the month in which the interview was held.

**203** (For office use) Verification of the interview by the fieldwork supervisor.

1	Verified	20.2
2	Not verified	79.8

### ***New Variables***

<b>vote19</b>	Voting in the Knesset election on April 9, 2019 for weighting survey data.	
1	Hadash-Ta'al	20.1
2	Ra'am-Balad	15.6
3	Other Arab political parties	0.5
4	Jewish political parties	12.9
5	Did not vote although had a right to vote	43.0
6	Did not vote and did not have a right to vote (minor)	0.6
7	Other, missing	7.3

<b>pol_ori</b>	Feeling closest to a political party or movement	
1	Rightwing Jewish political parties	3.4
2	Center-left Jewish political parties	10.2
3	Other Arab political parties	1.7
4	Ta'al	8.3
5	Ra'am and Southern Faction of the Islamic Movement	9.5
6	Hadash	19.3
7	Balad	9.1
8	Sons of Village Movement	6.6
9	Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement	14.7
10	No answer	17.2

<b>pol_ori_3cat</b>	Feeling closest to a political party or movement (3 categories)	
1	Jewish political parties	13.3
2	Arab political parties	54.6
3	Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement	14.7
4	No answer	17.2

<b>age</b>	Age groups (10 categories)	
1	18–21	12.3
2	22–24	8.7
3	25–30	15.5
4	31–35	12.1
5	36–40	11.4
6	41–45	10.3
7	46–50	9.5
8	51–55	7.2
9	56–60	4.6
10	61 and over	6.3
11	No answer	2.1

<b>mixedtown</b>	Residence in a mixed town	
1	Mixed town	10.5
2	Arab locality	89.5

<b>region</b>	Region of place of residence	
1	Galilee	53.1
2	Triangle	19.8
3	Negev	16.5
4	Mixed town	10.5
5	Not known	0.1

<b>com</b>	Community	
1	Druze	6.9
2	Christian	8.8
3	Bedouin from the Galilee	4.6
4	Bedouin from the Negev	16.5
5	Other Muslim	62.4
6	Not known	0.9

<b>druze</b>	Not Druze/Druze	
1	Not Druze	92.2
2	Druze	6.9
3	Not known	0.9

<b>identity</b>	Self-identity (3 categories)	
1	Non-Palestinian Israeli	36.0
2	Palestinian Israeli	47.1
3	Palestinian non-Israeli	14.8
4	No answer	2.1

<b>religiosity</b>	Religious observance (4 categories)	
1	Very religious	7.0
2	Religious	35.0
3	Religious to some extent	32.2
4	Not religious	22.7
5	No answer	3.2

<b>edu</b>	Educational level (4 categories)	
1	Incomplete high school	19.7
2	Complete high school	37.0
3	Post-high school	8.0
4	Complete higher education	33.7
5	No answer	1.6

<b>newvoting</b>	Voting and non-voting in Knesset election in April 2019	
1	Voted for a Jewish political party	11.9
2	Voted for an Arab political party	33.3
3	Did not vote for non-ideological reasons	18.7
4	Did not vote for ideological reasons	32.8
5	Not classified, no answer	3.3

<b>size</b>	Size of place of residence	
1	0–4,999	12.1
2	5,000–9,999	17.5
3	10,000–14,999	21.2

4	15,000–19,999	9.5
5	20,000–29,999	16.1
6	30,000 and over	23.5
7	Not known	0.1

<b>coexist_scale</b>	New coexistence scale from 2019 on	
0	Zero	11.0
1	1	6.0
2	2	6.9
3	3	7.6
4	4	12.4
5	5	20.0
6	Six	35.7
7	Not classified	0.4
	Mean	4.08
	Standard deviation	2.073

<b>coexist_scale</b>	Old coexistence scale from 2019 on	
0	Zero	10.7
1	1	5.6
2	2	6.0
3	3	8.2
4	4	6.3
5	5	27.2
6	Six	35.6
7	Not classified	0.5
	Mean	4.19
	Standard deviation	2.053

<b>militancy_scale</b>	Militancy scale	
0	0	9.1
1	1	5.9
2	2	11.4
3	3	10.0
4	4	6.5
5	5	7.6

6	6	6.3
7	7	5.8
8	8	12.3
9	9	4.5
10	10	4.7
11	11	4.5
12	12	2.6
13	13	7.2
14	Not classified	1.8
	Mean	5.71
	Standard deviation	3.908

<b>wgt</b>	Weighting coefficients	
1	Hadash-Ta'al	0.6154
2	Raam-Balad	0.6200
3	Other Arab political parties	0.2274
4	Jewish political parties	0.6507
5	Did not vote despite having a right to vote	3.2926
6	Did not vote – minor	0.3150
7	Other, no answer	1.0000

<b>id</b>	Serial number
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## Survey of Jews 2019

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I'm an interviewer from the University of Haifa. We are conducting a scientific survey, carried out by the university, on the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. Participation in the survey will enable you to express your opinion on the topic and to contribute to obtaining a true picture of the public opinion in the state. For the purpose of the study you were randomly chosen. Your answers will not be given to anyone and will be used for statistical objectives only. There are no correct or incorrect answers to the questions asked. We thank you in advance for your participation which is vital for the success of the study.

We start with questions about the possibilities of the relations between you and Israeli Arabs.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
1	Do you agree or disagree that Arabs will attend Jewish high schools?	29.8	16.5	21.5	30.2	1.9
2	Do you agree or disagree that Arabs will live in Jewish neighborhoods?	31.2	25.7	21.6	19.3	2.1
3	Do you agree or disagree that Arab political parties will join government coalitions?	36.4	21.2	18.1	20.9	3.4

And personally:

		Definitely Ready	Ready	Not Ready	Definitely Not Ready	No Answer
4	Are you ready or not ready to have Israeli Arab children attend schools of your children?	12.1	35.5	21.0	25.7	5.7
5	Are you ready or not ready to have Israeli Arabs live in your neighborhood?	9.7	29.9	28.2	26.1	6.1

I wish to ask you a few questions about your feeling when you get to be with Arab citizens:

		Feel very at ease	Feel at ease	Do not feel at ease	Do not feel at ease at all	No Answer
6	When you happen to be in a shopping mall where there are also Arabs, do you feel at ease or not at ease?	16.5	45.5	27.6	9.4	1.0
7	When you hear Arabic in Jewish places (localities, institutions), do you feel at ease or not at ease?	14.7	40.7	30.2	13.0	1.4

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
8	The country between the Jordan River and the Sea is a common homeland of Arabs and Jews	38.6	24.1	18.8	11.2	7.3
9	There is a lot of discrimination against Arabs in Israel	30.3	21.7	25.1	19.7	3.3
10	I accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society	18.2	18.5	32.2	29.4	1.7
11	I'm ready to have an Arab friend	17.9	13.6	23.8	42.0	2.7
12	I'm ready to have an Arab neighbor	30.1	19.7	19.3	28.6	2.3
13	I'm ready to have an Arab as superior in my job	23.7	18.7	21.6	31.8	4.1
14	Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Jews should adopt	29.3	21.3	24.4	15.8	9.2
15	Arab citizens and Jews must create together new common values and practices in addition to their own values and practices	25.0	14.4	25.9	30.7	4.1

To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arab citizens should be allowed:

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
16	To vote in Knesset election	16.3	10.0	22.8	49.2	1.6
17	To buy land wherever they want	38.5	25.0	16.5	15.2	4.8

To what extent do you agree or disagree that the state should:

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
18	Give Jews certain preference over Arab citizens?	17.3	19.4	27.3	30.8	5.3

The following statements are about Arab citizens in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
19	I'm reconciled with Israel as a state in which a Jewish majority and Arab minority live together	5.7	8.1	34.3	50.4	1.5
20	It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens always live together in Israel	18.2	22.6	31.9	22.9	4.4
21	Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state	13.2	9.6	28.7	46.7	1.7
22	Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act for changing their relations by legal and democratic means only	5.8	6.1	29.9	55.1	3.1
23	Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendship and activity in joint organizations	12.2	7.7	30.8	46.1	3.2
24	I would avoid as much as possible any personal contact with Arabs	47.4	26.3	11.2	13.0	2.1
25	To what extent is there or is there no discrimination in Israel against Arabs trying to move to a Jewish city?					
1	No discrimination at all				14.7	
2	Some discrimination				45.7	

3	Appreciable discrimination	17.4
4	A lot of discrimination	10.7
5	No answer	11.4

Here are more statements about Arab citizens in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
26	It is impossible to trust most Arab citizens	22.3	26.5	21.7	25.7	3.8
27	Most Arab citizens are disposed to violent behavior	25.5	28.7	22.8	19.0	4.0
28	Most Arab citizens would never achieve the Jews' cultural level	30.6	28.6	19.0	18.0	3.8
29	Most Arab citizens are not law-abiding	27.7	28.6	19.2	17.8	6.7
30	Most Arab citizens hate Jews	19.2	25.6	25.4	25.2	4.7
31	Most Arab citizens want to integrate in Israeli society	11.2	21.1	37.6	23.3	6.8
32	Most Arab citizens are reconciled with the existence of the state	27.5	29.7	22.2	11.8	8.8
33	Most Arab citizens want a Palestinian state instead of the State of Israel	12.1	16.6	23.8	35.7	11.8
34	I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel	19.8	18.4	21.0	39.4	1.3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following opinions?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
35	Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character	17.0	21.4	24.3	30.4	6.9
36	Arab citizens endanger the state because they may open a popular revolt	17.3	20.3	27.7	27.6	7.1

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the status of Arab citizens in the state?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
37	There should be equality between Arab citizens and Jews in individual rights, state budgets and opportunities for education and employment	17.0	15.0	32.0	32.9	3.1
38	Arab citizens have a right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights	12.4	13.8	34.0	37.3	2.6
39	Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept or not accept Israel's right to be a Jewish state	35.8	24.1	21.5	14.2	4.4
40	An Arab citizen who defines oneself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and to its laws	10.5	15.0	22.0	47.4	5.1

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state's character and the Jews and Arabs living in it?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
41	Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is democracy for the Arab citizens as well	7.4	9.1	25.7	53.3	4.5
42	Israel treats Arab citizens fairly	7.1	17.4	32.1	39.8	3.7
43	Arabs, like the Jews, have historical and national rights to the land	34.5	23.7	23.0	11.5	7.2
44	In decisions on the character and borders of the state there should be a majority from among the Jews and it is not sufficient to have a majority from among the population at large	9.7	12.6	24.7	43.7	9.3

To what extent do you trust or not trust each of the following institutions in Israel?

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
45	The courts	16.0	24.5	31.3	26.0	2.2
46	The police	12.0	30.2	37.9	18.3	1.5
47	The Knesset	17.9	39.3	31.1	9.9	1.8
48	The government	22.9	35.3	29.8	10.3	1.7

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
49	The Jewish media spreads hate against Arabs in Israel	50.4	31.5	8.7	4.9	4.5
50	The Arab media in Israel spreads hate against the state	5.5	10.5	25.9	41.9	16.1
51	It is possible in Israel to express different political opinions without fear	14.9	19.9	30.5	32.1	2.5
52	Arab Knesset Members incite against the state	6.0	7.4	24.5	56.0	6.1
53	Government Ministers incite against Arab citizens	32.3	31.7	19.4	8.7	8.0

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following arrangements for dealing with the relations between Arab citizens and Jews?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
54	Arab citizens should leave the country and receive proper compensation	32.7	27.5	17.7	16.1	5.9
55	Arab citizens will have a status of a national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and will come to terms with it	13.8	16.7	30.3	31.0	8.1
56	In case of contradiction between the democratic character and the Jewish character of the state, I would prefer the Jewish character	17.2	15.2	19.0	42.7	5.9

57 What do think of the Nation-State Law?		
1	It should be abolished	16.1
2	The principle of equality must be added in legislation to it	23.2
3	It should remain as is	15.1
4	The Jewish character of the state must be strengthened in it	26.7
5	(To the interviewer: Do not read) do not know, refuse	18.9

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
58	The Palestinians lack national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants	11.7	14.6	20.0	46.2	7.5
59	I believe that in 1948 a disaster (Nakba) occurred to the Palestinian Arabs in which they lost the war against the Jews, became refugees, their localities were destroyed, and they did not establish a state of their own	42.9	18.2	15.1	15.1	8.7

I'll read to you several things that may be required in order to make Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and they are citizens with equal rights in it. Please indicate if you agree or disagree that the Jews would take any of the following steps to make Arabs feel that Israel is their state and they are citizens with equal rights in it.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
60	In the framework of peace with the Palestinians, the state will compensate Arab citizens in land or money for the lands it expropriated from them	41.1	21.5	18.8	12.0	6.6
61	The state will recognize the unrecognized Arab localities that today do not have official status and grant them resources such as connection to the water and electricity grids as accorded to recognized localities	33.4	15.8	26.2	19.2	5.4

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
62	The state should give Arab citizens proper expression in its symbols, flag and anthem	50.9	21.0	13.1	9.3	5.7
63	The state should allow Arab citizens to manage their own educational, religious and cultural affairs	34.9	20.4	25.4	14.8	4.5
64	There will be no differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks in border crossings	46.1	22.2	13.1	12.8	5.8
65	The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive proper representation in all state institutions and public bodies	28.8	15.0	32.5	18.5	5.2
66	Arab political parties will be invited to participate in government coalitions like Jewish political parties	34.2	19.1	25.0	16.6	5.1
67	The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive their proportional share of the state budget	30.0	18.0	27.2	18.5	6.1
68	The Arabic language should be in use in state institutions as the Hebrew language and its instruction should be required in Jewish schools	36.2	17.0	22.5	20.1	4.3
69	The state should recognize Arab citizens as Palestinians and guarantees their right to maintain relations with the Palestinian people and Arab nation	50.0	20.3	13.6	7.4	8.8
70	The state will recognize its responsibility for the Nakba, i.e., the disaster that happened to the Palestinians during the 1948 war	65.1	17.5	6.3	3.8	7.3
71	Arab citizens will be granted preferential treatment in admission to state institutions and universities and colleges	54.3	20.9	15.3	5.0	4.4
72	The state should launch an emergency program to bridge the gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens	33.8	16.7	28.0	15.3	6.3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles for settling the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
73	Two states to two peoples	35.1	13.6	23.5	21.9	5.8
74	The pre-1967 borders will be the borders between the two states with an option of land swaps	43.7	17.9	17.7	9.5	11.3
75	The settlements outside the settlement blocs across the Green Line will be dismantled	49.4	17.3	16.2	11.3	5.8
76	Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	62.1	15.5	10.4	7.8	4.2
77	The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return to the State of Palestine only	43.0	13.0	20.0	15.7	8.3
78	After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will be over	38.1	14.3	17.1	22.0	8.4

Now I'll ask you some more questions about the termination of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the status of Israel in the region. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
79	I believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent agreement in the coming years	45.1	24.0	16.9	8.5	5.5
80	The Palestinians are the main guilty party for the protracted conflict between them and the Jews	15.2	15.6	24.9	40.4	4.0
81	In all Israeli, Arab and Jewish schools, the history of the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians must be taught from the viewpoint of both sides	25.6	14.4	29.5	25.5	5.0

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
82	In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East	17.6	19.2	25.7	24.9	12.7
83	Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries	21.9	21.8	25.7	22.3	8.3

Here are statements on Arabs in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
84	The Arab minority is a strong minority	26.3	21.0	25.9	17.0	9.8
85	Arab citizens have considerable influence on which of the two political blocs (the Left-Center or the Right) will be in power	30.9	28.5	19.3	12.6	8.8
86	The economy in Israel cannot survive without the labor of Arab citizens	29.5	18.2	29.0	18.2	5.1
87	Arab citizens can disrupt life in the country if they wish	13.5	12.3	32.0	36.9	5.3

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about organizations of Arab citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
88	The Arab political parties truly represent Arab citizens	43.1	20.7	12.1	12.2	11.8
89	The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational and cultural institutions	34.7	20.4	25.6	13.5	5.7

90	Do you support or oppose an Arab party that acts for joining a government coalition on the basis of accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and a state policy of equality and fairness toward Arabs in Israel?					
1	Definitely support					15.8
2	Support					40.9

3	Oppose	14.0
4	Definitely oppose	16.5
5	No answer	12.7

To what extent do you trust

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
91	Arab leaders in Israel?	57.6	29.0	8.6	0.9	4.0

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the possibility that Arab citizens use each of the following means to improve their situation in Israel?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
92	General strikes	53.4	16.8	13.3	8.9	7.6
93	Protest abroad	53.5	17.2	12.3	8.2	8.9

94 Do you think that there is a reasonable chance for an Arab youth to fulfill his occupational aspirations in Israel today?

1	No	6.1
2	Doubtful	12.5
3	Possible	33.4
4	Yes	45.0
5	No answer	3.1

95 Do you think that there is a right to exist in Israel for an Arab national minority with full civil rights? (To the interviewer: Read all answers before the respondent answers)

1	Yes	32.3
2	Yes with reservation	43.4
3	No	17.0
4	No answer	7.3

96 Do you accept today the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel?

1	Yes	45.2
2	Yes with reservation	35.3
3	No	15.3
4	No answer	4.2

<b>97</b>	How do you evaluate the state of relations today between Arab citizens and Jews?	
1	Very good	1.4
2	Sufficiently good	29.7
3	Not sufficiently good	45.3
4	Not good at all	19.3
5	No answer	4.2

<b>98</b>	Do you expect improvement or worsening of the state of relations between Arab and Jewish citizens over the next five years?	
1	Much improvement	1.5
2	Some improvement	31.2
3	Some worsening	26.0
4	Much worsening	10.9
5	No change	18.4
6	No answer	12.1

<b>99</b>	How does the government today treat Arab citizens?	
1	As equal citizens	27.2
2	As equal citizens that are discriminated against in certain areas	31.2
3	As second class citizens	23.3
4	As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	8.3
5	No answer	10.0

***We will end now with questions about you.***

<b>100</b>	Are you proud or not proud to be Israeli?	
1	Not proud at all	1.6
2	Not proud	6.2
3	Proud	33.5
4	Definitely proud	54.4
5	No answer	4.3

<b>101</b>	Which of the following identities is most important for you?	
1	Being an Israeli citizen	30.2
2	Belonging to the Jewish religion	17.1

3	Being a member of the Jewish people	45.1
4	No answer	7.6

<b>102</b>	Which of the following identities is most correct for you?	
1	Only Jewish and not at all Israeli	2.9
2	Mainly Jewish and Israeli to some extent	48.5
3	Mainly Israeli and Jewish to some extent	35.9
4	Only Israeli and not at all Jewish	5.1
5	No answer	7.7

<b>103</b>	According to how you understand and define Zionism, are you:	
1	Definitely Zionist	36.3
2	Zionist	46.6
3	Not Zionist	11.3
4	Anti-Zionist	1.5
5	No answer	4.3

<b>104</b>	Have you received help from Arab citizens?	
1	Daily	1.5
2	Often	14.2
3	Seldom	40.0
4	Almost never	38.9
5	No answer	5.3

<b>105</b>	Have you spent time with Arab citizens?	
1	Daily	8.0
2	Often	20.4
3	Seldom	38.2
4	Almost never	30.5
5	No answer	2.8

<b>106</b>	Do you have Arab friends and did you visit them at their home during the past two years?	
1	Do not have Arab friends	56.2
2	Have Arab friends but have not visited them at their home	27.8

3	Have Arab friends and have visited them at their home during the past two years	12.0
4	No answer	3.9

<b>107</b>	Have you personally encountered threats, humiliations, or beatings from Arab citizens against Jews?	
1	Almost never	64.9
2	Once or twice	18.5
3	Three to five times	5.8
4	Six or more times	5.7
5	No answer	5.0

<b>108</b>	To what extent you as a Jew, do you feel or not feel fear of danger to your personal safety from Arab citizens?	
1	Always	12.0
2	Often	19.4
3	Seldom	47.4
4	Never	16.6
5	No answer	4.6

<b>109</b>	To which political party do you feel closest?	
1	Labor headed by Gabay	4.2
2	Meretz headed by Zandberg	2.8
3	Yesh Aatid headed by Lapid	7.0
4	Hosen LeYisrael headed by Gantz	9.9
5	Telem headed by Ya'alon	0.0
6	Kulanu headed by Kahlon	4.6
7	Likud headed by Netanyahu	21.4
8	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	5.6
9	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennett and Shaked	5.4
10	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal headed by Peretz	2.2
11	Halhud HaLeumi-Tekuma headed by Smotrich	0.6
12	Utzma Yehudit headed by Ben-Ari (Kach, Kahane Hai)	1.6
13	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	5.9
14	Shas headed by Dar'i	3.2
15	Gesher headed by Levi-Abuksis	1.1
16	Zehut Yehudit headed by Feiglin	3.7

17	Yahad headed by Eli Yishai	0.4
18	Other Jewish political parties	0.9
19	Hadash (Rakah) headed by Ayman Odeh	0.1
20	Balad headed by Matanes Shehade	0.3
21	Ra'am headed by Mantzur Abas	0.0
22	Ta'al headed by Ahmad Tibi	0.0
23	Other Arab political parties	0.0
24	(To the interviewer: Do not read) none of the above	5.8
25	(To the interviewer: Do not read) do not know, refuse to answer, no answer	13.3

<b>110</b>	For which political party would you vote if the election were held today?	
1	Labor headed by Gabay	1.9
2	Meretz headed by Zandberg	2.3
3	Kahol Lavan headed by Ganz	21.4
4	Likud headed by Netanyahu (including Kulanu)	19.6
5	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	7.3
6	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennett and Shaked	4.0
7	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin headed by Peretz (Habayit Hayehudi, Halhud HaLeumi-Tekuma, Utzma LeYisrael)	3.1
8	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	5.2
9	Shas headed by Dar'i	3.7
10	Gesher headed by Levi-Abukhis	1.9
11	Zehut Yehudit headed by Feiglin	2.1
12	Yahad headed by Eli Yishai	0.5
13	Other Jewish political parties	0.3
14	Hadash-Ta'al headed by Odeh and Tibi	0.1
15	Ra'am and Balad headed by Abas and Shehade	0.2
16	Other Arab political parties	0.0
17	(To the interviewer: Do not read) none of the above	0.5
18	(To the interviewer: Do not read) I have not decided	8.6
19	(To the interviewer: Do not read) empty ballot	1.5
20	(To the interviewer: Do not read) I'll not vote	3.3
21	(To the interviewer: Do not read) do not know, refuse to answer, no answer	12.4

<b>111</b>	For which political party did you vote in the recent Knesset election in April 2019?	
1	Labor headed by Gabay	3.3
2	Meretz headed by Zandberg	2.2
3	Kahal Lavan headed by Ganz	19.7
4	Likud headed by Netanyahu (including Kulanu)	20.4
5	Yisrael Betenu headed by Avigdor Lieberman	3.0
6	Hayamin Hehadash headed by Bennett and Shaked	2.5
7	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin headed by Peretz (Habayit Hayehudi, Halhud HaLeumi-Tekuma, Utzma LeYisrael)	2.9
8	Yahadut Hatora headed by Litzman	4.5
9	Shas headed by Dar'i	4.5
10	Gesher headed by Levi-Abuksis	1.3
11	Zehut Yehudit headed by Feiglin	2.1
12	Yahad headed by Eli Yishai	0.1
13	Other Jewish political parties	3.0
14	Hadash-Ta'al headed by Odeh and Tibi	0.4
15	Ra'am and Balad headed by Abas and Shehade	0.1
16	Other Arab political parties	0.0
17	(To the interviewer: Do not read) did not vote although had the right to vote	19.2
18	(To the interviewer: Do not read) did not vote, minor	0.3
19	(To the interviewer: Do not read) empty ballot	0.8
20	Refuse to answer (to the interviewer: Say to the respondent: The data is important to us to check if the sample is representative of the population)	9.7

<b>112</b>	What is important to you: That the government will be ruled by the right or the left-center?	
1	It is very important that the government will be ruled by the right	34.4
2	It is important that the government will be ruled by the right	24.5
3	It is important that the government will be ruled by the left-center	17.2
4	It is very important that the government will be ruled by the left-center	10.6
5	No answer	13.3

**To the interviewer: The following question is for respondents who support any of rightwing political parties.**

<b>113</b>	If Netanyahu will not head the Likud and somebody else be instead, for which political list will you vote? (For voters for rightwing political parties only)	
1	I'll vote for one of the rightwing political parties	52.6
2	I'll vote for an ultra-orthodox party (Yahadut Hatora or Shas)	16.5
3	I'll vote for Kahol-Lavan	2.5
4	I'll vote for Labor	0.0
5	I'll vote for Meretz	0.0
6	I'll vote for another list	5.6
7	I'll not vote	3.2
8	Don't know, refuse	19.6

<b>114</b>	According to how you understand and define what is right, center and left, to which stream do you belong?	
1	Right	30.6
2	Moderate right	31.9
3	Center	18.7
4	Moderate left	9.2
5	Left	3.6
6	No answer	6.0

<b>115</b>	Are you Haredi, Dati, Masorti-Dati, Masorti-Lo Dati, or Hiloni?	
1	Haredi [ultra-orthodox]	10.2
2	Dati [national-religious]	8.2
3	Masorti-Dati [traditional-religious]	8.3
4	Masorti-Lo Dati [traditional-not religious]	23.2
5	Hiloni [secular]	48.3
6	No answer	1.8

<b>116</b>	In which country were you born?	
1	Born in Israel	70.9
2	Morocco, Tangier	1.8
3	Algeria, Tunisia, Libya	0.4

4	Iraq	0.7
5	Yemen, Aden	0.4
6	Syria, Lebanon, Egypt	1.1
7	Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece	0.0
8	Other countries in Asia and Africa	0.9
9	Former Soviet Union (Russia)	16.2
10	Poland	0.7
11	Romania	1.5
12	Germany	0.2
13	English-speaking countries (Great Britain, United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand)	1.0
14	Other countries in Europe and America	3.1
15	No answer	1.0

<b>117</b>	In which country was your father born?	
1	Born in Israel	31.8
2	Morocco, Tangier	9.5
3	Algeria, Tunisia, Libya	3.3
4	Iraq	3.8
5	Yemen, Aden	1.1
6	Syria, Lebanon, Egypt	1.3
7	Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece	2.1
8	Other countries in Asia and Africa	2.6
9	Former Soviet Union (Russia)	19.2
10	Poland	7.5
11	Romania	3.8
12	Germany	1.4
13	English-speaking countries (Great Britain, United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand)	1.9
14	Other countries in Europe and America	8.0
15	No answer	2.5

<b>118</b>	If you have to define yourself by ethnic descent, which of the following possibilities would you choose?	
1	A member of Mizrahi communities, Mizrahi, Sephardi	38.2
2	Ashkenazi	45.4
3	Mixed	12.1
4	No answer	4.2

**119** How old are you? Age in years.**120** What is your family status?

1	Bachelor	26.9
2	Married	61.9
3	Divorced/separated	7.4
4	Widowed	3.3
5	No answer	0.6

**121** What is the last class that you completed?

1	I did not go to school	0.1
2	Attended Heder or elementary school but did not complete	0.4
3	Completed elementary school	0.8
4	Attended high school (academic, vocational or Yeshiva) but did not complete	3.2
5	Completed high school	28.5
6	Attended post-secondary school, college, or university but did not complete	17.8
7	Completed a college or a university and received a B.A. degree	27.7
8	Completed a college or a university and received a M.A. degree	15.2
9	Completed a university and received a Ph.D. degree	4.0
10	No answer	2.3

**122** Are you:

1	A wage earner (including a civilian employed by the military, a professional soldier, a Kibbutz or Moshav member)	56.2
2	Self-employed	7.7
3	A soldier in a compulsory service	1.5
4	Not employed but seeking employment	4.5
5	Not employed and not seeking employment	0.7
6	Retired	17.3
7	A student (in high school, college, university, Yeshiva), a youth before the draft, a volunteer	8.5
8	A housewife	1.4
9	No answer	2.1

<b>123</b>	How many subordinates do you have in your work? (To the interviewer: Record the number of the subordinates and if none write 0)	
0	74.0	
1	2.8	
2	4.6	
3	2.3	
4	1.6	
5	1.8	
6	1.5	
7	1.3	
8	1.0	
9	0.3	
10	1.2	
11	0.3	
12	0.5	
14	0.2	
15	1.3	
16	0.2	
20	2.0	
25	0.5	
30	0.6	
35	0.3	
55	0.1	
60	0.2	
90	0.5	
130	0.1	
144	0.1	
150	0.4	
200	0.1	
300	0.1	

<b>124</b>	The average expenditure per month in Israel today is 15,800 NIS. In comparison, the expenditure of your family is:	
1	Much above the average	8.6
2	To some extent above the average	14.9
3	Same as the average	25.0
4	To some extent below the average	18.8
5	Much below the average	22.9
6	No answer	9.9

<b>125</b> The municipal status of place of residence (a classification variable).		
1	City	83.0
2	Moshav/rural community	10.8
3	Kibbutz	3.1
4	Settlement across the Green Line	2.4
5	Not known, refuse	0.7

<b>126</b> Name of place of residence / <b>district</b> . Region of place of residence (a classification variable).		
1	South	16.1
2	Haifa	12.9
3	Judea and Samaria	4.9
4	Jerusalem	10.6
5	Center	24.1
6	North	10.9
7	Tel Aviv	20.5

**Thank you. We are done.**

### ***Interviewer's Report***

<b>internet</b> Mode of conduct of the interview		
1	By phone	25.5
2	Via Internet	74.5

<b>file</b> classification of respondents		
1	Veterans by phone 1	12.1
2	Veterans by phone 2	4.6
3	Russians by phone	6.8
4	Veterans via Internet	65.8
5	Russians via Internet	8.7
6	Supplement ultra-orthodox by telephone	2.0

<b>sample</b> sampling group		
1	Immigrants interviewed in Russian	6.8
2	Settlers	4.6
3	Ultra-orthodox	9.7
4	All the rest (ordinary)	78.9

<b>russian</b>	Russian/not Russian	
1	Russian	15.5
2	Not Russian	84.5

<b>gender</b>	(a classification variable)	
1	Man	45.7
2	Woman	54.3

<b>age</b>	Age groups (12 categories)	
1	18–21	5.8
2	22–24	9.1
3	25–30	12.4
4	31–35	11.4
5	36–40	9.9
6	41–45	7.9
7	46–50	8.3
8	51–55	4.6
9	56–60	6.9
10	61–65	5.5
11	66–74	12.0
12	75+	5.8
13	No answer	0.2

<b>agegroup</b>	Age groups (6 categories)	
1	18–24	15.0
2	25–34	21.6
3	35–44	17.8
4	45–54	13.7
5	55–64	12.7
6	65+	19.1

<b>religiosity</b>	Religious observance (4 categories)	
1	Hiloni	50.9
2	Masurti	30.5
3	Dati	8.9
4	Haredi	10.1

<b>religiosity5</b>	Religious observance (5 categories)	
1	Haredim	10.2
2	Datiyim	8.2
3	Masortiyim Datiyim	8.3
4	Mosortiyim Lo Datiyim	23.2
5	Hilonim	48.3
6	No answer	1.8

### ***New Variables***

<b>vote19.</b>	Vote in Knesset election on April 9, 2015 for weighting.	
1	Likud	20.4
2	Kahol Lavan	19.7
3	Shas	4.5
4	Yahadut Hatora	4.5
5	Labor	3.3
6	Yisrael Betenu	3.0
7	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin	2.9
8	Meretz	2.2
9	Kulanu	2.5
10	Hayamin Hehadash	2.5
11	Zehut Yehudit	2.1
12	Gesher	1.3
13	Other Jewish political parties	0.5
14	Did not vote although they had the right to vote	19.2
15	No answer	11.4

<b>pol_ori</b>	Political party/movement one feels closest to	
1	Radical right and religious political parties	28.6
2	Likud	27.1
3	Center political parties	16.9
4	Labor	3.2
5	Left and Arab political parties	3.2
6	No answer	20.0

<b>blocclose</b>	Feeling closest to a political bloc	
1	Left-center	24.4
2	Right	55.6
3	No answer	20.0

<b>blocwillvote</b>	Intention to vote for a political bloc in the next Knesset election	
1	Left-center	26.0
2	Right	47.4
3	No answer	26.6

<b>blocvoted</b>	The political bloc voted to in Knesset elections in April 2019	
1	Left-center	25.2
2	Right	43.7
3	No answer	31.3

<b>blocprefer</b>	Preference of a political bloc to rule the government	
1	Left-center	27.8
2	Right	58.9
3	No answer	13.3

<b>ethnicity</b>	Ethnic descent (3 categories)	
1	Mizrahi	38.2
2	Mixed	12.1
3	Ashkenazi	45.4
4	No answer	4.2

<b>ethnicity4</b>	Ethnic descent (4 categories)	
1	Mizrahi	36.7
2	Russian	15.5
3	Mixed	11.7
4	Ashkenazi	32.5
5	No answer	3.5

<b>edu</b>	Educational level (4 categories)	
1	Incomplete high school	4.5
2	Complete high school	28.5
3	Post-secondary, not academic	17.8
4	Academic	46.9
5	No answer	2.3

<b>mixedtown</b>	Place of residence in a mixed city or a Jewish locality	
1	In a mixed town	20.7
2	In a Jewish locality (including not known)	79.3

<b>coexist_scale</b>	New coexistence scale beginning at 2019	
0	0	3.1
1	1	5.6
2	2	5.4
3	3	8.1
4	4	14.5
5	5	27.7
6	6	35.5
7	7 Not classified	0.0
	Mean	4.51
	Standard deviation	1.65

<b>coexist_scale_old</b>	Old coexistence scale in the years 2009–2019	
0	0	3.4
1	1	7.4
2	2	7.6
3	3	11.3
4	4	20.1
5	5	27.0
6	6	23.2
7	7 Not classified	0.0
	Mean	4.11
	Standard deviation	1.68

rejection_scale	Rejection scale	
0	0	5.9
1	1	6.8
2	2	8.0
3	3	7.1
4	4	7.2
5	5	11.2
6	6	11.0
7	7	9.3
8	8	7.9
9	9	6.6
10	10	4.9
11	11	5.7
12	12	5.0
13	13	3.4
14	14 Not classified	0.0
	Mean	5.99
	Standard deviation	3.58

wgt	Weighting coefficients	
1	Likud	0.90182
2	Kahol Lavan	0.75270
3	Shas	1.42989
4	Yahadut Hatora	0.86245
5	Labor	0.87151
6	Yisrael Betenu	0.70601
7	Ihud Miflagot Hayamin	0.72361
8	Merez	0.60800
9	Kulanu	1.71747
10	Hayamin Hehadash	0.43425
11	Zehut Yehudit	0.81747
12	Gesher	0.49150
13	Other Jewish parties	1.17394
14	Did not vote although had a right to vote	3.99702
15	No response	1.0000

id	Serial number
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The Arab-Jewish Relations Index in Israel is a project designed to examine the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens toward each other and toward the state. It was inaugurated in 2003 under the auspices of the University of Haifa and is based on annual surveys. The Index is intended to contribute to the study of the relationship between Arabs and Jews, to Arab-Jewish coexistence, and to the quality and resilience of Israeli democracy. The Index surveys constitute a database that is deposited in the database "Data Israel" (<https://dataisrael.idi.org.il/>) of the public opinion polls of Israel Democracy Institute and they are free to use.

The surveys of the 2019 Index were conducted immediately after the Knesset elections in April 2019 at the height of the implementation of the de-democratization project of the most right-wing government that Israel has ever had. Established in 2015, this government has taken steps to weaken democracy, to deepen the gap between population groups, to strengthen Jewish identity at the expense of Israeli identity, and to mark Arab citizens and Arab Knesset Members as enemies and as supporters of terrorism that should be barred from participation in government coalition.

The 2019 Index shows that the right-wing government succeeded in exacerbating the positions of the Jews, but had an unexpected and mixed effect on the positions of the Arabs. On the one hand, and paradoxically, compared to the 2017 index, the legitimacy of Israel's right to exist as a state, as a Jewish and democratic state, and even as a Zionist state, has risen. On the other hand, the Arabs' support for the use of radical means of struggle to improve their status, such as boycott of the Knesset, violence and even an Intifada, has increased. The Index paints a complex picture, according to which the attacks on the Arabs and the collapse of the Arab Spring strengthened their ties to the state and sharpened their perception that they have no better alternative than living as a national minority in Israel, but at the same time also increased their desire to fight vigorously to improve their situation.

Despite some exacerbation and radicalization in the attitudes of Arabs and Jews, they are still playing by the rules. There is almost no physical violence between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Jews and the state compared to the widespread violence of the Palestinians under occupation. The preservation of law and order and the calm of the Arab minority are a response to the democratic rights, to the social security and benefits of the welfare state, to the opportunity to lead a modern way of life, to the protection against Islamic fundamentalism, to the exemption from a duty of service to the state, and to the constant rise in living and educational standards. The Jews also do not break the rules because they understand that the Arabs are here to stay, that they are strikingly different from the Palestinians across the Green Line, and that they are loyal to the state despite the intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the Arab world. There is no confirmation in the Index findings over the years of the common fear that the relations between Arabs and Jews are in process of deterioration, separation and violent conflict.

This publication discusses the findings of the 2019 Index of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel on 16 key issues and presents a comparison with surveys since 2003. It also appears in Hebrew.

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